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 Moral elevation is a positive emotional response to the benevolent behaviour 
of third-parties, and it is known to engender a motivation to behave benevolently 
towards others in a remarkably general sense.  This ‘contagious’ benevolence is of 
obvious social value, but psychological research into moral elevation has been 
underway for less than two decades; consequently, relatively little is known at 
present about the nuances of the emotion’s elicitors and effects.  This thesis 
addresses some of the gaps in our understanding of moral elevation, by investigating 
the possibility that moral elevation may be a naturally selected cognitive adaptation.  
Specifically, this thesis attempts to uncover whether moral elevation’s observable 
characteristics present evidence of special design; that is, evidence that the emotion 
operates in such a way as to suggest that it reliably and efficiently performs a 
particular adaptive function.   
 Two theories about moral elevation’s possible adaptive function are 
described: the relationship-building hypothesis, which suggests that elevation serves 
to aid us in recognizing and capitalizing on opportunities to build high-quality social 
relationships; and the reputation-management hypothesis, which suggests that 
elevation helps us to ensure that we keep abreast of the competition to attract and 
retain social relationship-partners.  Although these two hypotheses are similar, and 
make largely identical predictions about the characteristics moral elevation should be 
expected to exhibit, prima facie reasons for preferring the reputation-management 
hypothesis are explained.   
 Tests of predictions derived from these theories of function are reported, and 
the results of these tests offer some support for the idea that moral elevation could 
be a functionally specialized cognitive adaptation.  Moral elevation appears to be 
elicited by behaviours which indicate that a third-party has attractive social-partner 
qualities – namely, a tendency to behave benevolently, a tendency to value the 
welfare of others, and the potential to generate positive externalities.  Elevation also 
seems to produce behaviours which would increase the social attractiveness of the 
elevated individual – namely, an increased willingness to value the welfare of others, 
and strengthened motivations to engage in a variety of pro-social behaviours.   
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 The results presented here suggest that moral elevation has a reliable pattern 
of activation, potentially indicating that it is a functionally integrated part of our social-
behaviour-regulating cognitive architecture.  Limitations of the thesis are discussed, 
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 This chapter introduces the subject of interest for the thesis – a social emotion 
called moral elevation.  The first section gives a brief summary of evolutionary 
explanations for human prosocial behaviour, and locates the thesis’ topic within a 
broader framework of current academic enquiry.  The second section summarizes 
the extant moral elevation literature and identifies a gap in the literature concerning 
whether the emotion may have been sculpted by natural selection.  A précis of the 
criteria for labeling a trait an adaptation is offered, and a framework for 
understanding emotions as evolved cognitive mechanisms is outlined.   Two theories 
about the possible adaptive function performed by moral elevation are explained; the 
relationship-building hypothesis, and the reputation-management hypothesis.  Prima 
facie reasons for preferring the latter over the former are laid out, and the chapter 
ends with a summary of predictions about elevation’s form, which are to be 


















Cognitive Adaptations for Regulating Benevolent Behaviour 
 Humans are a uniquely benevolent species; we have an unparalleled 
propensity to deliberately increase the welfare of others, even at a cost to ourselves 
(Høgh-Olesen, 2010; Katz, 2000; Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, & West, 2015; Wilson, 
2012).  Whether it be spending time or energy, sharing resources, passing up 
opportunities, or compromising our safety, we routinely incur various costs with the 
intention of benefitting other individuals.   
 This wide-spread benevolence was initially viewed by evolutionary theorists 
as a serious challenge to the idea of natural selection	(Fletcher & Doebeli, 2009).  No 
trait can reach fixation in a population if it diminishes the fitness of the individuals 
who express it, and absent any other qualifiers, benevolent behaviour is definitionally 
fitness retarding.  But over the past 60 years researchers have described a variety of 
circumstances in which the direct costs of ceding welfare to others can be recouped 
by the actor to generate a net fitness gain (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007).   
 The first proposal of a circumstance in which benevolent behaviour could be 
fitness-promoting for the actor came in the form of Hamilton’s (1964) kin selection 
theory.  Hamilton highlighted the idea of inclusive fitness, the central insight of which 
is that other individuals share copies of some of our genes by virtue of common 
decent.  If a gene, or more likely a set of genes, codes for behaviours which promote 
the reproductive interests of other individuals who carry them, they can positively 
influence their relative representation in future generations even if they result in an 
overall relative reproductive disadvantage for the individual they express themselves 
in.  So long as the fitness advantage created for other copies of these benevolent-
behaviour-producing genes is larger than the direct fitness cost they create for the 
individual carrying them, an inclusive fitness gain is generated, and they can 
increase in population frequency across generations.   
 Inclusive fitness may be conceptually necessary for explaining the evolution of 
benevolent  behaviours which generate a life-time direct fitness cost for the actor, but 
as Trivers (1971) pointed out, not all direct fitness costs last a life-time.  Sequential 
acts of benevolence between two individuals can, over time, produce gains in trade 
which will increase the reproductive success of both parties.  So long as the odds of 
reciprocation are high, and the costs incurred by the benefactor in any benevolent 
instance are smaller than the benefits produced for the recipient, directly-reciprocal 
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welfare-ceding behaviour can generate a life-time direct fitness gain for the 
individuals who engages in it (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).   
 Parties of three or more individuals can further increase the scope for 
generating gains in trade, if they engage in indirectly-reciprocal benevolence 
(Alexander, 1987; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2005; Trivers, 1971).  A network of indirect-reciprocity operates so that 
each member of the network will give assistance to any other network member, so 
long as that member has a prior history of helping others herself (Alexander, 1987; 
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004).  Restricting mutual-benevolence to direct, two-party 
exchanges carries with it the risk of failures in reciprocity resulting from unpredictable 
natural events; in any non-simultaneous dyadic exchange, there is a risk that your 
exchange partner may be unable to reciprocate when it would benefit you most (they 
may be sick, have fallen on hard times, or be out of town, etc.).  This risk is 
distributed, and so minimized, in systems of indirect-reciprocity – even if the 
individual you originally helped is unable to help you back, another member of the 
network will likely be able to offer assistance when needed (Wedekind & Braithwaite, 
2002).  Again, so long as each member of the network restricts their benevolence to 
situations in which the costs they incur are outweighed by the benefits they produce 
for others, the overall effect is a net direct fitness gain for each.   
 Direct fitness gains from benevolence need not come just from reciprocity.  
Displays of benevolent behaviour can be used as costly signals of an individual’s 
skills, qualities, and resources,  which promote the individual’s fitness interests by 
increasing the chances that they will be chosen by others for valuable reproductive 
or social relationships (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Noë & Hammerstein, 1995; 
Roberts, 1998).  The resulting reproductive advantages can outweigh the costs of 
benevolent behaviour even in the absence of reciprocity.   
 Strategically ceding contested resources can also act as a fitness promoting 
conflict resolution strategy.  When another individual would be willing to fight for 
ownership of some resource (be it your food, your mate, or your social position), and 
when the value of that resource to you is lower than the cost the other would likely 
be able to inflict in combat, the least fitness-damaging behavioural option available to 
you will be to willingly cede what the other individual demands (Hammerstein & 
Parker, 1982). 
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 So long as benevolent behaviour generates greater benefits for the recipient 
than the costs the actor incurs in performing it, and so long as its expression is 
contingent on the probability that one of the gains outlined above will eventuate, it 
can be a fitness promoting behavioural tendency, capable of spreading through a 
population by natural selection (Delton, 2010).   
 A slew of results in the empirical literature support the prediction that human 
benevolence should be dependent on these factors pertaining.  Across a variety of 
laboratory and naturalistic settings, people have proved markedly more willing to 
benefit others when fitness incentives exist for them to do so (or, more accurately, 
when there would have been fitness incentives for our ancestors in the environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness) (e.g. Barclay, 2010; Barclay & Willer, 2007; Chaudhuri, 
2011; Curry, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2013; Fehr & Gachter, 1999; Fischbacher, Gachter, 
& Fehr, 2001; Gachter, 2007; Herrmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 2008; Price, 2003; 
Raihani & Smith, 2015).  Humans do indeed seem to adaptively regulate their 
engagement in benevolent behaviour so as to selectively exploit those 
circumstances in which it would, ancestrally and on average, have produced some 
kind of fitness gain for the actor.  Despite being prolific, then, our tendency to cede 
welfare to others is far from random or indiscriminate.  Indeed, it has become such a 
well-displayed trait precisely because our species has grown so adept at being 
discerning about how much welfare we cede to whom and when.   
 This careful regulation is not achieved through a process of conscious 
deliberation.  In our intensely social lives, we face a host of situations every day 
where we have to choose between benefitting ourselves or benefitting others.  Do 
we forgo a second cup of coffee so there will be enough milk left for someone else to 
have one?  Do we bring in wood for the fire, or wait for someone else to get cold and 
do it first?  Do we humour the office bore at the Christmas party by listening to his 
thoughts on wind-farms? For how long – five minutes? Ten?  For the most part we 
are unaware of these decisions even being made, but navigating all of these choices 
adaptively (i.e., ceding welfare only when it is likely to be fitness promoting to do so) 
is arguably our evolutionary wheelhouse, the skill that allows us to occupy the 
cooperative niche that we do (Gintis, 2003; Høgh-Olesen, 2010; Krebs, 2011; 
Wilson, 2012).   
 Our ability to adaptively manage when and to what extent we cede welfare to 
(and impose costs on) others rests on a specialized cognitive decision-making 
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architecture.  Natural selection has equipped us with an intricate set of mental 
mechanisms, which function in concert, allowing us to increase and decrease our 
inclination to behave benevolently as situations (and therefore incentive structures) 
change (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Krebs, 2008; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 
1992).  Turning a fitness profit from intense sociality carries with it a complex set of 
information processing problems, and we are only able to successfully circumvent 
these problems because we have evolved a complex set of cognitive devices, each 
one specialized to overcome a specific difficulty.   
 Evolutionary psychologists have recently begun to map the computational 
properties of this decision-making architecture, bringing to light the variety of mental 
mechanisms involved in regulating our willingness to cede welfare to others.  
Mechanisms specialized for gathering, storing, and summarizing specific types of 
information, monitoring the environment for changes in relevant mutable variables, 
and regulating motivation and behaviour; all coordinating to solve different aspects of 
the same overall problem - living in an ecology where our welfare and the welfare of 
others often overlap or conflict  (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Delton, Cosmides, 
Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 2012; Delton & Robertson, 2012; Lieberman, Tooby, & 
Cosmides, 2007; Lim, 2012; Sell et al., 2009; Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2008; Tooby 
& Cosmides, 2008; Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008).  
 The central purpose of this thesis is to explore the possibility that a little-
studied emotion called moral elevation may be another member of this set of 
adaptations.  Although it was only recently described as an object of research, 
uptake in interest in the emotion has been relatively quick, particularly in the field of 
positive psychology, because it seems to increase people’s willingness to engage in 
benevolent behaviour.   
 
Moral Elevation  
 Moral elevation is the warm, uplifting emotional sensation that we sometimes 
experience when we witness or hear stories about others’ benevolent actions (Haidt, 
2003a).  It can be accompanied by a feeling of poignancy (Piper, Saslow, & Saturn, 
2015) and a sensation of warmth in the chest (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), and it invariably 
results in a broad, pleasant feeling, of wanting to behave more benevolently towards 
other people ourselves (Haidt, 2000).   
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 The first academic description of moral elevation was given by Jonathan 
Haidt, who coined the name as a way to highlight a proposed symmetry with socio-
moral disgust (Haidt, 2000).  He suggests that, whereas seeing others behave in 
socially undesirable ways can lead us to judge those others, and humanity more 
generally, as base and aversive, seeing others behave in a socially positive manner 
can lead us to judge those others, and humanity more generally, as pure and 
attractive. Placing moral disgust and moral elevation at opposite ends of a ‘vertical 
continuum’, Haidt suggests that disgust is provoked by displays of humanity’s worse, 
lower nature, and elevation is provoked by displays of humanity’s better, higher 
nature (Haidt, 2003a, 2003b, 2010).    
 Although moral elevation is similar in many respects to gratitude, it has two 
substantive differences.  The first is that, unlike gratitude, elevation is sensitive to 
‘disinterested elicitors’ (Haidt, 2003b)  -  others’ behaviours which do not directly 
affect the self.  Whereas gratitude is provoked when the actions of another benefit 
oneself, moral elevation is experienced in response to “the sight of a stranger 
helping another stranger” (Haidt, 2010, p.86). 
 The second differentiator is the scope of the motivational outputs that the two 
emotions produce.  Although both gratitude and elevation induce a desire to benefit 
the party whose actions evoked the emotion, elevation also creates a desire to 
benefit others more broadly (Haidt, 2003a; Algoe & Haidt, 2009).  While the 
benevolence that gratitude motivates is targeted specifically at the individual to 
whom one is grateful, the motivation to behave benevolently that elevation produces 
appears to be relatively indiscriminate.  Extending his analogy with disgust, Haidt 
describes this ‘prosocial action tendency’ as a kind of ‘positive contamination’ (Haidt, 
2003b).   
 Experiences of moral elevation have been found to increase rates of 
volunteering (Cox, 2010), organizational citizenship behaviour (Vianello, Galliani, & 
Haidt, 2010), helping (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010), mentoring (Thomson, 
Nakamura, Siegel, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014), and charitable donation (Van de Vyver 
& Abrams, 2015).  Proneness to experiences of moral elevation has also been found 
to correlate with self-reported prosocial behaviour, showing incremental predictive 
validity over the five-factor personality model (Landis et al., 2009).  There is even 
evidence that elevation can motivate us to behave benevolently toward people to 
whom we may previously have been hostile (Freeman, Aquino, & McFerran, 2009), 
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and that it can reduce expressions of prejudice, both racial (Freeman et al., 2009) 
and homophobic (Lai, Haidt, & Nosek, 2014).   
 Despite burgeoning interest, research into moral elevation is still in its infancy.  
As yet there have been no attempts to offer an evolutionarily grounded analysis of 
the emotion, and no attempts to formally explore the possibility that elevation may be 
an adaptive feature of our species-typical cognitive architecture.  This thesis intends 
to address that research gap.  A better understanding of what role, if any, this 
emotion plays in our evolved psychological repertoire would not only further our 
understanding of how humans are adapted to fill the intensely social niche that we 
do, it could also facilitate the cultivation of positive social outcomes.  A nuanced 
understanding of how and why we experience ‘prosocial contagion’ is a necessary 
precondition for realizing the potential that this phenomenon holds as a tool for social 
intervention.   
 The remainder of this chapter will lay out how we can go about investigating 
whether moral elevation may be an adaptation.  The next section will review the 
criteria which must be met in order for any trait to be labeled an adaptation.  The 
following section outlines the terms in which we can understand and discuss 
emotions as information processing adaptations.  The final section of this chapter 
reviews two hypotheses about the adaptive function which moral elevation may have 
been selected to perform.   
 
Identifying Adaptations   
 Confidence that a behavioural tendency is the output of a specialized 
cognitive adaptation requires particular standards of proof.  Any given phenotypic 
characteristic (any distinct trait, or ‘thing’ we can point to in an organism) can be 
explained by one of three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive factors 
(Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998):    
 
i)  it might be an adaptation, naturally selected because it had a positive effect on the 
reproductive success of the organism’s ancestors 
 
ii)  it might be a byproduct of an adaptation – a characteristic which arises because it 
is a necessary conjunct of some other naturally selected feature, or 
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iii)  it might be random noise – a characteristic arising from chance mutations in the 
organism’s genotype  
 
 To give an example, having rough, ridged skin on the tips of our fingers is an 
adaptation; it increases our ability to grip and manipulate objects (Adams et al., 
2013).  The tendency for residues to stick more easily to our fingertips than to other 
parts of our skin is a byproduct of this adaptation for grip; it is an unavoidable but 
non-functional consequence of having a grip-enhancing texture on our fingers.  Our 
fingerprints (the precise pattern of the rough ridges on our fingertips) are noise; they 
vary person to person for no reason other than inconsequential differences between 
our genotypes.    
 We can broadly discriminate between adaptations and byproducts on the one 
hand and random noise on the other by looking for evidence of species-typicality.  
The majority of adaptations increase in representation in a population, as they 
outcompete less effective alternative designs, eventually reaching fixation (although 
sex-selected adaptations and adaptations arising as the result of negative frequency-
dependent selection are exceptions (Ayala & Campbell, 1974).  Traits which have 
not been naturally selected (or which are not necessarily linked to those which have 
been) – those we would characterize as random noise – do not reach fixation.  With 
no impact on relative reproductive success, traits arising from genetic noise simply 
drift in population frequency by chance (Masel, 2011).   
 We gain confidence that a psychological trait is part of our reliably developing, 
species-typical cognitive architecture when we find it occurring across a variety of 
different cultures.  Traits needn’t occur in all cultures in order to be thought species-
typical - many adaptations are facultative and will develop only when certain 
environmental contingencies pertain – but finding that a behavioural phenomenon 
occurs in a range of cultures adds significant weight to the supposition that it is a 
species-typical characteristic.   
 The question of moral elevation’s culture-independence has yet to be properly 
addressed in the literature, and the overwhelming majority of empirical studies have 
relied on WEIRD participants (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and 
democratic) (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  Two small interview-based 
studies conducted in India and Japan did find that subjects described experiencing 
emotional reactions with the hallmarks of moral elevation when asked to recall 
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seeing another person perform a good deed for a third party (Haidt, 2003a).  But with 
their very small sample sizes (8 and 15 respectively) these studies give only a very 
preliminary hint at moral elevation’s species-typicality.   
 Although evidence of cross-cultural consistency weighs against a trait being 
the product of random noise, it does not help us to distinguish between adaptations 
and byproducts.  To make the case that moral elevation is an adaptation, we would 
need to find signs of ‘special design’ (Williams, 1966).  The important difference 
between adaptations on the one hand and byproducts and noise on the other is that 
adaptations are functionally organized.  They are an arrangement of parts which 
operate in such a way as to obfuscate an identifiable, reliably recurring, ancestrally 
relevant obstacle to relative reproductive success.  That is to say, adaptations are 
those features of an organism’s phenotype which are so improbably well-suited to 
solving an adaptive problem faced by the organism’s ancestors as to make it unlikely 
that they would have arisen by chance alone (Buss et al., 1998; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990a).  This kind of complex functional organization is known as ‘special design’, 
and its hallmarks are efficiency, complexity, economy, reliability, and precision 
(Williams, 1966).  Calling a trait an adaptation requires us to demonstrate that there 
is a high degree of fit between its form (how it operates) and the function it is 
proposed to have been selected for.   
 
Emotions as Cognitive Mechanisms   
 Cognitive adaptations are information processing devices, and so describing 
their form involves detailing their computational properties – the set of if-then rules 
that govern their operation.  A cognitive mechanism is a structure, instantiated in the 
brain, which is sensitive to specific forms of input (Barkow et al., 1992; Confer et al., 
2010).  When an individual’s environment presents information which meets the 
relevant criteria, the mechanism generates a particular set of outputs (an ‘output’ 
here being any state-change, whether it be in physiology, affect, cognition, motor-
movements, endocrinology, etc.).  A single cognitive mechanism may produce a 
range of conditional outputs which depend on variations in the informational input.  
These input-output relationships are what constitute the form of the cognitive 
mechanism.   
 Describing emotions as the outputs of cognitive mechanisms may seem 
counterintuitive because it stands at odds with the folk distinction between cognition 
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and affect (‘thinking’ versus ‘feeling’).  But from an evolutionary perspective the brain 
is an evolved information processing organ, and any and every mental operation 
must be describable in the computational language of cognitive psychology (Barrett, 
2005; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994).  This approach does not entail reducing emotional 
experiences to anything ‘deliberative’, ‘rational’, or ‘cold’ – rather, it allows us to 
detail the underlying information processing rules which give our emotions their 
consistently patterned structure.   
 From an evolutionary perspective, the function and computational structure of 
emotions is best thought of as a form of overarching mechanism coordination (Al-
Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, & Buss, 2015; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Haselton & 
Ketelaar, 2006; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b).  Our minds house a huge number of 
specialized cognitive devices, each selected to execute a specific adaptive function.  
Coordinating the operations of these many separate adaptations is crucial to 
avoiding two types of problem: conflicting effects, and compound adaptive 
challenges (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000, 2013).   
 The problem of conflicting effects arises from the sheer volume and variety of 
cognitive mechanisms we possess.  Each mechanism functions to circumvent a 
particular adaptive challenge, but we do not face all of our adaptive challenges at 
once and the solutions to different challenges can be mutually inconsistent (e.g., 
sleep and predator avoidance, eating and avoiding contamination, social bonding 
and avoiding social exploitation).  If our minds were structured in such a way that any 
cognitive mechanism could operate unrestricted, regardless of which other 
mechanisms might be operating, serious fitness-retarding consequences would 
quickly ensue, with the outputs of one mechanism cancelling out the effects of the 
next.   
 Equally importantly, adaptive challenges often present themselves in reliably-
patterned clusters, creating compound challenges which necessitate coordination 
between particular sub-groups of cognitive mechanisms.  Our ancestors routinely 
faced richly structured, fitness-relevant situations which could only be effectively 
navigated by the employment of a sustained and coordinated behavioural strategy.  
Situations like being stalked by a predator, meeting an attractive potential mate, 
finding our offspring in distress, having our social status challenged, and so on, 
require us to execute a range of specific tasks, some simultaneous, some 
sequential.  The execution of each task is controlled by a particular specialized 
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cognitive device, and these devices need to work in concert in order to produce a 
behaviourally coherent response to a complex situation.   
 Emotions are cognitive programs which evolved to fill this role of 
superordinate mechanism orchestration (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b).  Each of our 
emotions responds to a specific, evolutionarily recurrent situation type.  The inputs 
which trigger emotions are cues which reliably indicated, ancestrally, that a situation 
of the type they evolved to deal with currently pertains.  When triggered by such 
cues, an emotion will mobilize a specific subset of our cognitive architecture’s other 
programs, prompting them to operate in a particular configuration (up-regulating 
some, down-regulating others, altering the operating parameters of others still, etc.).  
Emotions initiate a pattern of activation across a varied range of different cognitive 
mechanisms, which may include: 
 Those governing perception; attention; inference; learning; memory; goal 
choice; motivational priorities; categorization and conceptual frameworks; 
physiological reactions (such as heart rate, endocrine function, immune 
function, gamete release); reflexes; behavioural decision rules; motor systems; 
communication processes; energy level and effort allocation; affective 
coloration of events and stimuli; and the recalibration of probability estimates, 
situation assessments, values, and regulatory variables (e.g., self-esteem, 
estimations of relative formidability, relative value of alternative goal states, 
efficacy discount rate); and so on.  (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008, p.118).   
The psychological configuration that any particular emotion initiates is the 
configuration which led, on average, to the most fitness promoting outcomes for our 
ancestors when they faced situations of the given type.  For example, when we 
experience fear in a situation where we might be being stalked by a predator:  our 
auditory attention threshold shifts, making us more readily aware of noises which 
might indicate the presence of a threat; the threshold at which we respond to stimuli 
as though they do constitute a threat is lowered; our goal focus changes, shifting the 
value we place on different potential outcomes (being somewhere safe or brightly lit 
suddenly becomes far more attractive and occupying a goal than finding food); and 
so forth. (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).  Similarly, when we face situations of potential 
toxic contamination, disgust initiates a pattern of cognitive activity which helps us to 
coordinate our behaviours in contamination-avoiding ways (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2000; Kelly, 2011).  Gratitude, guilt, and anger allow us to mobilize adaptive 
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behavioural routines in situations where we have a chance to consolidate a 
beneficial social relationship, risk undervaluing an important social partner, or risk 
being under-valued by another (respectively) (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Lim, 2012; 
Sell, 2005).   
 In many respects, this adaptationist approach to describing emotions does not 
stand at odds with or radically depart from other historically important theories of 
emotion.  It is not the first theory to acknowledge that emotions function to help us 
navigate adaptively important and specific situations (e.g.	 Ekman, 1999; Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 2014), and neither is it the first to recognise that emotions produce a 
‘cascade of changes’ (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011, p.306), altering a range of other 
mental functions so as to achieve a particular set of situation-relevant outcomes 
(e.g., Keltner & Cordaro, 2015; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2014).   
 Its emphasis on the function of coordinating these changes, however, means 
that the computational approach avoids arguments over the causal and taxonomic 
primacy of the evaluative, physiological and phenomenological, or expressive and 
behavioural  aspects of emotion experiences, which have predominated in emotion 
theory over the past fifty years.  There are different ways of cutting up the emotion 
literature (Gendron & Feldman Barrett, 2009; Scarantino & de Sousa, 2018), but 
theorists have largely agreed that the same set of central elements characterize 
emotional experiences, while debating which of these elements constitute the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an experience to be properly classified as 
emotional.  Some have placed their theoretical emphasis on the feelings – the 
physiological and phenomenological aspects – of emotional experiences	 (James, 
1884; Schachter & Singer, 1962), others on the evaluative (or appraisal) processes 
surrounding the triggering of an emotion	 (Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
2014), and others still on the motivations and behavioural consequents of emotional 
experiences	(Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Keltner & Cordaro, 2015).   
 The computational approach maintains all of the same central elements as 
these traditional theories, but subverts the need to argue about causal primacy by 
parsing the emotion itself as the superordinate cognitive device which mobilizes 
other parts of our cognitive architecture to operate in a specific configuration.  Each 
of these superordinate devices is equipped with a ‘situation-detecting’ component, so 
that situations which exhibit the requisite cues (likely to be a combination of 
exogenous and endogenous) will initiate the relevant emotion mechanism, in turn 
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prompting any necessary changes in physiology, appraisal, cognition, motivation, 
behaviour, communication, etc.  When any superordinate cognitive device of this 
kind is given to be an emotion, the question over the temporal primacy of the effects 
it produces is removed (they should be interpreted as functionally simultaneous), and 
the taxonomic necessity of any particular emotion characteristic, or effect, becomes 
unimportant, as emotion devices selected to guide us through different types of 
situations should be expected to produce different patterns of cognitive activation 
which will vary in the extent to which they involve physiological, cognitive, 
behavioural, and other categories of output.   
 Allowing for (and indeed anticipating) a collection of superordinate devices 
which between then initiate a broad spectrum of specific activation configurations, 
arguably aligns the computational approach more easily with the folk conceptions 
revealed in every-day language use concerning emotions.  Acknowledging wide 
variations in intensity, complexity, and duration makes sense of the proliferation of 
subtly differing synonyms for emotion states - such as mood, feeling, sentiment, 
passion, affect, appetite, and so on.   
 From this computational perspective, if moral elevation is an evolved 
emotional adaptation, it must manifest as a consistent pattern of cognitive activation 
which serves to pilot our behaviour through an ancestrally recurrent and complex 
adaptive challenge.  Two ideas have been proposed about the challenge which 
moral elevation may have been selected to help us overcome.  The next section 
details these proposals, before turning to the predictions they would make about the 
particular configuration of cognitive activation moral elevation should be expected to 
generate.   
 
Moral Elevation: Theories About Function 
 To date, two ideas have been mooted concerning moral elevation’s possible 
adaptive function.  Neither have been expounded at any proper length, however, and 
there have been no empirical tests of predictions derived from either hypothesis.  
Although their exponents have outlined them only in passing, this section will 
consider the merits of each proposal; they will be referred to here as the relationship-
building hypothesis and the reputation-management hypothesis.   
 Both ideas start from the same premise: people who behave benevolently 
make attractive social partners.  Forming social relationships (friendships, mate-
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ships, teams, alliances, and so on) is integral to our survival and reproductive 
success, and individuals who have a tendency to cede welfare to others generate 
more benefits as relationship partners than individuals who do not.  Consequently, 
when we see others behaving benevolently, we see them demonstrating their high 
value as potential social relationship partners.     
 
The relationship-building hypothesis 
 Under the relationship-building hypothesis, offered by Haidt and Fredrickson 
(Haidt, 2000; Fredrickson, 2004), the presence of a high value potential social 
partner signifies an opportunity.  Coming across a “good candidate for cooperation 
and affiliation” (Haidt, 2000, p.4) presents us with a chance to form a highly fruitful 
social relationship.  The relationship-building hypothesis points out that ancestors 
who failed to recognise and capitalize on opportunities to build such a crucial 
resource would have paid a heavy fitness penalty.  Haidt and Fredrickson suggest 
that moral elevation was selected because it helps us to capitalize on these 
opportunities – they see it as an adaptation which helps us avoid the opportunity cost 
of failing to form high-quality social relationships (Haidt, 2000; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2001).   
 According to the relationship-building hypothesis, then, moral elevation is a 
mental mechanism which kicks in when we see someone else behaving 
benevolently, allows us to recognise the actor as a good-quality potential relationship 
partner, and prompts us to take steps which should help us to take advantage of the 
opportunity this presents.  The emotion’s functional output is to motivate and 
coordinate behaviours which facilitate forming social bonds; "triggering love, 
admiration, and affection for the altruist, and making affiliative behaviour more likely” 
(Haidt, 2000, p.4).  The other benefitting behaviours which elevation tends to 
generate operate as social overtures, inviting and increasing the chances of forming 
relationships with others.    
 Although the selection pressure that Haidt and Fredrickson point to is 
undoubtedly real - social relationships are indeed a vital resource, and it is essential 
that we recognise and capitalize on opportunities to build them – there seems to be a 
disjunct between the function they propose and the behavioural output that moral 
elevation produces.  The most unique and interesting aspect of the behavioural 
phenomena associated with elevation – the apparent indiscriminateness of the 
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benevolent motivation it generates – does not seem to be a plausible way of 
addressing the pressure identified by the relationship-building hypothesis.     
 Despite the importance of social relationships, it is also essential that we 
exercise discretion in choosing whom to build them with.  We have limited time and 
resources, and so we are only ever able to maintain a finite number of affiliations 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1996).  The choices we make about which individuals to form 
affiliations with have important fitness consequences, because people differ in their 
abilities to benefit their social partners.  Variations across a host of dimensions (like 
status, strength, resources, and temperament) mean that relationships with some 
people bring greater fitness benefits than relationships with others (Noë & 
Hammerstein, 1994).  Individuals who failed to discriminate when making social 
overtures would quickly end up at a significant fitness disadvantage to individuals 
who carefully targeted their overtures towards potential partners who would be able 
to return relatively high benefit yields.   
 While individuals whose behaviour elicits moral elevation are themselves 
good candidates for social relationships, and elevated individuals do report 
motivations to seek a relationship with the person whose behaviour elicited the 
emotion, by far the most prominent and profound aspect of the experience seems to 
be a change in how we want to interact with people more generally (Algoe & Haidt, 
2009; Haidt, 2000).  Elevation seems to make people want to behave benevolently 
towards others in a remarkably broad sense.  This lack of discrimination would make 
a poor strategy for building an appropriate stock of high-quality cooperative 
partnerships – at least in the kind of social ecologies that humans inhabit, where the 
importance of being selective about our partners is high (a difficulty with the 
relationship-building account which has also been highlighted by (Pohling & 
Diessner, 2016).   
 Because the relationship-building hypothesis has not been expounded at any 
proper length, it could be that Haidt and Fredrickson intend to suggest that elevation 
functions to increase the chance of building a relationship exclusively with the 
benevolent person whose behaviour elicited the emotion.  The indiscriminateness of 
the benevolence that elevation motivates might be thought to function as a signal to 
the original benevolent actor – a display intended to attract her and increase the 
chance of being able to build a cooperative relationship with her.  But even under 
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this narrower parsing of moral elevation’s putative function, the behaviour the 
emotion motivates still seems inappropriately indiscriminate for the task.    
 Signaling one’s willingness to behave benevolently so as to attract social 
partners is an evolutionarily viable strategy, and one that we do seem to engage in 
successfully (behaviour which will be described in more detail in the next sub-section 
of this chapter) (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Raihani & Smith, 2015; Roberts, 1998; Van 
Vugt, Roberts, & Hardy, 2009).  It is not, however, the behavioural tendency that we 
should expect to be dominant in the output of a cognitive mechanism designed to 
increase our chances of forming a relationship with one particular individual.   
 If moral elevation was an adaptation for helping us to build a relationship with 
a particular good candidate for affiliation, this increase in general prosocial 
motivation should take more of a supporting role alongside stronger motivations to 
interact specifically with the individual we would like to build a relationship with.  
Building a single good quality social relationship would be more efficiently, 
economically, reliably, and precisely achieved with a much more targeted kind of 
benevolence than that generated by experiences of moral elevation.   
 
The reputation-management hypothesis  
 Fessler and Haley’s reputation-management hypothesis (Fessler & Haley, 
2003) points to a different kind of selection pressure created by the presence of high 
value potential social partners.  While it may sometimes represent an opportunity, 
others’ socially attractive behaviour can also present a threat to our relative social 
value.   
 Because people vary in their ability to benefit their social partners, and 
individuals who managed to form relatively high-yield relationships stood at a fitness 
advantage to those who did not, our ancestors faced a strong selective pressure to 
form the best quality social relationships they could (Nesse, 2007).  The competition 
created by this pressure resulted in the formation of a biological marketplace (Noë & 
Hammerstein, 1994), in which each individual bids for access to the most beneficial 
relationships they can afford.  We bid for access by advertising our own value as 
cooperative interactants; demonstrating our positive partner qualities so as to 
increase the chances that others will choose to form relationships with us.  Through 
these demonstrations, we create and maintain social reputations, and on the 
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strength of these reputations we win opportunities to form alliances and bonds with 
others (Barclay, 2013; Noë & Hammerstein, 1995).   
 Benevolent behaviour is an excellent way to showcase partner quality - it 
demonstrates that an individual has both the resources and disposition to benefit 
anyone they form a social relationship with.  Advertising partner quality through 
benevolence is known as competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998), a form of costly 
signaling (Zahavi, 1975), and it is thought to explain otherwise puzzling displays of 
benevolent behaviour across a variety of species (Noë, Van Schaik, & Van Hooff, 
1991).  Because of its advertising power, individuals can make fitness returns on 
benevolent behaviour even when the odds of direct reciprocation are low, when it 
would generate no inclusive fitness benefit, and when there is no threat of coercion.  
So long as it narrows the odds of us forming high-quality social relationships, by 
making us attractive in the eyes of others, welfare ceding behaviour can be fitness 
enhancing (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Fehrler & Przepiorka, 2013; Hardy & Van Vugt, 
2006; Nesse, 2007; Van Vugt et al., 2009).   
 In any market competition, margins are important.  To compete, we need to 
avoid “[lagging] too far behind relative to everyone else” (Alexander, 1987, p105), but 
advertising comes at a cost.  We would lose the fitness advantage that good quality 
relationships bring if we were to pay significantly over the odds in advertising for 
them.  The level of investment we need to make in order to adaptively manage our 
social reputations is a fine and moveable line - we need to display a level of 
benevolence comparable to that demonstrated by others in our social environment 
(Barclay, 2013; Fessler & Haley, 2003).  
 When others raise the bar, by engaging in remarkable public benevolence, we 
face a pressure to increase the investment we make in similar behaviours, so as to 
safeguard our relative reputational standing.  Fessler and Haley suggest that moral 
elevation is a cognitive device selected to respond to this pressure (Fessler & Haley, 
2003). The reputation-management hypothesis proposes that elevation is an 
adaptation which dynamically increases the investment we make in reputation-
management activities,  in response to others’ public welfare-ceding behaviours, so 
as to protect us from the fitness costs of failing to access or maintain adequate 
quality social relationships.   
 Unlike the relationship-building hypothesis, the reputation-management 
hypothesis faces no difficulty explaining the indiscriminateness of moral elevation’s 
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benevolent motivational output.  When it comes to maintaining a reputation for 
benevolence, what matters is not who we are benevolent to, but that other people 
see us behaving benevolently.  The more indiscriminate we are about our 
beneficiaries, the greater the chance that our benevolence will be noticed by others 
and our social reputations will be strengthened1.  If moral elevation is a cognitive 
device selected to help us manage our social reputations, then the indiscriminate 
benevolence it elicits would constitute a functional, broadcast signal widening, 
component of the emotion’s output.    
 
Generating predictions about form 
 Although they point to different selection pressures, these two hypotheses 
make largely identical predictions about the functional qualities moral elevation 
should be expected to demonstrate.  There are no differences in the predictions 
either hypothesis would make about the stimuli which should elicit moral elevation 
(the inputs of the cognitive mechanism).  Another individual’s observable 
demonstration of attractively benevolent qualities constitutes both a potential 
opportunity for a good-quality social relationship and a potential threat to our relative 
reputational standing.   
 There are, however, some differences in the predictions each hypothesis 
would make about the outputs we should expect moral elevation to generate.  The 
most obvious difference has already been discussed – the reputation-management 
hypothesis would predict that moral elevation should generate a relatively 
indiscriminate benevolent motivation because this would increase signal broadcast 
strength, maximizing the efficacy of the behaviour as a reputation-safeguarding 
device.  In addition to this, though, the two hypotheses make different predictions 
about the motivational priorities moral elevation should produce; a relationship-
building adaptation should incline us towards prioritizing opportunities to engage in 
relationship-building activities, whereas a reputation-management device should 
incline us towards prioritizing reputation-managing opportunities (a distinction which 
will be unpacked in Chapter 5).   
																																																								
1	Although this may only hold within limits – it would likely do little to enhance our 
social attractiveness if we behaved benevolently towards individuals who presented 
threats to others, e.g., exploitative or aggressive individuals	
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 Although the majority of the predictions these hypotheses make are not 
helpful in terms of differentiating their validity, they can help us to explore whether 
moral elevation shows a consistent pattern of activation indicative of special design.  
The following chapters investigate whether moral elevation displays traits which 
conform to the expectations of either theory of function, as seen through the lens of a 
computational model of emotions.  Figure 1 illustrates the basic computational form 
moral elevation should be expected to display if it functions as an adaptive 
superordinate mechanism-orchestration device (with labels indicating which 
components of the model will be explored in which empirical sections of the thesis).   
 The investigations which follow are offered as tentative, exploratory steps 
towards investigating the possibility that moral elevation may operate in the manner 
described by this model.  The thesis is organized into two parts, intended to reflect 
the computational structure we should expect from this kind of cognitive adaptation.  
The first part looks at what characteristics the ‘input’ side of moral elevation should 
be expected to demonstrate if it is a functional mental mechanism, and the second 
part considers what characteristics the ‘output’ side should be expected to 
demonstrate.   
 Chapter 2 offers a review of the literature concerning moral elevation’s 
elicitors, and outline predictions about elevation’s inputs  which are grounded in a 
functionalist analysis.  Specifically, the chapter considers what specific features of 
others’ social behaviours should be expected to elicit moral elevation, and whether 
any other exogenous or endogenous variables might moderate the relationship 
between others’ social behaviours and the elicitation of moral elevation.  Chapters 3 
and 4 report the results of studies intended to test these predictions.   
 Chapter 5 offers a review of moral elevation’s behavioural and motivational 
effects, and present functionalist predictions about elevation’s observable outputs.  
The chapter focuses in particular on the possible behavioural and motivational 
outputs of moral elevation, though other sub-components which have shown to or 
may be affected by elevation are illustrated in Figure 1 (marked with dashed lines).   
 Chapter 6 reports the results of studies intended to test these predictions.  
 Chapter 7 discusses the results of all studies reported here, draws 
conclusions, and offers suggestions for future research directions.   
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Figure 1.  Model showing the proposed basic computational structure of moral 
elevation, arranged as inputs and outputs.   
Note: 1 = Component explored in Study 1; 2 = Component explored in Study 2; 3A = 
Component explored in Study 3A; 3B = Component explored in Study 3B; 4 = 
Component explored in Study 4; 5 = Component explored in Study 5; 6 = Component 
































 This chapter begins with a summary of empirical findings offered in the 
literature to date which relate to the eliciting conditions for moral elevation.  Four 
predictions about elevation’s elicitors are then derived from the evolutionary 
hypothesis outlined in the previous chapter.  The first two predictions concern 
characteristics of an elevating actor’s behaviour; specifically, whether the behaviour 
is benefit conferring or simply moral norm-adhering, and whether or not an elevating 
act is costly for the actor to perform.  The second two predictions concern 
characteristics of elevating actors themselves; specifically, whether or not an actor 
has any obvious reasons to value the recipient of their benevolent actions, and 






 The moral elevation literature has so far been preoccupied overwhelmingly 
with the emotion’s motivational output, and there has been comparatively little 
attention paid to describing the types of event which elicit it.  As the chosen name for 
the emotion suggests, moral elevation is most often described as being elicited by 
morally praiseworthy behaviour.  Although the full scope of moral behaviour 
encompasses more than just benevolence (as Haidt himself points out elsewhere;  
Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), the qualifiers and examples used throughout the 
literature make clear the assumption that moral elevation is a reaction to seeing 
people increasing the welfare of others.  ‘Morally good’ is often used interchangeably 
with terms like ‘kind’ (Freeman et al., 2009; Haidt, 2000, 2003b; Landis et al., 2009; 
Schnall & Roper, 2012; Silvers & Haidt, 2008), altruistic (Ellithorpe, Ewoldsen, & 
Oliver, 2014; Haidt, 2000, 2003a; Piper, Saslow, & Saturn, 2015), and helpful (Haidt, 
2003a; Thomson et al., 2014; Thomson & Siegel, 2013).   
 In early research, when participants were asked to recall incidents which had 
elicited the sensations associated with moral elevation they “most commonly cited 
circumstances that … involved seeing someone else giving help or aid to a person 
who was poor or sick, or stranded in a difficult situation” (Haidt, 2000., p.2).  
Vignettes used by researchers to provoke moral elevation in experimental work since 
have described behaviours such as mentoring (Schnall & Roper, 2012; Schnall et al., 
2010; Silvers & Haidt, 2008), helping the homeless (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Aquino, 
McFerran, & Laven, 2011), making charitable donations (Aquino et al., 2011), and 
life-saving heroism (Englander, Haidt, & Morris, 2012).  
 There is agreement in the literature that not all acts of benevolence are likely 
to elicit moral elevation, but there have been few attempts to specify closely what 
features of any particular act would predict its capacity to arouse the emotion.  The 
qualifications offered by many authors are exceptionally vague, for example that an 
action must be ‘morally excellent’, ‘morally exemplary’, or ‘morally beautiful’ in order 
to elicit moral elevation (Haidt, 2000, 2003a; Haidt, 2003b; Monin, 2007; Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009; Landis et al., 2009; Vianello et al., 2010; Cox, 2010; Schnall et al., 
2010; Strohminger, Lewis, & Meyer, 2011; Aquino et al., 2011; Englander et al., 
2012; Schnall & Roper, 2012; Lai et al., 2014; Siegel, Thomson, & Navarro, 2014; 
Thomson et al., 2014).  Other papers suggest benevolence which is unexpected, 
extraordinary, uncommon, or profound (Freeman et al., 2009; Haidt, 2000; Piper et 
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al., 2015).  A summary of terms used to describe elevation’s elicitors is provided in 
Table 1 below.   
 Only one paper has focused its investigations on features which might 
moderate the relationship between benevolent behaviour and moral elevation.  
Thompson and Siegel (2013) found that participants who read a vignette about 
someone helping a person of good character reported stronger feelings of moral 
elevation, and subsequently made higher donations to a charity (taken to be a 
behavioural measure of elevation), than did participants who read about someone 
helping a person of bad character. They also found that participants who were asked 
to imagine someone doing a good deed at great expense made higher donations to 
charity (although they didn’t report stronger feelings of elevation) than did 
participants who were asked to imagine someone doing a good deed at little 
expense.  Beyond these findings, there is as yet no information available about 
which benevolent scenarios are most likely to elicit moral elevation or which would 
elicit it more strongly than others.   
 None of the descriptions of moral elevation’s elicitors offered in the literature, 
and neither of Thompson and Siegel’s predictions, are grounded in the logic of a 
functionalist analysis.  The sections that follow will discuss what characteristics we 
should expect to see in the situation detecting component (the ‘input side’) of moral 
elevation if the emotion has been shaped by natural selection to pick up on others’ 
displays of high social partner value.  The purpose of this chapter is to make 
predictions about what cues moral elevation should be sensitive to by considering 
what reliable, observable features of a situation tell us that someone else is likely to 
be a high-quality social affiliate.  Testing these predictions will help us to evaluate the 
likelihood that moral elevation is an adaptation; positive results would indicate a 
higher probability that the emotion is a functional feature of our species-typical 
cognitive architecture.   













Landis et al., 2009; Cox, 2010; Thomson & 
Siegel, 2013; Thomson et al., 2014; Siegel et al., 
2014 
Morally beautiful Haidt, 2000; Haidt, 2003a; Haidt, 2003b; Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009; Landis et al., 2009; Vianello et al., 
2010; Cox, 2010; Strohminger et al., 2011; 
Englander et al., 2012; Thomson & Siegel, 2013; 
Lai et al., 2014; Siegel et al., 2014; Piper et al., 
2015 
Morally admirable Haidt, 2000 
Morally exemplary Monin, 2007; Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Freeman et 
al., 2009; Cox, 2010; Aquino et al., 2011 
Morally uplifting Algoe & Haidt, 2009 
Morally excellent Freeman et al., 2009; Landis et al., 2009; 
Vianello et al., 2010; Schnall et al., 2010;  
Schnall & Roper, 2012; Thomson et al., 2014 
Morally good Freeman et al., 2009; Landis et al., 2009; Cox, 
2010; Aquino et al., 2011 
Morally virtuous Freeman et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2011; 
Englander et al., 2012; Ellithorpe et al., 2014; 
Thomson et al., 2014; Siegel et al., 2014; Van de 
Vyver & Abrams, 2015 
Virtuous Haidt, 2000; Silvers & Haidt, 2008; Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009; Freeman et al., 2009; Landis et al., 
2009; Vianello et al., 2010; Cox, 2010; Thomson 
& Siegel, 2013; Erickson & Abelson, 2012; 
Thomson et al., 2014; Piper et al., 2015; Van de 
Vyver & Abrams, 2015 
Exhibitions of humanity’s better nature Haidt, 2000; Aquino et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 
2009; Monin, 2007 
Saintly Haidt, 2000; Haidt, 2003b 
Good Haidt, 2000; Silvers & Haidt, 2008; Algoe & 
Haidt, 2009; Schnall et al., 2010 
Superhuman Haidt, 2003a 
Exhibitions of strength of character Landis et al., 2009 
Blurring human/God divide Haidt, 2003a 
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 Four predictions will be put forward in this chapter.  Predictions 1 and 2 
concern characteristics of morally elevating acts themselves, and predictions 3 and 4 
concern characteristics of the people involved in morally elevating acts.   
 
Morality vs. Benevolence 
 As outlined in the literature review above, there seems to be an implicit 
assumption amongst authors that ‘moral elevation’ may be something of a 
misnomer.  Although there is a vast overlap between benevolence and morality 
(more often than not, behaviours which are benevolent are also considered morally 
praiseworthy), the two categories are fully dissociable (Kurzban, DeScioli, & Fein, 
2012).  Some behaviours which involve increasing the welfare of another (e.g. 
helping a wanted murderer to evade capture) would almost certainly be considered 
immoral, and some behaviours which are generally considered moral (e.g. observing 
religious food taboos) are, at the least, not obviously benevolent.  Thompson and 
Siegel (2013) describe results which suggest that benevolent but morally 
questionable behaviour is less likely to elicit moral elevation than benevolent and 
morally laudable behaviour, but it remains an intuitive assumption that moral 
behaviour which does not involve conferring benefits on others is also less likely to 
elicit moral elevation (see, for example, Landis et al., 2009).  Because it has not 
been explicitly explored, it remains an open question whether moral behaviour is 
sufficient to elicit moral elevation, or whether benevolence is also necessary.   
 From the functionalist perspective of either the relationship-building 
hypothesis or the reputation-management hypothesis, it makes sense to expect that 
moral elevation would be more sensitive to benevolent behaviour than to moral 
behaviour per se, because benevolent behaviour is a better indicator of partner 
quality than simply moral behaviour.  Non-benevolent moral behaviours may be 
indicative of traits which would bring distal benefits to an individual’s relationship 
partners, e.g., individuals who adhere to purity norms might enjoy the health benefits 
of good hygiene, decreasing the odds that any social relationship with them would be 
cut short by illness.  But advantages of this ilk  pale in comparison to the direct 
benefits that come from an individual who undertakes to deliberately increase others’ 
welfare.  If moral elevation is an adaptation selected to react when others display 
attractive partner qualities, then we should expect it to be much more readily 
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responsive to others’ benefit-conferring behaviours than to their norm-adhering 
behaviours.   
 
Prediction 1:  Moral elevation is more likely to be elicited by others’ benevolent 
behaviour than by behaviours which are morally praiseworthy but non-benevolent 
 
 This prediction is yet to be explored.  There is a uniform tendency in the 
elevation literature to simply equate morality with benevolence - a conflation well 
evidenced in the prompts which are often used when asking participants to recall 
elevating incidents from their past, e.g., “think of a time when you saw someone do 
something wonderful, a very good deed, to someone else,  but not to you” (Haidt, 
2003a, emphasis added.  See also Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Aquino et al., 2011; Cox, 
2010; Siegel et al., 2014; Thomson & Siegel, 2013).  As a consequence, there has 
been no deliberate demonstration of the prediction being met.   
 The results of one study by Algoe and Haidt (2009) offer a little support for the 
idea that elevation is more likely to be elicited by benevolent behaviour than by non-
benevolent but otherwise moral behaviour.  Participants who were asked to recall 
witnessing a benevolent act reported having affective and motivational responses to 
the act which fit the description of moral elevation, whereas participants who were 
asked to recall witnessing someone overcoming adversity (a feat which 
demonstrates a number of non-benevolent moral virtues) reported having affective 
and motivational responses which fit the description of admiration/inspiration.  
Because Algoe and Haidt had implicitly defined moral behaviour as benevolent and 
non-benevolent behaviour as non-moral, they classified elevation as a reaction to 
moral excellence.   
 
Benefit Delivery: Ability vs. Willingness 
 The size of the benefit one person delivers to another is determined by two 
factors – the actor’s ability to deliver benefits (the scale of the resources she has 
available), and her willingness to do so (her generosity).  For Jenny to benefit Juan, 
she must both have resources to offer, and be motivated to offer them.  Recent 
research has demonstrated that, when it comes to gauging others’ value as social 
partners, we pay much greater attention to their generosity than to their ability to 
confer benefits.  Access to resources varied widely ancestrally, as a result of 
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unpredictable factors such as poor luck, injury, and illness.  An individual’s 
willingness to deliver benefits to others, on the other hand, tends to remain relatively 
stable over time.  Consequently, an individual’s generosity, and not the resources 
she had available, made the best predictor of the likely long-term benefits she would 
offer as a social partner (Delton & Robertson, 2012).  Pressure to pick the best 
available social partners led to selection for cognitive mechanisms which allow us to 
accurately gauge others’ generosity, and use this gauged value in estimating how 
profitable specific relationships would likely be, relative to others.    
 Generosity is a factor of how much an individual values another person’s 
welfare relative to her own.  The more she values the welfare of the other, the more 
motivated she will be to trade-off her own welfare in order to increase theirs.  We can 
describe this relative valuation as a ratio – one individual’s welfare trade-off ratio 
(WTR) towards another (Delton, 2010).  If Jenny values Juan’s welfare half as much 
as her own, then her WTRJuan would be 1:2, or 0.5; if she values Juan’s welfare just 
as much as her own, her WTRJuan would be 1; if she did not value Juan’s welfare at 
all, then WTRJuan would be 0; and so on.  Our minds compute and store a WTR for 
each specific other in our social environment.  When we face a choice between 
behavioural alternatives with opposing fitness consequences for ourselves and an 
other, the WTR we hold for that other stands as one of three parameters in the 
decision rule which guides our behaviour.  The other two parameters are the costs 
(C) and benefits (B) which would result from a particular choice, and the decision 
rule runs as follows (Delton, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008; Tooby et al., 2008):  
 
i)  For actions which would benefit the other at a cost to the self, take the action if 
and only if  CSelf  <  BOther  x  WTROther 
 
ii)  For actions which would benefit the self at a cost to the other, take the action if 
and only if   BSelf  >  COther  X  WTROther 
 
 When we have an opportunity to benefit another individual, we take the 
opportunity so long as the cost we would incur is lower than the benefit the individual 
would derive, discounted by our valuation of their welfare.  This decision rule sits at 
the root of our ability to adaptively regulate our welfare-ceding behaviour.   
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 In order to differentiate, then, between an individual’s ability to benefit another 
and her willingness to do so, we need to pay attention to the cost : benefit structure 
of her behaviours.  Looking at benefit size in isolation does not allow us to 
distinguish between the well-resourced-but-mean and the poorly-resourced-but-
generous.  For example, if we only knew that Jess had increased Juan’s welfare by 
50 ‘fitness points’, and Jenny had increased Juan’s welfare by 10 ‘points’, Jess may 
seem like the more generous of the two.  If we know the proportionate costs they 
each incurred in increasing Juan’s welfare, however, we can infer (a lower bound for) 
the WTR they each hold towards Juan.  If Jess’s gift to Juan cost her 10 ‘points’, 
while Jenny’s cost her 5, then we could deduce that Jess has a minimum WTRJuan of 
0.2 (10/50) whereas Jenny has a minimum WTRJuan of 0.5 (5/10).  Although Jess 
delivered a larger benefit to Juan (and incurred a greater absolute cost), Jenny 
incurred a higher proportionate cost than Jess, demonstrating a higher valuation of 
Juan’s welfare – Jenny is more generous than Jess, and is likely to have a greater 
positive impact on Juan’s welfare over time.   
  Because of this predictive utility, we use information about the cost : benefit 
structure of others’ actions when we make judgments about which social partners to 
pick and invest in relationship with.  Rather than simply preferring people who deliver 
the largest benefits to others, we pay close attention to the proportionate costs 
incurred in others’ benevolent behaviours.  Social partners who incur higher 
proportionate costs to deliver benefits to others are viewed as preferable to partners 
who incur lower proportionate costs, even if the size of the benefits they deliver is 
larger (Bliege Bird & Power, 2015; Delton et al., 2012; Delton & Robertson, 2012; 
Lim, 2012; Sell, 2005).   
 If moral elevation is a cognitive mechanism which has been naturally selected 
to respond to indications of high partner value in others, then we should expect it to 
be sensitive to information which we are already known to track and use in 
estimating partner value.  The situation detecting component of moral elevation 
should be functionally integrated with our ‘welfare trade-off ratio estimator’.  If this 
were the case, then moral elevation would be more readily or more strongly 
activated by benevolent behaviours which require the actor to incur relatively high 
proportionate costs.   
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Prediction 2:  A benevolent act will elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation if the 
actor has to pay a higher proportionate cost to perform the act  
 
 Thompson and Siegel (2013) found that participants who were asked to 
imagine benevolent acts which were very costly to perform reported stronger feelings 
of elevation than did participants who were asked to imagine less costly benevolent 
acts.  However, because the authors did not control for the size of the benefits 
produced by these benevolent acts, it is not possible to draw conclusions from their 
results about whether the proportionate cost incurred by the actor has an effect on 
the potential of an act to elicit moral elevation.    
 
Incentives to Trade-off Welfare 
  There are a number of incentives for individuals to trade-off their welfare for 
specific others, including inclusive fitness incentives, the promise of direct or indirect 
reciprocity, and avoiding costly conflicts over resources.  Variables like kinship, 
likelihood of reciprocity, and relative formidability all affect how willing we are to cede 
welfare to others (Barclay, 2004; Curry et al., 2013; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Jensen 
& Petersen, 2011; Sell et al., 2008; Smith, Kish, & Crawford, 1987).  Our minds use 
a myriad of cues to gauge the magnitude of each variable (Barclay, 2013; Delton & 
Robertson, 2012; Lieberman et al., 2007; Sell et al., 2009), and these magnitudes 
are combined in forming our welfare trade-off ratio toward any given other (Delton, 
2010; Lim, 2012).   
 The presence and strength of these incentives to benefit others will be 
randomly distributed across the social interactions that we get to observe (only a 
fraction of those that go on between those around us).  As a result, they can produce 
confounds when we try to infer how much an individual would benefit us as a social 
partner by observing how much she benefits others.  Just because Jenny benefits 
Juan greatly, we can not safely assume that she would benefit us equally well if Juan 
happens to be her son, her husband, or her boss.  In order to accurately appraise 
others’ value as potential social partners, our minds control for the presence of 
strong incentives in the specific episodes of benevolence we get to observe.  We 
judge others as comparatively less socially attractive (‘altruistic’, ‘kind’, ‘nice’, and 
‘generous’) when they benefit from their own benevolent acts (Lin-Healy & Small, 
2013).  It should be assumed, then, that benefit conferring behaviour will have less 
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power to elicit moral elevation when there are clear incentives for the actor to 
engage in it.   
 
Prediction 3:  A benevolent act will elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation if there 
are no obvious incentives for the actor to value the welfare of the recipient   
 
Indirect Benefit Delivery 
 Finally, a tendency to behave benevolently is not the only indicator that an 
individual may be a high-value social relationship partner.  Variables like strength, 
skill, health, status, intelligence, and attractiveness can affect how able another 
individual would be to access and retain resources, and thereby would affect their 
likely long-term ability to deliver benefits.  Individuals who are well-endowed on any 
of these other dimensions may also generate positive externalities (indirect benefits 
produced by proximity with the individual) which would benefit their social 
relationship partners (Barclay, 2013).  For example, associating with males who are 
strong enough to deter ambushers would reduce one’s own chance of being 
ambushed.   
 Although, as argued above, non-benevolent attractive partner qualities are 
expected to be insufficient to elicit moral elevation (benefit conferral should be a 
necessary condition), other attractive traits may still be expected to have a 
compounding effect on the ability of benevolent acts to elicit elevation.  A benevolent 
actor who already commands a high partner-value, by virtue of one of these other 
traits, would present a more attractive potential relationship prospect to onlookers, 
and therefore also a greater threat to the relative market value of others, than a 
benevolent actor of otherwise relatively low partner-value.   
 
Prediction 4:  A benevolent act will elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation when 
the actor has other traits indicative of high partner-value 
 
 For ease of presentation, tests of these four predictions will be presented 
across two chapters.  Chapter 3 will report the results of studies intended to test 
predictions 1 and 2; predictions about which characteristics of others’ behaviour are 
likely to elicit moral elevation.  Chapter 4 will report the results of studies intended to 
test predictions 3 and 4; predictions about recipient and actor characteristics which 
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may moderate the ability of others’ behaviour to elicit moral elevation (the studies 
presented in Chapter 4 will also offer additional tests of predictions 1 and 2).  There 
will be a general discussion of empirical results relating to all four predictions about 









 This chapter reports the results of two studies.  Study 1 aimed to test the 
prediction that benefit conferral is a necessary condition for another’s behaviour to 
elicit moral elevation, and Study 2 aimed to test the prediction that the power of a 
benevolent act to elicit moral elevation will increase in line with the proportionate cost 
incurred by the benevolent actor.  The results of Study 1 failed to provide support for 
the prediction – implications and potential study design limitations are discussed.  











Study 1:  Is Benefit Conferral Necessary to Elicit Moral Elevation? 
 
Study 1 aimed to test prediction 1: 
 
Prediction 1: Moral elevation is more likely to be elicited by others’ benevolent 
behaviour than by behaviours which are morally praiseworthy but non-benevolent 
 
Design 
 Study 1 employed a between-subjects experimental design.  Participants 
were randomly divided into two conditions: participants in condition 1 were asked to 
read a vignette describing a benefit conferring act of self-sacrifice, and those in 
condition 2 were asked to read a vignette describing a non-benefit conferring but 
morally laudable act of self-sacrifice.  Participants then completed a moral elevation 
measure; it was anticipated, in line with prediction 1, that participants in condition 1 
would report stronger feelings of moral elevation than participants in condition 2. 
 In order to explore the cross-cultural consistency of moral elevation, study 1 
recruited participants from two geographical regions: India, and the USA.  With the 
exception of one small-sample and informally reported study (Haidt, 2003a), no prior 
research on moral elevation has included participants from non-Western cultures, 
and so it remains an open question whether experiences of moral elevation vary 
across social and ecological circumstances.   
 It should be noted that participants in study 1 were also asked, in the final 
stage of the study, to complete a 9-item questionnaire measure intended to test 
prediction 6 of this thesis.  This was done in order to maximize data-collection 
efficiency, but for ease of exposition the results from that questionnaire measure will 
be reported and discussed in Chapter 6, after prediction 6 has been put forward (the 





 208 participants (112 from the USA and 96 from India) were recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk between 24-25/02/2019, and were paid $1 for their time.  
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Ethical approval for the study was granted by Brunel University London’s College of 
Health and Life Sciences Research Ethics Committee on 12/12/2018.   
 Participants’ age range was 18-68 (M = 34.70, SD = 10.02), and 44.8% were 
female.  64.2% of participants reported having some kind of religious affiliation, with 
the remaining 35.8% explicitly identifying as non-religious.  
 Participants were screened using the 3 attention checks planted at different 
points in the survey.  Directly after reading the short story, participants were asked 
two basic comprehension questions about the text itself, and the very end of the 
survey, participants were presented with a free-text comment box, and asked to 
answer honestly whether they had been paying attention during the study.   
Participants who got either of the first two questions wrong, or who answered 
anything other than affirmatively to the last question, were excluded from all 
analyses.  The remaining N was 134 (37 from India and 97 from the USA).   
 
Measures 
 Both vignettes used (the morally elevating version and the control) are given 
in full in Appendix A.  Both vignettes describe a light-aircraft, carrying two men, 
Oshin and Mika, which crashes in a remote location.  In the Benevolent version of 
the story (morally elevating condition), both men survive, but Mika is badly injured.  
There are limited rations, and Oshin opts to starve in order to feed the rations to 
Mika.  In the Moral version (control condition), only Oshin survives the crash – Mika 
is killed outright.  There are no rations whatsoever, but Oshin opts to starve rather 
than resort to cannibalism.  The text of each story was kept as near to identical as 
possible.  Both stories describe Oshin’s struggle with hunger, and the sacrifice he 
makes in order to keep Mika alive / avoid cannibalism.  Cannibalism was chosen for 
the non-benevolent moral condition because it is a widely-held moral taboo which 
does not centre on delivering a benefit to another individual.   
 Moral elevation was measured using a modified version of a scale developed 
by Vianello and colleagues (Vianello et al., 2010). Vianello et al.’s 8-item 
questionnaire taps the affective, physical, and motivational aspects of the experience 
of moral elevation.  In full the items run: ‘I feel more open towards others’; ‘I feel like 
I’m a better person’; ‘I feel warmth in my chest’; ‘I feel a lump in my throat’; ‘my 
muscles are relaxed’; ‘I would like to do something good for other people’; and ‘I 
would like to behave as [story protagonist] behaved’.  The scale was developed by 
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Vianello and colleagues using the results of an exploratory factor analysis performed 
by Algoe and Haidt (2009), and its three factor structure was supported by Vianello 
et al.’s own confirmatory factor analysis.  Vianello et al. reported high scale reliability; 
α = 0.82.  This measure was adapted here to an ipsative, or forced choice, format.  
Each of the 8 items was paired with two other answer choices; a positively-valenced 
sensation not associated with moral elevation, and a ‘neither’ option.  For example: 
 
Item 1)  As I read the story I felt: 
 a)  More open towards others (Elevation option) 
 b) Like a strong and capable person 
 c) Neither of the above 
 
The full ipsative measure is included in Appendix A.  
 The order of presentation for the elevation and control response options in 
each item was counterbalanced across the 8 questions.  The task instructions given 
with the measure ran as follows:  
 
“Please read each of the following pairs of statements.  For each pair, please pick 
the option which best describes how you felt whilst you read the story.  If you felt 
both of the options listed, please pick the option which you felt most strongly.  If you 
felt neither of the sensations listed, please pick the third option, ‘neither’.” 
 
 A forced-choice format was used for the moral elevation probe to introduce 
methodological variety (the original 8-item Likert-type scale is used in studies 4 and 
5 of this thesis).  The advantage of having two ‘positive’ sounding response options 
for each item is that it minimizes any possible social-desirability bias in participants’ 
answers.  Participants who may otherwise over-report their experiences of moral 
elevation in order to avoid using the negative or lower end of a numeric scale are 
given the opportunity to choose a different positive response or a null response 
instead.   
 Participants were also asked to provide basic demographic information; age, 
sex, and religious affiliation.  
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Procedure 
  Participants were directed via hyperlink to a survey hosted on Qualtrics, 
described as a psychological study looking at emotional reactions to a short story, 
and were split randomly by Qualtrics into either condition 1 (experimental) or 
condition 2 (control).   
 Participants’ moral elevation scores were calculated by giving a score of 1 to 
each response option from the 8-item elevation scale, and a score of 0 to each 
control response option and to each ‘neither’ response option.  This gave a minimum 
score of 0 and a maximum score of 8, with higher scores representing stronger 
feelings of moral elevation.  Data analysis was conducted using IBM’s SPSS 
statistics package.   
 
Results 
 Table 2 shows the mean moral elevation scores for male and female 
participants, religious and non-religious participants, and participants from each 
country and in each condition.   
 
Table 2 
Moral Elevation by Country, Condition, Sex, and Religious Affiliation 
              Group n M(SD) 
Country   
India 37 4.05 (1.53) 
USA 97 3.13 (2.05) 
Condition   
Benevolent  65 3.25 (2.03) 
Moral  69 3.26 (1.89) 
Sex   
Male 74 2.93 (1.97) 
Female 60 3.95 (1.81) 
Religious   
Yes 86 3.74 (1.78) 





 Incomplete data (i.e. an insufficient number of participants at each possible 
moral elevation score) prevented the use of an ordinal regression model.  Although 
moral elevation was significantly non-normally distributed (D(208) = .15, p < .001), a 
linear regression model was explored.  A backwards step-wise multiple linear 
regression analysis was conducted, using condition, country, sex, and religiosity as 
predictors, and moral elevation as the dependent variable.  The resulting coefficients 
are summarized in Table 3.   
 
Table 3 
Regression Coefficients: Condition, Country, Sex, and Religiosity as Predictors of  
Moral Elevation 
Predictors B SE B β  
Step 1    
   Constant 3.30 .60  
   Country: India vs. USA -.24 .44 -.05 
   Religious: No vs. Yes .77 .39 .19* 
   Sex: Male vs. Female -.72 .42 -.19* 
   Condition: Control vs. Elevated .27 .34 .07 
Step 2    
   Constant 3.05 .39  
   Religious: No vs. Yes .86 .35 .22* 
   Sex: Male vs. Female -.72 .33 -.18* 
   Condition: Control vs. Elevated .28 .35 .07 
Step 3    
   Constant 3.20 .35  
   Religious: No vs. Yes .86 .35 .22* 
   Sex: Male vs. Female -.72 .34 -.18* 
Note: R2 for Step 1 = .10 (p = .02), ΔR2 for Step 2 = <.01 (p = .60), ΔR2 for Step 3 = 
0.1 (p = .40). * p < .05.   
 
 Sex and religiosity were the only variable to emerge as significant predictors 
of moral elevation, accounting for 9% of the variance in moral elevation combined 
(F(2,122) = 5.97, p = .003).  As illustrated in Table 2, the mean elevation scores of 
female participants were higher than those of male participants - a difference which 
was statistically significant; U = 3981.5, p = .003.  The moral elevation scores of 
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religious participants were also significantly higher than those of non-religious 
participants; U = 5138.5, p = .02. 
 Neither condition nor country predicted moral elevation.  The failure of 
condition to affect moral elevation was confirmed by a Mann-Whitney U test; U = 
5715, p = .47, upper CI = -.95, lower CI = .42. Mean moral elevation scores for 









Figure 2. Mean moral elevation scores for participants in each story condition.  Error 








 Study 1 found no support for prediction 1; the story condition into which 
participants were placed failed to predict moral elevation scores, and there was no 
significant difference in reported moral elevation between participants who read the 
benevolent story and participants who read the morally praiseworthy but non-
benevolent story.  The relatively wide confidence interval of the t-test suggest that 
the study may have lacked the power to find the predicted effect.  In addition, no 
manipulation check was included to make sure that participants reading the control 
story did not view the protagonist’s behaviour as benefit conferring, and so it may 
have been that, even though Mika was dead, participants viewed Oshin’s behaviour 
as beneficial to Mika.  The fact that participants with a religious affiliation reported 
significantly stronger feelings of moral elevation than non-religious participants 
leaves open the possibility that some idea of an after-life or belief in the supernatural 
may have prompted some participants to view Mika as a beneficiary, despite him 
being un-benefit-able in a practical sense.  This methodological error (the failure to 
include a manipulation check) precludes drawing any firm conclusions from study 1 
about the sensitivity of moral elevation to benevolent vs. non-benevolent but morally 
praiseworthy behaviours.   
 Although there was no support for prediction 1, some of the secondary 
variables measured in study 1 did generate results of interest.  There was a some 
evidence that moral elevation is not an emotional phenomenon isolated to Western 
cultures; participants from India (a hitherto un-represented cultural group in elevation 
research) reported just as many sensations characteristic of moral elevation than did 
participants from the USA (the staple cultural sampling pool).  Additionally, female 
participants and religiously inclined participants reported significantly stronger 
feelings of moral elevation than male participants and non-religious participants.  
These results fit with trends reported (though never noted as features of interest) in 
the wider moral elevation literature (e.g. (Aquino et al., 2011);	(Algoe & Haidt, 2009);	
and (Landis et al., 2009).  Because tests of sex-differences are not routinely reported 
in the extant moral elevation literature, and tests of religiosity-differences even less 
so, the robustness and magnitude of these trends are as yet difficult to gauge – the 
remaining studies in this thesis will provide opportunities to gather more information 
about these relationships.   
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Study 2: Is Moral Elevation Sensitive To Proportionate Cost Incurred By The 
Actor? 
 
Study 2 aimed to test prediction 2: 
 
Prediction 2:  A benevolent act will elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation if the 
actor has to pay a higher proportionate cost to perform the act 
 
Design 
 Study 2 employed a between-subjects experimental design.  Participants 
were asked to rate how morally elevated they felt in response to a short story about 
a benevolent act which had required the benefactor to incur either a low, moderate, 
or high cost.  In line with prediction 2, it was expected that participants who read 
about the high cost benevolence would report stronger feelings of moral elevation 





 130 participants were recruited between 03-05/05/2013 using the online 
crowdsourcing platform Crowd Flower, and were paid $0.25 for their time.  Ethical 
approval was granted for the study on 15/03/2013.   
 The age range of participants was 18-81 (M = 33.36, SD = 12.16), and 48.5% 
were female.  61.5% of participants indicated that they held a religious affiliation.  
79.1% of participants were from the USA, 20% from India, and 0.8% each were from 
the UK, New Zealand, and Uruguay.   
 
Measures 
 All participants read the same vignette describing an altruistic act – the 
vignette only described the protagonist’s behaviour and the benefit it produced, but 
the cost that the protagonist incurred was not mentioned.  In full, the passage ran: 
 
Alex is running late, so he takes a shortcut through the park.  He’s walking briskly 
and is fairly sure he can make it on time when he comes across an elderly lady 
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wandering across the grass. She’s clearly confused and a bit agitated.  Alex pauses 
to ask her what’s wrong, and it quickly becomes apparent that the lady is suffering 
from early stage dementia and doesn’t know how to find her way back to her home.  
Alex spots a policeman nearby and gently takes the lady over to him. He explains 
the situation, and the policeman assures Alex that he’ll take care of the lady and see 
that she gets home OK.  As Alex turns to leave, the elderly lady takes his arm and 
pleads with him to stay; she’s obviously distressed and seems to find Alex’s 
presence comforting.  Alex glances at his watch; if he stays, he’ll miss it for sure.  He 
thinks about the lady’s distress and comes to a decision - ‘Of course I’m staying, 
don’t worry’ Alex says to her.  He and the policeman manage to work out where the 
lady lives, and return her to her carers unharmed. 
 
Participants rated their experience of moral elevation in response to this passage on 
a 7 point Likert scale anchored at ‘Not at all elevated’ (1), ‘Somewhat elevated’ (4), 
and ‘Very elevated’ (7).  Because moral elevation is unlikely to be known by that 
moniker, participants had already been asked to read a short description of moral 
elevation and its effects – the descriptive passage ran: 
 
This is a study about an emotion known as ‘moral elevation’.  Moral elevation is what 
people often feel in response to seeing others act as moral exemplars.  An important 
part of what causes moral elevation is that the good deed you witnessed is done to 
someone other than yourself – that’s what sets it apart from gratitude.  Think about 
how you feel when you see someone do something really good, kind, selfless, or 
virtuous for another person (not yourself).  People commonly use phrases like 
‘touched’, ‘moved’, ‘inspired’, or ‘morally uplifting’ to describe the feeling of moral 
elevation, and report a warm sensation in the chest and a desire to do good deeds 
themselves as a result of the emotion.  Morally elevating actions show us the better 
side of human nature, and make us want to try to be better people ourselves.  In 
what follows, we will use the word ‘elevated’ to refer to this emotion.   
 
 After the initial vignette and moral elevation probe, participants read a short 
passage describing the cost that the protagonist had incurred in order to deliver the 
benefit.  Each participant saw either the high cost, moderate cost, or low cost version 
of the passage:  
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High cost condition: Because he stayed with the elderly lady, Alex missed his flight 
to Paris.  He had saved for months to visit the place where his parents met.  Alex 
suffers from a terminal illness and has been given a prognosis of 6 months; even if 
he could raise the funds, he would not be able to reschedule his trip before he 
becomes too ill to travel.  
 
Moderate cost condition: Because he stayed with the elderly lady, Alex missed his 
interview for a promotion at work.  He would now have to hope that his managers 
understood and would reschedule, or else wait for another opportunity for promotion 
to come up.  
 
Low cost condition: Because he stayed with the elderly lady, Alex missed getting 
his car to the garage to be waxed that day.  He would have to ring the garage and 
re-arrange the appointment for tomorrow.  
 
Finally, participants were asked to rate, again on a 7 point Likert scale, whether there 
was any change in the moral elevation they felt after learning about the cost that the 
protagonist incurred; the scale was anchored at ‘Much less’ (1), ‘The same’ (4), and 
‘Much more’ (7).   
 
Procedure 
 Participants were directed via hyperlink to a questionnaire hosted on Survey 
Monkey.  They were informed that the study was interested in how morally elevating 
different acts are, and were asked to read the short descriptive passage explaining 
moral elevation.  Participants were randomly assigned by Survey Monkey to one of 
three conditions (low cost, moderate cost, and high cost).  Each participant read the 
initial vignette, and rated their experiences of moral elevation from 1-7.  Participants 
were then shown one of the passages describing the cost the altruist had incurred, 
dependent on the condition in which they had been placed, and were asked to rate 
how much more or less morally elevated they now felt after learning about the cost 
incurred.  Data analysis was carried out using IBM’s SPSS, and missing data were 




 Table 4 shows mean initial elevation and mean change in elevation for 
participants in each of the three cost conditions, and Table 5 shows the means for 
male and female participants, and religious and non-religious participants.   
 
Table 4 
Initial Moral Elevation and Change in Moral Elevation by Condition 
  Condition  
        High     Moderate        Low 
Variable  n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) 
















 As with study 1, incompleteness of data prevented ordinal analyses, and so 
elevation scores were treated as scale variables.  Because neither initial elevation 
nor change in elevation were normally distributed (respectively, D(130) = .13, p < 
.001, and D(130) = .19, p < .001), non-parametric analyses were adopted.  
Bonferroni corrections were applied to compensate for multiple comparisons.  
 Two Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed to establish whether initial moral 
elevation or change in moral elevation varied significantly across the three conditions 
(it was anticipated that initial elevation would not vary, and it was hypothesized that 
change in elevation would).  Initial moral elevation did not vary significantly across 
the three cost conditions (H(2) = .90, p = .64), while change in elevation did vary 
significantly (H(2) = 25.62, p < .001).  Follow-up Mann-Whitney tests revealed that 
participants in the high and medium cost conditions reported significantly larger 
increases in elevation than participants in the low cost condition (respectively, U = 
38.15, p < .001, and U = 23.45, p = .003), although the difference in change in 
elevation between high and medium cost condition participants was non-significant – 
U = 14.71, p = .09.  The mean differences are illustrated in Figure 3.  
 There was no significant difference between male and female participants for 
either initial elevation (U = 2307, p = .35) or change in elevation (U = 2488, p = .07).  
Similarly, there was no significant difference in either initial elevation or change in 
elevation between religious and non-religious participants; respectively, U = 1971.5, 
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p = .37, and U = 1979, p = .34.  Age was also non-normally distributed; two 
Spearman’s rank-order correlations revealed a significant positive relationship 
between age and initial elevation (rs(129) = .27, p = .002) but no significant 
relationship between age and change in elevation (rs(129) = .06, p = .50).   
 
Table 5 
Initial Moral Elevation and Change in Moral Elevation by Sex and Religious Affiliation 
 Sex Religious 
    Female    Male     Yes      No 
Variable n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) n M(SD) 
Initial 63 5.60 (1.21) 67 5.24 (1.25) 80 5.49 (1.25) 45 5.29 (1.20) 




Figure 3.  Change in Moral Elevation by Cost Condition 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean change in elevation score for participants in each story condition.  





 The results of study 2 offered good support for prediction 2; participants 
reported a greater positive change in their experiences of moral elevation when they 
learned that a benevolent act had cost the actor more dearly.  There was a clear 
linear relationship between cost incurred by the actor and subsequent change in 
moral elevation.  Participants in the low cost condition reported a slight decrease in 
moral elevation, and participants in the high cost condition reported a higher 
increase in elevation than participants in the moderate cost condition.  These group 
differences were not present for the pre-manipulation, initial reports of moral 
elevation, giving confidence that the differences in change in moral elevation 
represent an experimental affect.  It seems that moral elevation may indeed be 
sensitive to features of a benevolent act which indicate that the actor values the 
welfare of the recipient highly, suggesting that it is functionally integrated with our 
welfare trade-off ratio estimator.  This apparent synergy between moral elevation 
and another mechanism in our social-cognitive architecture supports the idea that 
elevation plays a functional role in regulating our other-regarding behaviours.    
 As in study 1, female participants and participants who reported religious 
affiliations expressed stronger feelings of moral elevation than male or non-religious 
participants.  Although only the higher initial elevation of women was statistically 
significant, the means summarized in Table 4 reflect what seem to be steady trends.  
Unlike in study 1, there was a significant positive correlation between age and 
participants’ initial reported moral elevation.   
 
Conclusion 
 Studies 1 and 2 aimed to test predictions about which particular aspects of 
others’ behaviour should be expected to elicit moral elevation, or to elicit it more 
strongly, if the emotion is indeed a cognitive mechanisms sculpted by natural 
selection to respond to indications of high partner-value in others.   
 It was reasoned in Chapter 2 that individuals who tend to directly confer 
benefits on others make better (more profitable) social-relationship partners than 
individuals who tend to exhibit norm or rule following behaviour (all else equal).  On 
that basis, it was expected that moral elevation should be more sensitive to – i.e. 
more easily elicited by – others’ benefit conferring behaviours than by their simple 
norm-following behaviours.  The results of study 1 failed to support this prediction, 
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but study 3B (reported in the next chapter) will offer another chance to test prediction 
1 using a less problematic control vignette.  
 It was also reasoned in Chapter 2 that moral elevation, if it is a functionally 
integrated part of our social-cognitive machinery, should be sensitive to information 
about how much an actor values the welfare of the recipient in a benevolent act.  So-
called welfare trade-off information (i.e., information about how much of her own 
welfare an actor is willing to sacrifice in order to increase the welfare of the recipient) 
is known to be something we track and respond to in evaluating others’ worth as 
potential social-relationship partners	(Delton et al., 2012; Delton & Robertson, 2012), 
and so it was predicted that there would be a positive relationship between the 
proportionate cost an actor incurs in performing a benevolent act and the degree of 
moral elevation the act elicited.  This prediction was supported by the results of study 
2.   A further test of prediction 2 will be offered in study 4, reported in the next 
chapter.  
 Having offered preliminary investigations of the types of behaviours which 
elicit moral elevation, Chapter 4 will turn to investigations centered around which 



























 Chapter 4 reports the results of three studies.  Studies 3A and 3B aimed to 
test the prediction that beneficiary-specific incentives for a benevolent actor’s 
behaviour should decrease the power of the behaviour to elicit moral elevation.  
Study 4 aimed to test the prediction that benevolent behaviour will be more morally 
elevating when it is performed by actors who are otherwise relatively socially 
attractive.  Neither Study 3A nor study 3B found support for the prediction – 
implications are discussed.  Study 4 found some support for the prediction – study 






Studies 3A and 3B: Is Moral Elevation Sensitive To The Presence Of Incentives 
For The Benefactor’s Behaviour? 
 
Study 3A 
Study 3A aimed to test prediction 3: 
 
Prediction 3:  A benevolent act will elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation if there 
are no obvious incentives for the actor to value the welfare of the recipient 
 
Design 
 In contrast to studies 1 and 2, study 3A used a within-subjects design.  All 
participants were asked to read two short stories and answer a series of questions 
intended to gauge which story they found more morally elevating.  One story 
described someone performing a benevolent act in a situation where there was a 
clear incentive for the actor to value the recipient’s welfare, and one story described 
a benevolent act in a situation with no clear incentive.  In line with prediction 3, it was 
anticipated that participants would report finding the story in which there was no 
clear incentive for the actor’s behaviour more morally elevating than the alternative 
story.   
 As in study 1, participants in study 3A were asked to complete a 9-item forced 
choice questionnaire measure intended to test prediction 6 (again, to maximize data-
collection efficiency).  The results from that measure will be presented in Chapter 6, 





 106 participants were recruited via Amazon’s MTurk between 24-25/02/2019, 
and were paid $1 for their time.  Ethical approval was granted for this study on 
23/01/2019.   
 All participants (43% female, age range 22-69, M = 36.44, SD = 10.64) were 
from the USA, and 54% indicated that the held no religious affiliation.  Participant 
attention was checked at three points in the survey; two comprehension-based 
questions following the story texts they were asked to read, and one free text 
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question at the end of the survey asking participants to answer honestly whether 
they had been paying attention throughout the survey.  Participants who gave 
incorrect answers for either of the comprehension questions, and those who gave 
anything other than an affirmative answer to the free text question were excluded 
from analyses.  The remaining N was 102.   
 
Measures 
 Two short vignettes describing benevolent acts were used for this study.  In 
story 1, Sam saves Ian’s valuables when they fall into the river on a company team 
building day.  In story 2, Adam goes out of his way to give a man a lift home on a 
rainy night.  In order to avoid confounds produced by any differences between these 
two scenarios, each story was written in two versions – in one version (A), the 
recipient had no qualities that would obviously incentivize the actor to value his 
welfare, and in the other version (B) the recipient did have a quality that would 
obviously incentivize the actor to value his welfare.  In story 1A, Ian is described as 
Sam’s boss, and in story 1B Ian is described as a very junior colleague of Sam.  In 
story 2A, the man whom Adam helps is described as a well-heeled old friend from 
college, and in story 2B the man is described as a stranger who was down on his 
luck (each version is given in full in Appendix B).  
 The scale used to measure which story participants were more morally 
elevated by was based around Vianello et al.’s (2010) 8-item elevation scale, 
described in the measures section of study 1 in Chapter 1 (p. 30) above.  
Participants were asked, for each of the 8 sensations in the moral elevation scale, 
which story, if either, had elicited it most strongly.  For example:  
 
1) Did either story make you feel more open towards others? (If both stories made 
you feel this, please pick the story which made you feel it more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, the first story 
b) Yes, the second 
c) No, neither story 
  
 The full measure is included in Appendix B.  Participants were also asked to 
provide basic demographic information.    
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Procedure  
 Participants were asked to follow a hyperlink from MTurk to a survey hosted 
on Qualtrics.  They were randomly assigned, by Qualtrics, to one of two conditions: 
in condition 1, participants were asked to read story 1A and story 2B, and in 
condition 2 participants were asked to read story 1B and story 2A.  Following the 
stories, and the attention check comprehension questions, participants were asked 
to complete the comparative moral elevation measure.   
 The comparative moral elevation measure was scored by giving participants 1 
point each time they chose an answer that equated to being more elevated by the 
story in which the benefactor had an incentive (‘A’ version stories), -1 point each time 
they chose an answer that equated to being more elevated by the story in which the 
benefactor had no incentive (‘B’ version stories), and 0 point each time they chose 
the ‘neither story’ option.  Scores could be anywhere between -8 and 8.  A score < 0 
is taken to indicate that the participant was more elevated by the B story (where 
there was no incentive), and a score > 0 is taken to indicate that the participant was 
more elevated by the A story (where there was an incentive).  A score of 0 is taken 
to mean that the participant was no more elevated by one story than by the other.   
 
Results 
   
Did participants find one story more elevating than the other? 
 In total, 45.1% of participants had scores < 0, 44.1% had scores > 0, and 
10.8% had a score of 0, meaning that marginally more participants reported finding 
the B story (where the protagonist had no obvious incentive for his actions) to be 
more elevating than the A story (where the protagonist had an incentive to help the 
recipient).  The magnitude of this difference, however, was trivial.  Table 6 is the 
contingency table showing which story was found to be more morally elevating by 
participants in each condition, and Figure 4 shows the number of participants who 
chose the incentive and no-incentive stories across both conditions.   
 The data from participants in condition 1 conform to the expectations of 
prediction 3 – participants were overwhelmingly more likely to rate the story in which 
the protagonist had no clear incentive for his actions as more morally elevating than 
the story in which there was an obvious reason for the protagonist to value the 
welfare of the recipient (which in this condition was story 2B).  The answers of 
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participants in condition 2, however, ran in the opposite direction – these participants 
were far more likely to rate the story with the clear incentive as more elevating than 
the story with no clear incentive (which in this condition was story 2A).  A chi-square 
test confirmed that there was a significant association between condition and choice 
of which story was more elevating; χ2 (2) = 31.54, p < . 001.  In short, participants in 
both conditions were significantly more likely to rate story 2 as more morally 
elevating than story 1.   
 
Table 6 
Story Chosen as More Elevating by Condition 








7 (14.9) 34 (72.3) 6 (12.8) 
Condition 2 
 
38 (69.1) 12 (21.8) 5 (9.1) 
Total 37 (44.1) 46 (45.1) 11 (10.8) 
  
 
Were there any age, sex, or religiosity differences in moral elevation? 
 In order to investigate whether there were any relationships between moral 
elevation and sex, age, and religiosity, it was necessary to score the comparative 
elevation measure using a different method.  As described above, the comparative 
moral elevation measure was initially scored by giving participants 1 point each time 
they chose the A story as more elevating, -1 point each time they chose the B story 
as more elevating, and 0 points each time they picked ‘neither’.  This left participants 
with scores between -8 and 8, and allowed for the categorical comparisons 
necessary to test prediction 3; a score > 0 was taken to indicate that a participant 
found the A story more elevating, a score < 0 that they found the B story more 
elevating, and a score of 0 that they found neither story more elevating than the 
other.  Looking for sex, age, and religiosity differences, however, requires a 
continuous dependent variable.   
 To gauge how elevated participants felt overall (in response to both stories 
combined), they were given a score of 1 each time they answered that either the A 
story or the B story had evoked an elevating sensation, and a score of 0 each time 
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they picked ‘neither’.  This left participants with a moral elevation score between 0 
and 8, with higher values taken to indicate that the participant experienced stronger 
feelings of moral elevation.  Mean moral elevation scores by sex and religious 









Figure 4. Total number of participants who chose the incentive-present and 









Moral Elevation by Sex and Religious Affiliation 
Group n M(SD) t(df) 
Sex    
Male 57 5.31 (2.43)  
1.72 (98.95) Female 44 6.05 (2.43) 
Religious    
Yes 48 6.38 (1.47)  
3.64 (85.31)* No 54 4.87 (2.61) 
Total 102 5.58 (2.27)  
Note: * p < .05 
 
 Once again, female participants expressed stronger feelings of moral 
elevation than male participants, although the difference only approached 
significance; t(98.95) = 1.72, p = .08, Cohen’s d = .30 (equal variances not 
assumed).  Religious participants also expressed significantly stronger feelings of 
moral elevation than non-religious participants; t(85.31) = 3.64, p < .001, Cohen’s d 
= .71 (equal variances not assumed).  There was no significant correlation between 
age (which again was non-normally distributed) and moral elevation; rs(102) = .11, p 
= .26.   
 
Discussion 
 Contra prediction 3A, participants in study 3 were not more likely to express 
feelings of moral elevation in response to the B versions of the stories than they 
were in response to the A story versions.  In fact, participants were overwhelmingly 
more likely to report that story 2 was more elevating than story 1, regardless of which 
variants they read, suggesting that the manipulation may have failed.  Best efforts 
were made to match the two vignettes as closely as possible, but there may still 
have been too many confounds to produce adequately interpretable results.  If there 
was any effect of the presence or absence of incentives for the protagonist to value 
the beneficiary’s welfare, it seems it would have been drowned out by the effects of 
other elements of the two stories.  It should also be considered that participants may 
have been expressing a recency bias in their answers; stories 2A and 2B were the 
second stories presented in each condition.  The choice to use a within-subjects 
design was motivated by cost efficiency, but the drawbacks of repeated measures 
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could have negatively affected the power of this design to detect the sought-after 
effect.   
 Once again, however, there was evidence contributing to the pattern of a 
stable sex-difference in moral elevation, with female participants scoring marginally-
significantly higher than male participants.   As in study 1, religious participants 
reported significantly stronger feelings of moral elevation than non-religious 
participants.  It bears noting, though, that the moral elevation scale used was less 
than optimal for these analysis.  In retrospect it would have been preferable to have 
given participants a wider range of response options, so as to be able to more 
accurately quantify the strength of their feelings of elevation.  As things stood, with 
answers to each of the moral elevation scale items being effectively binary, it was 





 Study 3B also aimed to test prediction 3, but unlike study 3A, 3B employed a 
between-subjects design.  Participants were asked to rate how morally elevated they 
felt after reading stories about benevolent acts which occurred between family 
members, friends, or strangers.  In line with prediction 3, it was expected that 
participants who read the stories about benevolence between strangers would report 
stronger feelings of moral elevation than participants who read about benevolence 
between family members or friends.   
 Study 3B also afforded an opportunity to further test prediction 1: 
 
Prediction 1: Moral elevation is more likely to be elicited by others’ benevolent 
behaviour than by behaviours which are morally praiseworthy but non-benevolent 
 
 Participants were asked to read three short stories in total, two describing 
benefit conferring behaviours, and one describing behaviour which would be 
considered morally laudable but which did not involve benefitting another individual.  
After each story, they were asked to indicate which emotional state they felt the story 
had evoked in them.  In line with prediction 1, it was anticipated that participants 
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would only choose moral elevation as their response to the two benevolent stories, 





 163 participants were recruited through Crowd Flower between 25-
29/11/2014, and were paid $0.50 for their time.  Ethics approval was granted for the 
study on 09/09/2014.  64% of participants were female, and the age range was 18 – 
69 (M = 37.43, SD = 12.48).  Participant nationality and religious affiliation were not 
recorded for study 3B.   
 
Measures 
 The three stories presented to participants were based on real news stories, 
and the only details changed were the relationships between the protagonists and 
the recipients.   
 One story acted as a control was not varied between participants. This 
described a young lady continuing her passion for and improvement in CrossFit 
(exercise) training, following a car accident after which her arm was amputated. The 
expectation was that this story would elicit inspiration, and not moral elevation, 
despite describing an individual with a number of morally positive virtues (e.g., 
strength of character, determination, optimism).   
 The other two stories were found by searching the internet for news items 
tagged as ‘restoring faith in humanity’. They describe noteworthy acts of helpfulness 
or kindness, and were expected to elicit moral elevation.  The first (‘elevating story 
1’) described a young boy who wrote a book and sold copies of it to raise money for 
research into a rare disease that one of his friends suffers from.  The second story 
(‘elevating story 2’) described a marine who carried a young para-athlete across the 
finish line of a marathon after the young lad’s prosthetic leg failed.  Both elevating 
stories were varied three ways: in condition 1, the ‘high incentive’ condition, the 
benefactor and recipient were described as brothers; in condition 2, the ‘moderate 
incentive’ condition, the benefactor and recipient were described as friends; and in 
condition 3, the ‘low incentive’ condition, the benefactor and recipient were described 
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as strangers.  All three versions of both elevating stories, and the story used as a 
control, are given in full in Appendix C.   
 Moral elevation was measured using Vianello et al.’s (2010) 8 item elevation 
scale.  Participants were asked to rate, using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’, 5 
= ‘very much’), how strongly they felt each of the 8 sensations described in the scale.  
Cronbach’s α was .91.   
 Finally, participants were given the opportunity to donate their participation fee 
to a charity (Medecins Sans Frontieres); this was included as a behavioural measure 
of moral elevation, following other researchers who have taken charitable donation 
as indicative of elevation’s pro-social motivational output (Freeman et al., 2009) 
(Aquino et al., 2011) (Thomson & Siegel, 2013). 
 
Procedure 
 Participants were directed, via hyperlink, to a questionnaire hosted on Survey 
Monkey.  The questionnaire was described to participants as a study investigating 
emotional reactions to news stories.  In order to reduce the chance of producing 
demand characteristics, participants were told that the researcher was interested in 
three emotions (or ‘feelings’); having one’s faith in humanity restored, being inspired 
to reach one’s full potential, and being amused.   
 ‘Having your faith in humanity restored’ was used in place of ‘feeling morally 
elevated’ because moral elevation is not a commonly used phrase, and it is one with 
a somewhat checkered history – the term was more popular in the second half of the 
19th century, when it was used to refer to a deliberate attempt at bettering, or morally 
educating, others who were deemed ‘less fortunate’ (often women, ethnic minorities, 
and the poor).  The term ‘faith in humanity restored’, on the other hand, has become 
a popular internet meme over the past 10-15 years.  Used to describe the reaction to 
an action or event which improves the observer’s opinion of people in general, the 
phrase fits well with descriptions given in the elevation literature of the appraisals 
which accompany experiences of moral elevation. It is an apt synonym for having 
one’s “views about humanity changed in a more optimistic way” (Haidt, 2000), for 
feeling “optimistic about humanity” (Haidt, 2003a), and for realizing that “there are 
good people in the world, there is good in people” (Haidt, 2003a).   
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 The other two emotions, being inspired and being amused, were included as 
decoys, to mask the research intention of the study.  The use of these two decoys in 
particular was motivated by the similarity between these two emotion states and 
moral elevation; all three are positive, pleasant affective states, evoked by 
witnessing others’ actions (Algoe & Haidt, 2009).  The decoy emotions could 
therefore stand as partial manipulation checks, able to offer indications of whether 
the elevating materials used were eliciting moral elevation, or some other type of 
positive, other-orientated reaction.  
 A further benefit of the inclusion of ‘being inspired’ as a decoy was the 
opportunity to replicate the differentiation of inspiration and elevation that Algoe and 
Haidt (2009) achieved in their work exploring emotional reactions to excellence in 
others.  They found evidence to support characterizing moral elevation and 
inspiration (which they conceive of as the motivational output of ‘admiration’) as 
reactions to distinct types of social stimuli.  Whereas moral elevation is brought 
about by “others exceeding standards of virtue”, admiration (and it’s concomitant 
motivational effect, inspiration) is brought about by “others exceeding standards of 
skill or talent” (p.108).  With evidence grounding fine-grained distinctions between 
positive emotions still something of a lacuna in the literature (Strohminger et al., 
2011), opportunistic verifications of the distinctions which have so far been drawn 
can help to firm our confidence in the coherence of the phenomena being explored.  
 Participants were given a description of each emotion, and asked to read 
them carefully as “different people may have slightly different understandings of 
words related to feelings or emotions” (participant instructions).  As a further 
precaution against demand characteristics, the descriptions did not make reference 
to stimuli that would normally elicit the feelings described, but instead detailed the 
sensations that accompany the emotion and the motivations that typically follow from 
experiencing it.  The full descriptions ran as follows: 
 
Please read the following descriptions of 3 emotions. Each description is broken into 
two parts: what sensations or feelings the emotion produces, and what the emotion 





1. Having your faith in humanity restored 
Feeling: Optimistic and positive about humanity or human nature. Warm, uplifted, 
open, moved, touched.  
Wanting to: Show others that human nature is good by setting an example. Being 
moved to do positive, caring, kind, or helpful things for others. 
 
2. Amusement or mirth 
Feeling: Light-hearted, high-spirited, entertained.  
Wanting to: Laugh, play, engage in merriment, do something fun.  
 
3. Being inspired to reach your full potential 
Feeling: Energized, motivated, and positive about the possibility of achieving goals. 
Wanting to: Take on new challenges, work harder to reach targets, or throw yourself 
into activities that matter to you.   
 
 To check attention and understanding, participants were asked to indicate for 
each emotion whether they thought it was positive/pleasant, negative/unpleasant, or 
were unsure about its valence.  
 Following this, participants were presented with three news stories 
(sequentially).  Each participant saw the (putatively) inspiring story, and was 
randomly assigned to see one version of each of the (putatively) elevating stories; 
the order of viewing was fixed as elevating story 1, inspiring story, elevating story 2.  
 After each story, they were asked to indicate which of the three previously 
described emotions they had experienced most strongly while reading (with ‘this 
story did not make me feel any of the above’ given as a fourth response option).  
Choosing one of the three emotions as their response took participants to a page 
with further probes about the strength and quality of the emotional experience.  The 
probes for having one’s faith in humanity restored comprised the 8 item moral 
elevation scale from (Vianello et al., 2010).  The probes for amusement and 
inspiration were included only to authenticate the deception that the study was aimed 
at exploring more than one emotion; there were 7 amusement probes, and 8 
inspiration probes, to give face-validity in juxtaposition with the elevation scale.  
Participants who chose the option ‘this story did not make me feel any of the above’ 
after reading the story were directed straight to this page.   
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 Participants’ moral elevation scores were computed by summing their 
responses on the 5-point Likert scale to the 8 moral elevation scale items, and 
dividing that sum by 8.  This gave each participant a moral elevation score between 
1 and 5, with higher scores indicating stronger feelings of moral elevation.  Each 
participant completed the moral elevation scale a maximum of 3 times, because they 
were given the option to choose ‘this story restores my faith in humanity’ after 
reading each story.  Only the scales which were completed after participants read 
the two benevolent stories (stories 1 and 2) were computed and used for the 




Did the three stories elicit the anticipated emotional responses? 
 In line with prediction 1, the two putatively elevating stories were 
overwhelmingly described by participants as such, and the putatively inspiring story 
was equally overwhelmingly described as inspiring rather than elevating.  Table 8 
and Figure 5 show the choice frequency for each response option across all three 
stories; story 1 (the boy who writes the book), story 2 (the marine who carries the 
boy), and story 3, the control story (the amputee who succeeds at Cross Fit).   
 
Were there any age or sex differences in moral elevation? 
 In order to perform these analyses, participants’ moral elevation scores for 
each of the elevating stories were combined and divided by 2, to produce a total 
elevation score for each participant.  These scores were normally distributed; D(79) 
= .07, p = .20.  In contrast to study 1, there was no significant difference between the 
mean elevation scores of male and female participants (male M = 3.34, SD = .59, 
female M = 3.49 SD = .91); t(76) = -.75, p = .46.  Neither was there any significant 
correlation between age and moral elevation; age was once again non-normally 
distributed, but Spearman’s rank-order correlation was rs(79) = .01, p = .90.  
 
Was there a relationship between story condition and moral elevation? 
 The mean moral elevation scores for participants in each condition for the two 
morally elevating stories are given in Table 9.  Contra prediction 3, two one-way 
ANOVAs found no significant main effect of condition on moral elevation for either 
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story: for elevating story 1, F(2,99) = 1.11, p = .33; and for elevating story 2, F(2,109) 
= .26, p = .77.  
 
Table 8 















107 (65.6%) 37 (22.7%) 5 (3.1%) 14 (8.6%) 













Was there a relationship between moral elevation and participant donations to 
charity? 
 In total, only 19 participants chose to donate their participation fee to MSF.  
There was no significant difference between the mean elevation scores of 
participants who chose to donate and those who chose not to (donation M = 3.30, 
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Figure 5.  Number of participants reporting moral elevation, amusement, or 





 Study 3B rectified the major methodological flaws that were present in study 
3A – it used a between-subjects design, allowing the same vignette to be used 
across conditions with only very minimal changes, and the absence of repeated 
measures also removed any possibility of a presentation-order effect – but there was 
still no support found for prediction 3.  There were no significant differences between 
the elevation scores of participants in the different story conditions, lending good 
support to the counter-hypothesis, that moral elevation is not sensitive to the 
presence or absence of motivations for a benevolent actor to value the welfare of the 
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recipient.  If it is in fact a cognitive adaptation, moral elevation would seem not to 
have the level of functional sophistication assumed by prediction 3.   
 Study 3B did, however, provide support for prediction 1.  Although study 1 
failed to find support for the idea that moral elevation is elicited exclusively by 
benefit-conferring, and not by non-benevolent but otherwise morally laudable, 
behaviours, study 3B used a less ambiguous vignette as its control and found that 
participants were vastly less likely to express feelings of moral elevation in response 
to others’ moral-but-non-benevolent behaviour.  Only 4.3% of participants said that 
the story about the amputee whose extraordinary perseverance and positivity led her 
to break her pre-amputation Cross Fit records was morally elevating, compared with 
the 71.2% and 65.6% of participants who said that the stories about the marine 
helping the young triathlete and the boy writing and selling a book to help his friend 
(respectively) evoked elevation.   
 This study did not find a significant sex-difference in reported moral elevation.  
Although the means trended in the same direction as those in studies1, 2, and 3A, 
the difference was only very slight and was far from statistically significant.  As the 
result of an unfortunate oversight, participant religiosity was not recorded, and so it 
was not possible to look for any difference in reported elevation between religious 
and non-religious participants.   
 
 
Study 4: Is Moral Elevation Sensitive To Socially-Attractive Characteristics Of 
The Actor? 
 
 Study 4 aimed to test prediction 4, and it provided an opportunity to further 
test prediction 2.   
 
Prediction 4:  A benevolent act will elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation when 
the actor has other traits indicative of high partner-value 
 
Prediction 2:  A benevolent act will elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation if the 





 Study 4 employed a 2 x 3 between participant experimental design.  
Participants were asked to rate their feelings of moral elevation after reading a short 
story describing a benevolent act, accompanied by a picture of the protagonist’s 
face; the act itself was either described as low cost or high cost, and the face 
accompanying the story was either a high, moderate, or low dominance male.  
Socially dominant males are physically formidable individuals, capable (at least 
ancestrally) of acquiring and holding resources, and likely to emit a number of 
positive externalities which would benefit their social allies (Jensen & Petersen, 
2011; Sell et al., 2009); higher dominance males, then, are more attractive social 
partners than lower dominance males, ceteris paribus.   
 In line with prediction 4, it was anticipated that participants who read the story 
which was accompanied by the high-dominance face would report the strongest 
feelings of moral elevation, and participants who read the story accompanied by the 
low-dominance face would report the weakest feelings of elevation.  In line with 
prediction 2, it was also anticipated that participants who read the high-cost version 
of the story would report stronger feelings of elevation than participants who read the 





 Participants (N = 315, 56.2% female) were recruited through Crowd Flower 
and Amazon MTurk, between 15-17/12/2013, and were paid $0.35 for taking part in 
the study.  Ethical approval was granted for the study on 30/10/2013.    
 Participant age was recorded in ordinal blocks (e.g., 18-25, 25-35, etc.); 
35.9% were aged between 25 and 35, 20% were between 35 and 45, 18.4% 
between 18 and 25, and 15.9% between 45 and 55.  66.5% of participants indicated 
that they held some kind of religious affiliation.  The majority of participants were 
from the USA (72.1%), 20% were Canadian, 5.4% from the UK, and the remaining 






 Moral elevation was elicited using a vignette about a young man helping an 
elderly man to clear his driveway of snow.  Participants saw either a low cost version 
of the story, in which the young man has to invest a moderate amount of effort to 
help the elderly man, or a high cost version, in which the young man has to invest 
substantially more time and energy.  The first paragraph was identical for both story 
versions, and ran as follows: 
 
Both Story Conditions 
Alex was being given a lift home by his friend Martin one winter afternoon after the 
two had met for lunch together in town. As they drove they passed an elderly man, 
his coat collar turned up against the cold wind that was picking up, shovelling snow 
from his driveway. Alex tapped Martin’s shoulder and said, ‘You can just let me out 
here, thanks Martin’. They were about half a mile from Alex’s house, but Martin 
assumed that Alex wanted to stop in at his girlfriend’s place, which was close-by; he 
pulled over and let Alex out. As Martin drove off, Alex jogged back to the man with 
the shovel to offer help. Alex and the elderly man chatted while they took it in turns to 
shovel the snow – Alex making sure he himself did the majority of the work. Alex 
learned that the man had wanted to clear the snow because his daughter was driving 
down to visit that evening with his new grandchild.  
 
The stories varied in their closing lines: 
 
Low cost story 
The snow-fall had been quite light, around 4 inches, and the wind eased as they 
worked, making the job easier. In total, Alex spent 15 minutes helping the man clear 
the 5 yards of driveway. When the job was finished, Alex said goodbye, the man 
thanked him for his kindness, and Alex walked home.  
 
High cost story 
[Identical to the low cost story until the final four lines]: 
The snow-fall had been heavy, around 8 inches, and the worsening wind made the 
job increasingly difficult. About half way up the 30 yard track, Alex grew concerned 
about the elderly man being out in the cold and the wind, so he convinced him to go 
	 65	
inside the house and have a warm drink, while Alex remained outside to finish the 
job. In total, Alex spent two and a half hours clearing the snow. When the job was 
finished, Alex said goodbye, the man thanked him for his kindness, and Alex walked 
home.    
 Perceptions of the protagonist’s dominance were manipulated using pictures 
of male faces accompanying the stories and labeled with the protagonist’s name.  
These pictures (shown in Figure 6) were taken from a database of 25 maximally 
distinct male faces, created using FaceGen modeler software (version 3.1) (Todorov, 
Dotsch, Porter, Oosterhof, & Falvello, 2013).  Each identity in the database has been 
manipulated on the dimension of dominance (Todorov & Oosterhof, 2011) to create 
7 versions (-3SD, the lowest dominance, to +3SD, the highest dominance).  One 
identity was chosen (number 25) to represent Alex; the -1SD version served as the 
low dominance stimulus, the +1SD version was the moderate dominance stimulus, 
and the +3SD version provided the high dominance stimulus. 
 Moral elevation was measured using the 8 item moral elevation scale from 
Vianello et al. (2010); Cronbach’s α was .86. Participants were also asked to answer 
a 7 item questionnaire intended to gauge their perceptions of Alex’s value as a social 
partner.  The measure included items such as ‘I would like to spend time socially 
with Alex’, and ‘Alex would make a good friend’, scored on a 7-point Likert scale (full 
questionnaire included in Appendix D); Cronbach’s α for this scale was .72.   
 
 





Figure 6:  Left to right, ‘Low Dominance’ (-1SD), ‘Moderate Dominance’ (+1SD), and 




 Participants were directed via hyperlink to a questionnaire hosted on Survey 
Monkey. Participants were randomly assigned by Survey Monkey to one of six 
conditions.  Each participant was asked to read either the low cost or the high cost 
version of the altruistic vignette. Alongside the story, participants were presented 
with a picture of a male face which was either high dominance, moderate 
dominance, or low dominance.  After reading the story, participants were asked to 
rate their perceptions of the protagonist’s dominance, their experiences of moral 
elevation, and their perceptions of the protagonist as a prospective social partner.   
 Data analysis was carried out using IBM’s SPSS.  There was a relatively high 
proportion of missing data, and these were deleted list-wise in all analyses.  
 
Results 
  Participants completed an 8-item moral elevation measure, scored on a 
Likert-scale running from 0-5; summing and averaging these scores gave each 
participant a moral elevation score between 0 and 5, with higher values indicating 
that participants experienced stronger feelings of moral elevation.  Mean moral 
elevation scores of participants in each picture and story condition, as well as male 
and female, and religious and non-religious participants, are given in Table 11.  
Moral elevation scores were somewhat negatively skewed, creating a significantly 
non-normal distribution; D(296) = .06, p = .03.  Reverse Log transformation did not 
improve the normality test-results, but the absolute value of skew was relatively 
small (Z-skew = -1.70), and it is possible that these tests were too sensitive for the 
relatively large study N.   
 
Dominance manipulation check 
 In order to establish whether the picture stimulus each participant was given 
affected their perceptions of Alex’s dominance in the expected fashion, participants 
were asked to rate (using a 5 point Likert scale) how likely they thought Alex would 
be to win in a physical confrontation with a man of a similar age.  Mean dominance 
ratings for male and female participants and participants in each picture and story 





Dominance Ratings by Sex, Picture Condition, and Story Condition 
Group n M(SD) t(df) 
Picture Condition    
Low 91 3.27 (.72)  
3.15 (311)* High + Moderate 223 3.58 (.78) 
Story Condition    
High 166 3.58 (.88)  
2.14 (312)* Low 148 3.39 (.73) 
Sex    
Male 137 3.43 (.78)  
1.20 (312) Female 177 3.54 (.77) 
Note: * p < .05 
  
 A one-way ANOVA found a significant effect of picture condition on ratings of 
Alex’s dominance; F(2, 311) = 5.25, p = .006.  Planned contrasts showed a 
significant difference between the means of the high and moderate dominance 
picture conditions and the low dominance picture condition (t(311) = 3.15, p = .002), 
but no significant difference between the high dominance and moderate dominance 
picture conditions (t(311) = -.58, p = .56.  These results suggest that the 
manipulation of Alex’s dominance was only partially successful. Consequently, 
participants from the high and moderate dominance picture conditions were 
combined into one group (displayed in Table 9 as ‘High + Moderate’).  All of the 
following analyses contrast the means of this combined group with the means of the 
participants in the low dominance picture condition – referred to hereafter as the high 
dominance picture condition and the low dominance picture condition respectively.   
 Unexpectedly, there was a significant difference in ratings of Alex’s 
dominance between the high and low cost story conditions, with participants in the 
high cost condition rating Alex as significantly more dominant than participants in the 
low cost condition; t(312) = 2.14, p = .03.  A two-way ANOVA was conducted to 
check whether there were any interaction effects between picture condition and cost 
condition (no interaction effects were expected); as anticipated, there were 
significant main effects for both picture and story condition (respectively, F(2, 308) = 
5.54, p = .004, and F(1, 308) = 5.23, p = .02), but the interaction effect was non-
significant; F(2, 308) = .37, p = .70.  
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 There was no significant difference in dominance ratings between male and 
female participants.  Although women rated Alex as more dominant than men did, 
the difference was non-significant; t(312) = 1.20, p = .23. 
 
Table 11 
Mean Moral Elevation by Picture Condition, Story Condition, Sex, and Religiosity 
Group n M(SD) 
Picture Condition   
High 213 3.31 (.79) 
Low 84 3.24 (.73) 
Story Condition   
High 154 3.33 (.79) 
Low 143 3.24 (.75) 
Sex   
Male 131 3.18 (.72) 
Female 166 3.37 (.80) 
Religious   
Yes 192 3.39 (.77) 
No 103 3.11 (.74) 
 
 
Did story condition, picture condition, sex, or religiosity predict participants’ 
moral elevation? 
 Mean elevation scores are given in Table 11.  A backwards stepwise, linear 
multiple regression was conducted with cost condition, dominance condition, sex, 
and religiosity as predictors, and moral elevation as the outcome variable.  Table 12 
shows the resulting coefficients.  Sex was the only significant predictor in the model 
(F(1,293) = 4.58, p = .03), although it only accounted for 2% of the variance in moral 









 Table 12 
Regression Coefficients: Cost Condition, Dominance Condition, Sex, and Religiosity 
as Predictors of Moral Elevation 
Predictors B SE B β  
Step 1    
   Constant 3.26 .15  
   Cost: Low vs. High .08 .09 .05 
   Dominance: Low vs. High .09 .10 .06 
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.19 .09 -.12* 
   Religiosity: No vs. Yes .001 .13 <.001 
Step 2    
   Constant 3.27 .11  
   Cost Condition: Low vs. High .08 .09 .05 
   Dominance Condition: Low vs. High .09 .10 .06 
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.19 .09 -.12* 
Step 3    
   Constant 3.31 .09  
   Dominance Condition: Low vs. High .09 .10 .05 
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.20 .09 -.13* 
Step 4    
   Constant 3.37 .06  
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.19 .09 -.12* 
Note: R2 for step 1 = .02 (p = .19), ΔR2 for step 2 = <.001, (p = .99), ΔR2 for step 3 = 
.003 (p = .38), ΔR2 for step 4 = -.003 (p = .38).  *p < .05.   
 
 Picture condition failed to predict moral elevation, although the relatively wide 
95% confidence interval for the mean difference in elevation scores across the two 
conditions (upper bound = .12, lower bound = -.27) suggests the test may not have 
had the power required to detect the effect under scrutiny.  Although the picture 
condition to which participants had been assigned did not predict their reported level 
of moral elevation, there was a significant correlation between moral elevation and 
participants’ own ratings of Alex’s dominance; r = .20, p < .01, suggesting that moral 
elevation was affected by participants’ perception of how dominant they perceived 
the story protagonist to be.   
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Did story condition, picture condition, sex, or religiosity predict participants’ 
perceptions of the protagonist’s social value? 
 
 Participants had been asked to complete a 7-item measure of how attractive 
they thought Alex would be as a social partner (using a 7-point Likert response 
scale); participant scores for each item were summed, and divided by 7, to give each 
participant a ‘perceived social attractiveness’ score between 1 and 7, with higher 
values indicating that participants found Alex more attractive as a social partner.  
Mean social attractiveness ratings are given in Table 13.   
 A second backwards stepwise linear multiple regression was conducted with 
story condition, picture condition, sex, and religiosity as predictors, and participants’ 
perceptions of the protagonist’s social value as the outcome variable.  The 
coefficients from the regression analysis are shown in Table 14.   
 
Table 13 
Mean Ratings of Alex’s Social Attractiveness by Picture Condition, Story Condition, 
Sex, and Religiosity 
Group n M(SD) 
Picture Condition   
High 219 5.93 (.87) 
Low 88 5.88 (.81) 
Story Condition   
High 161 6.03 (.80) 
Low 146 5.78 (.89) 
Sex   
Male 134 5.72 (.86) 
Female 172 6.06 (.82) 
Religious   
Yes 203 5.91 (.85) 
No 103 5.95 (.85) 
  Note: * p < .05 







Regression Coefficients: Cost Condition, Dominance Condition, Sex, and Religiosity 
as Predictors of Perceived Social Value 
Predictors B SE B β  
Step 1    
   Constant 5.23 .14  
   Cost: Low vs. High .15 .08 .10 
   Dominance: Low vs. High .04 .09 .03 
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.37 .08 -.24* 
   Religiosity: No vs. Yes .06 .12 .03 
Step 2    
   Constant 5.26 .12  
   Cost Condition: Low vs. High .14 .08 .10 
   Religiosity: No vs. Yes -.37 .08 -.24* 
   Sex: Female vs. Male .06 .12 .03 
Step 3    
   Constant 5.31 .07  
   Cost Condition: Low vs. High .14 .08 .10 
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.37 .08 -.24* 
Note: R2 for step 1 = .07 (p < .001), ΔR2 for step 2 = .001 (p = .65), ΔR2 for step 3 = 
.001 (p = .60) 
 
 Sex and cost emerged as the only two significant predictors, accounting in 
combination for 7% of the variance in moral elevation.  Follow-up t-tests confirmed 
that there was a significant sex-difference in ratings of Alex’s social attractiveness, 
with women rating Alex as significantly more attractive than men; t(305) = 3.57, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = .40.  There was also a significant difference in ratings of Alex’s 
social value across the story conditions.  Participants reading the high cost story 
rated Alex as significantly more socially attractive than participants who read the low 
cost version; t(305) = .32, p = .01.   
 Although story condition did not predict moral elevation, there was a 
significant positive correlation between ratings of Alex’s social attractiveness and 
reported strength of moral elevation, r = .38, p < .001, suggesting that there may be 
a relationship between story condition and moral elevation, mediated by perceptions 
of Alex’s social attractiveness, but not one large enough to detect statistically.  There 
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was also a significant positive correlation between participants’ own ratings of Alex’s 
dominance and their ratings of his social attractiveness; r = .25, p < .001.    
 
Discussion 
 The results of study 4 offered some support for both prediction 4 and 
prediction 2, although this support was not unambiguous and may have been 
weakened by methodological flaws.       
 Contra prediction 4, the picture conditions to which participants were assigned 
did not significantly affect participants’ ratings of the protagonist’s partner value or 
their reported moral elevation. The relatively weak relationship between the picture 
condition to which participants were assigned and their ratings of Alex’s dominance 
suggests that the stimuli used in study 4 may not have been fit for purpose; the use 
of computer generated faces may have lowered the ecological validity of the study, 
making the predicted effect more difficult to detect.  However, participants’ own 
ratings of how dominant Alex was did significantly and positively correlate with both 
reported moral elevation and ratings of how attractive he was as a social partner, 
offering some support for the idea that benevolent behaviour is more morally 
elevating when it is performed by an otherwise socially attractive actor.  
 Contra prediction 2, there was no significant effect of story condition on 
reported moral elevation.  Participants who read about Alex spending 2.5 hours 
clearing a 30 yard track reported slightly stronger feelings of moral elevation than 
participants who read about Alex spending 15 minutes clearing a 5 yard driveway, 
but the difference was not statistically significant.  Participants who read the high 
cost story version did, however, give significantly higher ratings of Alex’s social 
attractiveness, which itself significantly and positively correlated with reported moral 
elevation, hinting at a positive relationship between cost incurred by the protagonist 
and strength of feelings of moral elevation.  The stories used to contrast high and 
low cost benevolence in study 4 may have been less effective as manipulations than 
those used with more success in study 2.  Because the difference in cost incurred by 
the protagonist in the study 4 stories was less extreme than the differences in the 
study 2 stories, study 4’s experimental manipulation may have been too subtle to 
produce the same effect.   
 As in study 1, study 4 found a significant sex difference in moral elevation, 
adding more weight to the supposition that women are prone to experience stronger 
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feelings of moral elevation than men.  There was no evidence, however, that 
participant religiosity predicted moral elevation.   
 There was a significant effect of story condition on perceptions of the 
protagonist’s dominance, which was an unanticipated relationship.  It seems 
reasonable to suppose that the additional physical labour carried out by the 
protagonist in the high cost story version played into participants’ perceptions of how 
physically formidable he was.   
 
Conclusion And General Discussion  
  Studies 3A, 3B, and 4 aimed to test predictions about recipient- and actor-
characteristics which might be expected to moderate the power of a benevolent 
action to elicit moral elevation.   
 It was reasoned in Chapter 2 that we gain little pertinent information about 
another individual’s potential value as a social partner when we see her delivering 
benefits to recipients whose welfare she has an obvious investment in.  When there 
is no clear incentive for an actor to value the welfare of the recipient, we, as 
unrelated third-party observers, can make a more accurate assessment of the value 
the actor may be expected to place on our welfare.  On that basis it was predicted 
that moral elevation would be elicited more strongly by benevolent acts where the 
recipient was a stranger, than those where the recipient bore some important 
relationship the actor (be it boss, friend, or family member).  Studies 3A and 3B, 
however, found no support at all for this prediction.  On its own, the failure of study 
3A to find support for prediction 3 may have been attributable to critical design error, 
but combined with the lack of support from study 3B the results lend substantial 
weight to the null-hypothesis.   
 It was also reasoned in Chapter 2 that, because benevolent actors who are 
also capable of generating positive externalities are ceteris paribus more attractive 
as social-relationship partners than benevolent actors who do not generate positive 
externalities, moral elevation should be elicited more easily or more strongly by the 
actions of individuals who possess other attractive partner qualities.  It was therefore 
predicted that the same benevolent action would elicit greater feelings of moral 
elevation when it was described as having been performed by a more dominant 
(physically formidable) actor.  The results of study 4 partially conformed with this 
prediction.  Although design flaws may have limited the power of the study to detect 
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the expected effect, there was some evidence that moral elevation is sensitive to 
other socially attractive characteristics of a benevolent actor.   
 The studies reported above also allowed for additional tests of predictions 1 
and 2.  Although study 1 (reported in the previous chapter) failed to find support for 
the prediction that moral elevation would be sensitive exclusively to others’ benefit 
conferring behaviours (as opposed to others’ moral norm-adhering behaviours), 
study 3B found strong support for prediction 1.  Study 3B used a less ambiguous 
control story than that used in study 1, and the results of study 3B suggested (in line 
with those reported by Algoe and Haidt (2009)) that participants classified benefit-
conferring behaviours as morally elevating, and virtues of character as inspiring.   
 In contrast, prediction 2, which was supported by the results of study 2 
(reported in the previous chapter), found only slim support from study 4.  Participants 
who read the vignette about the actor who incurred the higher proportionate cost to 
help the recipient did not report significantly stronger feelings of moral elevation than 
participants who read the vignette about the actor who incurred a lower proportionate 
cost.  There is reason to think that the manipulation used in study 4 may have been 
less effective than required to detect the effect that was found in study 2.   
  Taken in conjunction, then, Chapters 3 and 4 provide some evidence that the 
situation-detecting component of moral elevation functions in the way we would 
expect a social-value alert mechanism to operate.  Moral elevation does seem to be 
particularly sensitive to displays of benefit-delivery, it seems to respond to the 
proportionate costs incurred by benevolent actors, and it appears it may be 
compounded by actors who are otherwise already socially attractive.  It does not, 
however, appear to be sensitive to the nature of the relationship between the actor 
and the recipient.   
 Two trends emerged across the results of studies 1-4; female participants and 
religiously inclined participants seem to report higher feelings of moral elevation than 
male or non-religious participants.  Although the magnitudes of these differences 
only reached statistical significance in some of the studies (studies 1 and 4 for sex, 
and 1 and 3A for religion), the means reported in every study trended in the same 
direction.  The studies reported in Chapter 6 will offer further chances to look for the 
presence of these relationships, and their potential origin and significance will be 
considered in Chapter 7.   
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 Finally, it should be noted that the participants used across studies 1 – 4 were 
recruited from online paid-participant platforms (Crowd Flower and Amazon 
Mechanical Turk).  These crowdsourcing sites have become increasingly popular as 
sources of relatively inexpensive, plentiful, and quickly collectable data, and many 
research projects have obtained high quality and reliable data using online collection 
methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  It is important to bear in mind, 
however, that issues such as lack of experimental control (Crump, McDonnell, & 
Gureckis, 2013) and participant non-naiveté (Chandler, Paolacci, Peer, Mueller, & 
Ratliff, 2015) may dilute or distort the results produced by studies which rely 
exclusively on online participants.  Study 5, reported in Chapter 6, will offer some 
variation in participant recruitment methodology to rectify this sole reliance on 
internet-based samples.   
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 In this chapter, consideration is given to the kinds of computational output 
moral elevation should be expected to generate if the emotion is an adaptation which 
functions in the manner suggested by either the reputation-management hypothesis 
or the relationship-building hypothesis.  The theory of recalibrational emotions is 
described, and the particular type of computational element with which these 
emotions interact – the internal regulatory variable – is introduced.  Predictions 
concerning which internal regulatory variables moral elevation should interact with 
are offered.  It is proposed that experiences of moral elevation should recalibrate an 
individual’s welfare trade-off ratio, making them more willing to cede welfare to 
others.  It is also proposed that experiences of moral elevation should alter the 
weight placed by an individual on various motivational priorities; specifically, that an 
individual should become more concerned with behaving benevolently than with 
demonstrating strict moral norm-adherence, and that individuals should preferentially 
seek opportunities to demonstrate a willingness to help others who are less able to 
repay their actions.  It is also predicted, in line with the reputation-management 
hypothesis and contra the relationship-building hypothesis, that elevated individuals 
should express stronger motivations to display their benevolence to others than to 
engage in relationship-building activities with the individual whose behaviour elicited 





 Having examined the input side of moral elevation for evidence of special 
design, this chapter moves on to consider what characteristics the output side of the 
emotion should be expected to exhibit if it is a functionally specialized part of our 
naturally developing cognitive architecture.   
 In studies across the moral elevation literature, participants who report 
stronger feelings of moral elevation have been shown to make larger donations to 
charity (Aquino et al., 2011; Thomson & Siegel, 2013; Van de Vyver & Abrams, 
2015), make higher offers in a dictator game (Aquino et al., 2011), spend more time 
helping a researcher with a boring task (Schnall et al., 2010), engage in more 
volunteering activity (Cox, 2010), demonstrate more organizational citizenship 
behaviours (Vianello et al., 2010), and take a greater interest in mentoring (Thomson 
et al., 2014).  This combination of results provides strong evidence that moral 
elevation increases an individual’s tendency to engage in benevolent behaviour.  As 
with elevation’s elicitors, however, there have been no investigations looking for 
evidence of nuances in the emotion’s output which would be predicted by a theory 
about its function.   
 The next section will describe in more detail how emotions are thought to 
work at a computational level, focusing in particular on the working of a sub-category 
of emotions that we might expect moral elevation to belong to.  The remaining 
sections will make predictions about observable outputs which would indicate that 
such computational processes are occurring when people experience moral 
elevation.   
 
Recalibrational Emotions 
 As described in Chapter 1, evolutionary psychologists understand emotions 
as cognitive adaptations which operate as superordinate mechanism-coordinating 
devices.  They mobilize various cognitive subroutines, each emotion creating a 
pattern of cognitive activation which helped our ancestors to solve some particular, 
recurrent, and relatively complex adaptive problem	 (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b, 
2008).  
 Some emotions initiate immediate, reflexive behavioural sequences (e.g., 
fear, disgust, or sexual arousal).  These are emotions which function to guide us 
through situations where quickly initiating a fixed pattern of action is necessary to 
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avert some fitness (or opportunity) cost. Other emotions, though, have less 
precipitous effects; we experience them as more phenomenologically diffuse, some 
of them may not have definitive associated facial expressions, and they don’t 
generate the same kind of highly specific action routines as emotions like fear.  This 
second class are known as ‘recalibrational emotions’, and it is this category to which 
moral elevation would belong.   
 Recalibrational emotions alter our motivational priorities by updating the 
values stored in registers in our minds which  help us to adaptively regulate our 
behaviour.  These registers are known as ‘internal regulatory variables’ (IRVs) - a 
class of computational element described under a recently proposed computational 
framework for motivation (Tooby et al., 2008).  Our minds use IRVs to store 
information about variables in the world which can alter the fitness consequences of 
various types of behaviour.   
 The fitness consequences of any decisions we make (any course of action we 
take) are dictated by a number of mutable variables, exogenous and endogenous.  
The likely fitness-outcome of foraging for a particular kind of food, for example, 
depends (at least) on the calorific value of the food, the current energy 
needs/reserves of the individual, the availability of alternative sources of 
nourishment, the physical exertion required to obtain it, the risk exposure, and the 
opportunities the individual will miss if she invests time in foraging.  Each of these 
variables is subject to change, as food ripens, personal circumstances change, the 
seasons move on, etc.  In order to make fitness promoting decisions, we need to be 
able to gather information about the magnitudes of variables like these, and use this 
information to guide our decision making.   
 IRVs are proposed to execute this function, acting as our minds’ update-able 
information storage units.  They enable us to adaptively match our decision making 
strategies to our changing environment.  Our minds are expected to contain an 
enormous number of IRVs, to facilitate the highly sophisticated context sensitivity of 
our behaviour (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013).   
 WTRs (described in Chapter 2) are an example of a summary IRV.  They are 
computed by summing estimates of a range of variables which dictate the likelihood 
that our welfare and the welfare of another will overlap.  Features of individuals 
which give us reasons to value their welfare, such as their likely degree of genetic 
relatedness to us, the chance that they will value our welfare in return, or the 
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potential they hold as a mating opportunity, are stored as IRVs in our minds (a 
kinship index, a reciprocity index, a sexual value index etc., for each specific other 
we encounter).  These variables are combined to form the WTR we hold for any 
individual, which in turn feeds into the decision rule our minds use to make choices 
about welfare ceding or cost imposing behaviours (CSelf  <  BOther  x  WTROther / BSelf  
>  COther  X  WTROther).  A single IRV can stand as input to a variety of decision rules 
or summary variables.  Kinship indices, for example, feed into the computation of our 
welfare trade-off ratios, and also into our computation of others’ sexual value, 
thereby affecting the output of decision rules which govern our romantic behaviour 
(Lieberman et al., 2007).   
 When features of the environment change, these IRVs need to be updated, or 
recalibrated.  For example, when someone else benefits us unexpectedly, increasing 
the likelihood that a social relationship with them would be valuable to us,  we may 
experience gratitude, which produces an upward recalibration of: our WTR toward 
the person to whom we are grateful; the value we place on opportunities to associate 
with the other; and our motivations to communicate our positive feelings about the 
other to the other (Lim, 2012).  In performing these recalibrations, gratitude helps us 
build or solidify beneficial social relationships.   
 Recalibration plays a large part in all emotion programs, but it is expected to 
be the principal or only role played by emotions like guilt, gratitude, shame, and grief 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).  Rather than producing an immediate and very specific 
sequence of actions (like the startle reflex when we we’re given a fright), 
recalibrational emotions have a more down-stream effect on our behaviour, by 
altering the parameters that feed into the decision rules which guide the ways we 
act.  Moral elevation fits the phenomenological profile of a recalibrational emotion 
because it lacks an associated knee-jerk behavioural response (a feature noted, 
though not satisfactorily explained, by Fredrickson, 2013).   
 The sections that follow will consider what recalibrational activities moral 
elevation may perform.  Under the relationship-building hypothesis, the 
recalibrational activities of moral elevation should be geared towards helping us take 
advantage of an opportunity to form a social relationship with a high-value potential 
partner.  Under the reputation-management hypothesis, on the other hand, elevation 
should initiate a pattern of recalibration geared towards helping us safeguard our 
social reputation in the face of threats from others who display attractive partner 
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qualities.  Of the five predictions given below, confirmation of the first four – 
predictions 5a, 5b, 6a and 6b - would add equal weight to either hypothesis.  
Prediction 6c, however, offers a chance to differentiate the two.   
 
Up-Regulating Extrinsic Welfare Trade-Off Ratios 
 The impetus to benefit another individual can be very different depending on 
whether or not our actions are being observed, and consequently we are expected to 
calculate two parallel WTRs; an intrinsic one, which guides unobserved behaviours, 
and an extrinsic one, which guides our public (or potentially public) behaviours 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).  This extrinsic WTR – or more specifically, one of the 
parameters that feed into its calculation - would be the most obvious candidate IRV 
for moral elevation to recalibrate.   
 Given the importance of benevolent signaling behaviour in human social life, 
one of the inputs affecting our extrinsic WTR must be some kind of ‘signaling value 
index’  - a register of the probable marginal returns to be made from public displays 
of welfare ceding.  Up-ratcheting this ‘signal value’ would increase an individual’s 
willingness to benefit others (in observable situations); whether the signal was 
intended for all and sundry (à la the reputation-management hypothesis) or for one 
particular target (à la the relationship-building hypothesis) up-ratcheting this index 
would be a computationally efficient way to adaptively steer our behaviour.   
 
Prediction 5a:  Morally elevated individuals will display higher extrinsic WTRs than 
will non-elevated individuals   
 
 Although there is already plenty of evidence that moral elevation increases 
welfare-ceding behaviour (summarized above), there has so far been no 
unambiguous demonstration that elevation is actually recalibrating one of our 
cognitive registers, rather than just producing some unguided impulse to perform a 
benevolent act.  Even if the interaction between moral elevation and WTRs was 
considered self-evident, extant research results don’t allow us to estimate the 
magnitude of the effect.  One resource allocation decision in isolation (such as one 
donation to a charity) only allows us to estimate a lower bound for the actor’s welfare 
trade-off ratio toward the beneficiary.  Giving an actor a series of resource allocation 
choices with different and opposing fitness outcomes for herself and another person, 
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however, allows us to identify the upper bound of her WTR (Delton, 2010).  Study 5, 
reported in Chapter 6, will employ a research paradigm capable of giving a more 
granular picture of moral elevation’s behavioural output.   
 
Interaction With Other Attractive Partner-Qualities 
 Some people rely heavily on their generosity to attract and retain partners, 
while others have different qualities which allow them to rely less on benevolent 
signaling to gain access to social relationships.  Status, resources, sexual value, 
formidability, etc. (the qualities discussed in the final section of Chapter 2), raise an 
individual’s partner-value irrespective of their generosity, and so we might expect the 
presence of these qualities to attenuate the effects of moral elevation on an 
individual’s extrinsic WTR.  The ‘market value’ of otherwise socially-attractive 
individuals is not as threatened by the socially attractive performances of others 
(reputation-management hypothesis - Fessler & Haley, 2003), and these individuals 
have less need to rely on behavioural performances of their own in the course of 
courting potential social partners (relationship-building hypothesis).   
 
Prediction 5b: The effect of moral elevation on extrinsic WTR will be less pronounced 




 Finally, if moral elevation acts in a recalibrational capacity, we should expect 
to see some effects on the motivational priorities of morally elevated individuals.  If 
one of elevation’s functions is to increase our engagement in activities which signal 
our partner value to others (or a specific other), then we should expect elevated 
individuals to preferentially seek opportunities to engage in activities with the 
strongest available signal value.  In line with the reasoning laid out in Chapter 2, we 
might expect that: 
 
Prediction 6a: Morally elevated individuals will express stronger motivations to 






Prediction 6b: Morally elevated individuals will express stronger motivations to 
benefit others whose welfare they have no incentive to value than those whose 
welfare they are already invested in  
 
 (The failure to find any support for prediction 3 may give us pause in backing 
prediction 6b, but the data to test prediction 6b were collected at the same time as 
the data testing prediction 3).   
 The relationship-building hypothesis and the reputation-management 
hypothesis make different predictions about the relative value to an elevated 
individual of signaling opportunities and relationship building opportunities.  Although 
the relationship-building hypothesis allows for some signaling behaviour (in order for 
the elevated individual to attract the person whose behaviour elicited the emotion), it 
should predict that motivation towards signaling activities would take a back-seat to 
motivations to actually build a relationship with the socially attractive other.  The 
reputation-management hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that elevated 
individuals would show a stronger preference to demonstrate their benevolent 
qualities to others than the pursue a relationship with the benevolent actor who 
generated the emotion.  Given the stronger prima facie case for the reputation-
management hypothesis, this thesis prefers the second prediction: 
 
Prediction 6c: Morally elevated individuals will express stronger motivations to 
engage in benevolent signaling activities than in relationship-building activities 
 
 The following chapter will report the results of two studies intended to test 
whether moral elevation’s outputs conform to the expectations of a functionalist 
hypothesis.  Study 5 will look for evidence of moral elevation recalibrating our 
welfare trade-off ratios, and study 6 will look for evidence of moral elevation 
recalibrating our motivational priorities.  In addition to further exploring the possibility 
that moral elevation is a functionally integrated part of our cognitive architecture, it is 
hoped that the investigation of prediction 6c may allow us to establish a clearer 
picture of precisely what function moral elevation could have been selected to 
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perform.  If this prediction is met, we would have stronger reason to accept the 
























 This chapter reports the results of two studies.  Study 5 aimed to test two 
predictions: that moral elevation will increase an individual’s extrinsic welfare trade-
off ratio; and that the effects of moral elevation on an individual’s welfare trade-off 
ratio will be attenuated by the individual’s relative partner value.  Study 6 aimed to 
test the prediction that elevated individuals would express a particular pattern of 
motivational priorities.  Study 5 found some support for the first prediction, but no 
support for the second.  Study 6 did not find evidence two of the anticipated 
motivational differences between more and less elevated individuals, but it did find 
evidence of the difference anticipated specifically by the reputation-management 




Study 5: Does Moral Elevation Increase Extrinsic WTR, And If So, Is This Effect 
Attenuated By High Partner-Value? 
 
 Study 5 aimed to test predictions 5a and 5b: 
 
Prediction 5a:  Morally elevated individuals will display higher extrinsic WTRs than 
will non-elevated individuals 
 
Prediction 5b: Individuals with relatively high partner-value will be less prone to 
experience moral elevation than individuals with relatively low-partner value 
 
Design 
 Study 5 employed a between-participant experimental design.  Participants 
were asked to watch a short video (either a morally elevating clip or an amusing 
one), and then asked to complete a measure designed to show their WTR towards 
an anonymous stranger.  In line with prediction 5a, it was anticipated that 
participants who watched the elevating video would display higher WTRs than 
participants who watched the amusing video.  Participants were also measured for 
attractiveness and physical formidability (characteristics which raise the partner 
value of men and women respectively (Bang Peterson, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 
2010; Sell et al., 2008)).  In line with prediction 5b, it was anticipated that participants 
who were relatively attractive or formidable would demonstrate lower WTRs than 






 106 participants, a mix of undergraduate students and staff, were recruited 
from University College Isle of Man between 01/05/2018 and 08/02/2019.  Ethical 
approval was granted for the study on 27/03/2018.  All participants were residents of 
the Isle of Man.  Participant age ranged between 18 and 75 (M = 32.82, SD = 15.40), 
and 63% of participants indicated that they held no religious affiliation.   
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 3 participants failed to complete the measure of the study’s dependent 
variable, and were removed from the dataset.  A further 15 participants were 
removed because the WTRs they expressed during completion of the dependent 
variable measure were too inconsistent to be functionally interpretable.  Full criteria 
for this removal process are detailed in the procedures section below.  The 
remaining N was 88.   
 
Measures and Materials 
 The video clip used to elicit moral elevation was a 2.23 minute portion of the 
video Kindness Boomerang published by ‘Life Vest Inside’, which depicts people on 
a city street performing kind acts for one another in a ‘pay-it-forward’ fashion, set to 
moving music.  The video clip used as a control was 2.48 minute clip from a BBC 
David Attenborough documentary Planet Earth, depicting the mating dance of a bird 
of paradise, set to whimsical music.   
 The measure used to gauge participants’ WTRs was developed by Delton 
(2010).  The measure comprises a series of resource-allocation decision making 
tasks, in which the participant must choose between allocating a sum of money to 
themselves, or allocating a different sum of money to an other.  Figure 7 gives an 
example.   
  Throughout the decisions, the ratio of the values to be allocated varies (in the 
examples given in Figure 3, the Self amount : Other amount ratios are 27:20, 7:20, 
and 3:20 respectively).  By looking for a participant’s ‘switch point’ - the point at 
which a participant switches from allocating to themselves to allocating to the other - 
we can establish an upper and lower bound for the individual’s WTR towards the 
other. 
 The total set of decisions presented to participants is comprised of 6 anchored 
sub-sets (mixed and combined). Each sub-set is formed of 10 decisions, and within 
each set, the amount that the other can be allocated is fixed, anchoring variable 
sums which can be allocated to the self.  The anchored amounts are 19, 23, 37, 46, 
68, and 75.  The amount that the self can be allocated is determined by multiplying 
the anchors by different (evenly spaced) ratios: -0.35, -0.15, 0.05, 0.25, 0.45, 0.65, 
0.85, 1.05, 1.25, and 1.45 (rounded to nearest integer).  Participants were asked to 
assume that each choice was independent of the others, and that the money could 
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Figure 7.  Example of Welfare Trade-off Task Decisions 
 
  Self Other 
Decision 1   
Option 1 54p 0p 
Option 2 0p 37p 
Decision 2   
Option 1 17p 0p 
Option 2 0p 37p 
Decision 3   
Option 1 9p 0p 
Option 2 0p 37p 
 
Figure 7:  Participants must choose between option 1 and option 2 in a series of 
decisions.   
 
  
 Moral elevation was once again measured using the 8 item moral elevation 
scale from Vianello et al. (2010).  Participants were asked to indicate their 
agreement with scale items using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Strongly 
disagree” to 7 “Strongly agree”; Cronbach’s α was .81. 
 To measure participant attractiveness, facial photographs were taken using 
an iPhone 5, mounted on a Rhodesy ‘octopus style’ tripod stand.  After initial data 
collection was complete, the facial photographs were rated by 20 Amazon MTurk 
workers, recruited from the USA.  These workers were presented with each 
participant photograph sequentially, and asked to rate, on a scale from 1 (‘very 
unattractive’) to 10 (‘very attractive’), how attractive they thought the person in the 
photograph was compared to other men/women of a similar age. There was good 
inter-rater agreement;  Cronbach’s α = .98.   
 To gauge participant formidability, flexed bicep circumference was measured 
using a standard dress-maker’s tape-measure.  Participants were asked to flex 
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whichever arm they preferred (with sleeves removed where possible), and their 
biceps was measured at the highest point.   
   
Procedure 
 Participants were seen by the researcher one-on-one in a private room.  
Participants were alternately placed into either condition 1 or condition 2 
(randomized by the order in which they were recruited). 
 A facial photograph was taken, with any long hair tied back off the face, 
glasses removed, and the camera mounted on a tripod to standardize picture angle.  
Participants’ flexed bicep circumference was measured as a gauge of their physical 
formidability.  Although more direct measures of strength exist (e.g. hand-grip or 
weight-lifting ability), flexed bicep circumference (which has previously been found to 
account for roughly 50% of the variance in weight-lifting ability (Sell et al., 2010)) was 
the most cost and time efficient measurement option.  
 Participants were then shown one of the two short video clips.  Following the 
video, each participant was asked to complete a ‘decision making task’.  Participants 
were told that the ‘other’ in the decision options was another study participant with 
whom they had been randomly and anonymously paired, and who would not be 
performing the decision making task. Participants were told they were in the role of 
‘decision-maker’, and their decisions would determine how much money they and 
the ‘other’ had the opportunity to win.  Making the recipient in the WTR task an 
anonymous stranger was not only a practically useful aspect of the design – it also 
ensured that the WTR participants were being asked to display was as close to 
being comprised only of the value held in participants’ ‘signal value index’ as 
possible.  That is to say, offering participants the chance to benefit an anonymous 
stranger removed the possibility that any other, non-signal related, reasons for a 
participant to value the welfare of the recipient would confound the resulting WTRs. 
 To make the stakes real, participants were told that, at the completion of the 
study, three participant-pairs would be drawn at random, and the money allocated by 
the ‘decision-maker’ would be paid out to both parties of the pair in full.  After the 
decision making task, participants were asked to complete the 8 item questionnaire 
measure of moral elevation.   
 Participants’ WTRs were calculated following the procedure set out by Delton 
(2010).  For each of the 6 anchored decision sets, participants’ WTRs were 
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calculated by finding the switch point – the point at which the participant switches 
from giving money to the other to taking money for themselves.  If more than one 
possible switch point exists, the switch point assigned to the set was the one with 
which the greatest number of decisions conformed; i.e., if 5 of the decisions in the 
set conformed with one available switch point, and 8 of the decisions conformed with 
the other, the second switch point would be used to determine the WTR expressed 
in the set.  To gauge the consistency of the assigned switch point, each set was 
given a ‘consistency maximization score’ (CMS) – a number between 1 and 10, 
indicating how many choices in the set conformed with the switch point assigned to 
it.   
 Each participant’s 6 CMS scores were averaged to give a percentage value 
representing how uniformly they had expressed the WTRs assigned to them.  
Because a CMS of 70.84% is expected if participants were answering randomly 
(Delton, 2010), participants with scores lower than 75% were removed – the 
remaining N was 88.  Once all 6 sets were marked, participants were given a ‘perfect 
consistency score’ (PCS) – a number between 1 and 6, indicating how many of the 6 
anchored sets were perfectly consistent with a single switch point (those with a CMS 
of 10).  Because even one decision that is incongruent with the switch point of a set 
prevents that set from being perfectly consistent, the PCS offers a more stringent 
test of participants’ WTR consistency.   
 The attractiveness ratings gathered for each participant were summed and 
averaged, to give each participant a mean attractiveness score.  Data were manually 
inputted to and analyzed using SPSS.   
 
Results 
 Initial data inspection revealed a number of outliers. There was one low-end 
outlier among the WTR scores, and four low-end outliers among the moral elevation 
scores.  All outliers were replaced with the second lowest non-outlying score for that 
measure.  Following these replacements, WTR scores were normally distributed 
(D(86) = .09, p = .06, but elevation scores were negatively skewed (D(86) = .11, p = 
.01).  Reverse Log transformation did not improve the shape of the distribution, and 
so elevation scores were left untransformed; this should be borne in mind when 
judging the resilience of the following tests.  Both attractiveness scores (D(79) = .07, 
p = .20) and bicep circumference (D(83) = .09, p = .97) were normally distributed.  
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Mean scores for moral elevation, WTR and PCS by condition, sex, and religious 
persuasion are given in Table 15.  
 
Table 15 
Mean Moral Elevation, Welfare Trade-off Ratio, and Perfect Consistency Scores by 











Condition     
  Elevated 40 4.92(.80) .82(.42) 5.05(1.24) 
 Control 39 4.07(.93) .73(.37) 3.90(2.29) 
Sex     
Male 41 4.49(.20) .78(.40) 4.59(1.92) 
Female 36 4.54(.92) .76(.40) 4.37(1.92) 
Religious     
Yes 16 4.51(.98) .76(.38) 4.57(1.79) 
No 63 4.53(.87) .84(.48) 4.13(2.36) 
Total 79 4.51(.96) .77(.40) 4.48(1.91) 
 
 
 A backwards step-wise linear multiple regression analysis was conducted 
using moral elevation as the dependent variable and participant age, sex, religious 
affiliation, and condition as the predictor variables.  The purpose of this analysis was 
to check for any demographic differences in moral elevation, and to ensure that the 
manipulation had had the anticipated effect.  Regression coefficients are shown in 
Table 16.   
 As anticipated, condition significantly predicted moral elevation, accounting for 
17% of the variance in mean elevation scores.  None of the demographic predictors 
emerged as significant.  
 A second backwards step-wise linear multiple regression analysis was 
conducted with condition and moral elevation as the predictors, and WTR as the 







Regression Coefficients: Condition, Sex, Age, and Religiosity as Predictors of Moral 
Elevation  
Predictors B SE B β  
Step 1    
   Constant 4.20 .24  
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .79 .18 .44* 
   Sex: Female vs. Male .03 .18 .02 
   Age -.01 .23 -.06 
   Religiosity: No vs. Yes .31 .23 .14 
Step 2    
   Constant 4.22 .23  
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .79 .18 .44* 
   Age .004 .01 -.06 
   Religiosity: No vs. Yes .31 .22 .14 
Step 3    
   Constant 4.11 .14  
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .77 .18 .43* 
      Religiosity: No vs. Yes .27 .22 .13 
Step 4    
   Constant 4.19 .13  
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .74 .18 .41* 
Note: R2 for step 1 = .19 (p = .002), ΔR2 for step 2 <.001 (p = .86), ΔR2 for step 3 = -















Regression Coefficients: Condition and Moral Elevation as Predictors of Welfare 
Trade-off Ratio 
Predictors B SE B β  
Step 1    
   Constant .57 .24  
   Moral Elevation .02 .06 .05 
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .09 .10 .10 
Step 2    
   Constant .67 .07  
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .10 .09 .12 
Step 3    
   Constant .72 .05  
Note: R2 for step 1 = .02 (p = .49), ΔR2 for step 2 = -.002 (p = .68), ΔR2 for step 3 = -
.02 (p = .26) 
 
 Contra prediction 5a, neither moral elevation nor the condition in which 
participants were placed predicted participants’ mean WTR.  As illustrated in Figure 
8, the confidence interval for the mean WTR difference between participants in the 
two conditions was relatively wide (lower bound = -.08, upper bound = .27), 
indicating that the test may not have had the required power to detect any effect of 
condition on WTR.   
 It was also noticeable that the distribution of welfare trade-off ratios, although 
it passed tests of normality, was not smoothly distributed, with build-ups of extreme 
scores at either end of the scale (illustrated in Figure 9).  Extreme cases were 
excluded (i.e., leaving only cases with WTRs > 0 and < 1.14), resulting in a 















Figure 8: Mean welfare trade-off ratios expressed by participants in each of the two 






















Figure 9: Frequency distribution, with normal curve, of welfare trade-off ratio scores, 



















Figure 10:  Frequency distribution, with normal curve, of welfare trade-off ratios with 
extreme cases removed.   
 
 
 With these extreme cases removed, a second backwards step-wise linear 
multiple regression analysis was conducted with condition and moral elevation as the 
predictors, and WTR as the outcome variable.  The resulting coefficients are shown 
in Table 18.   
 Moral elevation did not significantly predict WTR, but there was a significant 
effect of condition on WTR; F(1, 66) = 4.67, p = .03, R2 = .06.  A further simple 
regression analysis confirmed that, under the trimmed distribution, condition also 
significantly predicted moral elevation; F(1, 66) = 18.65, p < .001, R2 = .22.    
 As an exploratory measure, a t-test was performed to see whether the 
difference in perfect consistency scores between participants in the two conditions 
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was significant.  Participants in the elevated condition (under the trimmed 
distribution) averaged 4.55 perfectly consistent sets out of 6 (SD = 1.62), whereas 
those in the control condition averaged only 3.30 (SD = 2.47), a difference which 
was statistically significant; t(68) = 2.47, p = .02.  The difference is illustrated in 
Figure 11.   
 
Table 18 
Second Regression Coefficients: Condition and Moral Elevation as Predictors of 
Welfare Trade-off Ratio 
Predictors B SE B β  
Step 1    
   Constant .73 .18  
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .15 .07 .29* 
   Moral Elevation -.02 .04 -.07 
Step 2    
   Constant .64 .04  
   Condition: Elevated vs. Control .14 .06 .26* 
























Figure 11: Mean number of sets, out of 6, answered perfectly consistently by 




 Both participant attractiveness and bicep circumference were normally 
distributed; respectively, D(79) = .07, p = .20, and D(83) = .09, p = .97.  A series of 
simple regression analyses were conducted to explore whether either moral 
elevation or WTR varied in line with female attractiveness or male bicep 
circumference.  Contra prediction 5b, the results showed no significant relationships: 
female attractiveness did not predict moral elevation (R2 = .01, p = .54) or WTR (R2 = 
.02, p = .39); and male bicep circumference did not predict moral elevation (R2 = .01, 





 Study 5 provided some support for the prediction that more morally elevated 
individuals would express higher welfare trade-off ratios towards anonymous 
strangers.  Although the regression results with the full set of scores returned no 
significant results, the sample size for this study was relatively small and the tests 
may have lacked enough power to detect any present effects.  Once the distribution 
was trimmed of extreme scores, and thereby made more normal, the condition into 
which participants had been placed did significantly predict the WTR they 
subsequently displayed.  There was also a significant positive correlation between 
WTR and self-reported moral elevation.  There was also a significant effect of video 
condition on participants’ perfect consistency scores – participants who watched the 
elevating video expressed significantly more consistent WTRs than those who 
watched the control video.  This may indicate a stronger pattern of cognitive 
activation in the welfare trade-off mechanisms of morally elevated participants, which 
would be anticipated by the hypothesis that moral elevation acts as a recalibrational 
emotion.   
 There was no support, however, for the prediction that more physically 
formidable males and more attractive females would be less prone to the effects of 
moral elevation than their less formidable or less attractive counterparts.  Neither the 
attractiveness of female participants, nor the bicep circumference of male 
participants predicted either the level of moral elevation they reported or the WTR 
they expressed.  
 There were a number of methodological problems in study 5 which may have 
inhibited the ability of the study to detect the predicted effects.  Because a single 
researcher conducted this study in an isolated location with a small population, the 
overall N was relatively small, and there was a lack of environmental control in some 
aspects of the administration procedures.  Not all participants wore clothing which 
allowed for a clean bicep measure, and the location (and therefore lighting 
conditions) used to photograph participants varied, contributing to potentially 
confounding measurement error in both bicep circumference and attractiveness.  
Any attempts to further explore the effects of physical differences on individuals’ 
proneness to experience moral elevation should consider the use of more 
sophisticated biometric measuring techniques (e.g., (M E Price, Dunn, Hopkins, & 
Kang, 2012)).   
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 In addition to testing predictions 5a and 5b, study 5 allowed for a replication of 
Delton’s (2010) demonstration that our minds do in fact house WTRs.  Delton 
illustrated that participants are able to produce remarkably consistent answers on the 
WTR task (with choices which conform very closely to a single ratio switch point) but 
unable to achieve anything like the same consistency when performing a 
mathematically identical task with an externally generated ratio (deciding whether 
sets of monetary comparisons fell above or below a given exchange rate).  An 
astonishing 45.6% of participants in study 5 had perfect consistency scores of 6 (i.e., 
all six decision-sets had a single switch point); 17.7% had a PCS of 5, and 13.9% 
had a PCS of 4.  It also bears noting that Delton asked his study participants to 
imagine a specific ‘other’ as the recipient in their WTR tasks, the present study used 
an anonymous stranger  as the ‘other’.  The fact that the same high level of choice 
consistency emerged here as in Delton’s work supports the idea that our welfare 
trade-off ratio estimator mechanism does include a ‘signal value’ index, capable of 
motivating us to confer benefits on others even when the values for all other WTR 
sub-indices are nil.   
 There was no significant sex difference in moral elevation in study 5, but as 
with studies 1 - 4, mean scores for women were slightly higher than mean scores for 
men.  Similarly with religiosity differences, although non-significant, mean elevation 
for religious participants in study 5 were slightly higher than those for non-religious 
participants.   
 
Study 6: Do Elevated Individuals Show Particular Motivational Preferences? 
 
 Study 6 aimed to test predictions 6a, 6b, and 6c: 
 
Prediction 6a: Morally elevated individuals will express stronger motivations to 
engage in benevolent behaviour than in non-benevolent but morally laudable 
behaviour 
 
Prediction 6b: Morally elevated individuals will express stronger motivations to 
benefit others whose welfare they have no incentive to value than those whose 
welfare they are already invested in 
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Prediction 6c: Morally elevated individuals will express stronger motivations to 




 Study 6 employed an unconventional design, opportunistically harvesting 
participants from two separate studies already reported above (studies 1 and 3A).  
The motivation for the design was to maximize data collection (and therefore cost) 
efficiency.  At the close of each of these two studies, participants were asked to 
complete an ipsative questionnaire intended to gauge their motivational preferences.  
The intention of study 6 is to explore the results of those motivational preference 
probes; the purpose of reporting these results here, rather than alongside studies 1 
and 3A, is to maintain the expositional integrity of considering moral elevation’s 
inputs separately from its outputs.   
 In line with prediction 6a, it was anticipated that participants with higher moral 
elevation scores would express a stronger preference for opportunities to behave 
benevolently than for opportunities to behave morally; in line with prediction 6b, it 
was anticipated that participants with higher moral elevation scores would express 
stronger preferences for opportunities to benefit strangers than loved ones; and in 
line with  prediction 6c, it was anticipated that participants with higher moral elevation 
scores would express stronger preferences for opportunities to engage in signaling 





 Participants from study 1 (N = 134, age range 18-68, M = 34.70, SD = 10.02, 
44.8% female, recruited from the USA and India), were combined for analyses with 
participants from study 3A (N = 103, age range 22-69, M = 36.44, SD = 10.64), 43% 







 Participants from both samples had previously been asked to read vignettes 
describing more or less putatively elevating behaviour and to then rate their 
experiences of moral elevation. Participants in study 1 had been asked to complete 
an ipsative version of Vianello et al.’s (2010) 8 item moral elevation measure (given 
in full in Appendix A).  Each of the 8 items had three answer choices, and 
participants were asked to indicate the option which best described how they felt as 
they were reading the story.  One option for each item was taken from the moral 
elevation scale, one option was a positively-valenced sensation not associated with 
elevation, and the third option was ‘neither’.  Participants in study 3A had previously 
been asked to read two short vignettes, and then complete an 8 item comparative 
moral elevation measure (again adapted from Vianello et al. (2010)).  For each of the 
8 aspects of moral elevation picked up by Vianello et al.’s scale, participants were 
asked which story, if either, had elicited it most strongly in them (the full measure is 
given in Appendix B).   
 Participants’ motivations were measured using a 9-item forced-choice 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was comprised of 9 statement pairs, and 
participants were asked to choose which item in each pair they agreed with most 
strongly (full list of items and task instructions included in Appendix F).   
 The first three questions in the 9 item motivation probe asked participants 
whether they felt more motivated to engage in benevolent behaviour or moral 
behaviour, or unmotivated to engage in either kind of behaviour.  The first question 
asked participants whether they more strongly endorsed the statement ‘I want to 
make a positive difference in other peoples’ lives’ (benevolent option) or the 
statement ‘I think it’s very important to fulfill my obligations’ (moral option).  The 
second question asked participants to choose between ‘Being kind is the most 
important thing in life’ (benevolent option) and ‘I always try to do what’s right’ (moral 
option.  The final question offered ‘I want to be a more generous person’ (benevolent 
option) and ‘I want to be a more moral person’ (moral option).   
 The second three questions in the 9 item motivation probe asked participants 
whether they felt more motivated to engage in kindly behaviours towards their loved 
ones or towards strangers.  The first item asked participants to choose between ‘I 
want to help someone less fortunate than myself’ (strangers) and ‘I want to remind 
my family that I love them’ (loved ones).  The second item offered ‘Everyone 
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deserves help when they’re at their lowest ebb’ (strangers) or ‘It’s important to be 
there for the people who are there for you’ (loved ones), and the third item offered ‘I 
think we should all work to make society fairer for people who get a raw deal’ 
(strangers) or ‘I’m looking forward to the next time I get to hang out with my closest 
friend’ (loved ones).  
 The final three items aimed to tap into whether morally elevated individuals 
show a greater concern for signaling their partner value to others (though 
indiscriminate benevolence) or for building a new social relationship with the 
protagonist who elicited the elevation (through targeted benevolence).  The first item 
asked participants to choose between ‘If I was in [protagonist’s] position, I’d like to 
think I would have done the same thing they did’ (indiscriminate) and ‘If I met 
someone like [protagonist], I think we’d be really good friends’ (targeted).  The 
second item offered ‘I’d like to get more involved in projects that help my local 
community’ (indiscriminate) or ‘I’d go out of my way to help someone who acted like 
[protagonist] did’ (targeted), and the third item offered ‘Reading the story made me 
want to be a more caring person’ (indiscriminate) or ‘As I read the story, I wished I 
could tell [protagonist] what a good person I thought he was’ (targeted).   
   
Procedure 
 Study 1 participants’ moral elevation scores were calculated by giving a score 
of 1 to each response option from the 8-item elevation scale, and a score of 0 to 
each control response option and to each ‘neither’ response option, giving a moral 
elevation score between 0 and 8, with higher scores indicating stronger feelings of 
moral elevation.  
 The use of a comparative format for measuring elevation in Study 3A 
participants was intended to facilitate exploration of prediction 3 (described in 
Chapter 4), but the inclusion of the ‘neither’ choice option also allowed the measure 
to be scored as an indicator of overall moral elevation.  As described in Chapter 4, 
participants were given a score of 1 each time they answered that either story had 
evoked a component of elevation, and a score of 0 each time they answered that 
neither story had evoked the sensation in question.  This left Study 3A participants 
with a moral elevation score between 0 and 8, with higher values taken to indicate 
stronger overall feelings of moral elevation.  
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 Participants’ answers to the motivation probes were scored in three groups.  
The answers to questions 1-3 were scored so that -1 represented the choice of the 
‘benevolent’ option, 1 represented choosing the ‘moral’ option, and 0 represented 
choosing ‘neither’.  Participants’ scores for each of the three questions were 
summed and averaged, to give participants a mean score for benevolent vs. moral 
motivation (Motivation 1), such that negative values indicate a stronger motivation 
engage in benevolent behaviour than to demonstrate fealty to moral norms.   
 For questions 4-6, a score of -1 indicated having chosen the ‘loved ones’ 
option, 1 represented the ‘strangers’ option, and 0 represented ‘neither’.  The scores 
were, again, summed and averaged, giving a mean score for helping loved ones vs. 
helping strangers (Motivation 2), with negative values indicating a stronger 
preference for the former, and positive values a stronger preference for the latter.   
 Finally for questions 7-9, -1 indicated the choice of the ‘indiscriminate’ option, 
1 represented the ‘targeted option’, and 0 represented ‘neither’.  Mean scores for 
indiscriminate vs. targeted benevolence (Motivation 3) ran so that negative numbers 
indicated a stronger motivation for indiscriminate benevolence, and positive numbers 
indicated a stronger preference for targeted benevolence.  
 Data were analysed using IMB’s SPSS.   
 
Results 
 A backwards step-wise linear multiple regression, using motivation 1, otivation 
2, and motivation 3 as predictors and moral elevation as the outcome variable.  The 
resulting coefficients are shown in Table 19.   
 Motivation 1 and Motivation 2 failed to predict moral elevation.  There was no 
significant relationship between whether a participant felt more motivated to act 
benevolently or morally and the level of moral elevation they reported, and there was 
likewise no relationship between elevation and whether a participant felt more 
motivated to invest in loved ones or be kind to strangers.  Motivation 3, however, did 
emerge as a significant predictor, accounting for accounting for 22% of the variance 
in moral elevation scores; for model 3, F(1, 225) = 32.79, p < .001, R2 = .22.  The 
more morally elevated participants were, the more likely they were to express 
stronger motivations to engage in indiscriminate benevolence than to engage in 




Second Regression Coefficients: Motivation Scores as Predictors of Moral Elevation 
Predictors B SE B β  
Step 1    
   Constant 5.33 .25  
   Motivation 1: Benevolence vs. Morality -.26 .25 -.09 
   Motivation 2: Loved ones vs. Friends .15 .24 .06 
   Motivation 3: Indiscriminate vs. Targeted -.87 .23 -.33* 
Step 2    
   Constant 5.38 .24  
   Motivation 1: Benevolence vs. Morality -.21 .23 -.07 
   Motivation 3: Indiscriminate vs. Targeted .81 .21 .31* 
Step 3    
   Constant 5.31 .23  
   Motivation 3: Indiscriminate vs. Targeted -.93 .16 .36* 
Note: R2 for step 1 = .13 (p <.001), ΔR2 for step 2 = -.003 (p = .37), ΔR2 for step = -
.002 (p = .52). *p ≤ .001.  
 
Discussion 
 Study 6 failed to find support for predictions 6a and 6b.  Morally elevated 
individuals did not demonstrate stronger preferences for benefit-conferring over 
moral norm-adhering behaviour, and nor did they express stronger motivation 
towards helping lower-value social partners than pre-existing reciprocal relationship 
partners.   
 Support was found, however, for prediction 6c.  Morally elevated individuals 
expressed stronger motivations to engage in benevolence which would help others 
more broadly than to engage in behaviours which would help to foster a social 
relationship with the person whose behaviour elicited the moral elevation.  This result 
lends some weight to the validity of the reputation-management hypothesis over the 








Omnibus Analysis: Sex and Religiosity Effects Across Studies 
 
 In order to explore further the possible sex and religiosity differences in moral 
elevation, uncovered in the studies reported above, an omnibus analysis was 
conducted by pooling data from different data-sets.  Participants from studies 1, 3A, 
3B, 4, and 5 were combined into one data-set; study 2 participants were not included 
because they had not completed a comparable measure of the dependent variable, 
moral elevation.  Because religiosity was not recorded for participants in study 4, the 
total N for religiosity tests was 711 (68.4% identified as religious), whereas for sex 
tests N = 876 (52.2% female).  Mean standardized moral elevation scores are 
broken down by sex and religiosity in Table 20.   
 
Table 20 
Mean Standardized Moral Elevation Scores by Sex and Religiosity 
Group M SD 
Sex   
Male -.14 .99 
Female .12 .99 
Religious   
Yes .07 .96 
No -.16 1.07 
 
 
 Participants’ moral elevation scores were standardized, to allow for 
comparison, and a stepwise linear regression analysis was conducted, with sex and 
religiosity as predictors, and moral elevation as the outcome variable.  The resulting 
coefficients are shown in Table 21. 
 Both sex and religiosity significantly predicted moral elevation (F(2,688) = 
10.04, p < .001).  The size of the effect was not large, however, with sex accounting 








Regression Coefficients: Sex and Religiosity as Predictors of Moral Elevation 
Predictors B SE B β  
Model 1    
   Constant .34 .05  
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.27 .08 -.14* 
Model 2    
   Constant -.02 .08  
   Sex: Female vs. Male -.26 .08 -.13* 
  Religiosity: No vs. Yes .21 .08 .10* 








 The final chapter summarizes the empirical findings presented in Chapters 3, 
4, and 5; general conclusions about the implications of these findings are drawn.  
There is a discussion of the demographic differences in moral elevation found in 
some of the studies reported above, and the challenges the sex-difference in 
particular poses for the reputation-management hypothesis are highlighted.  Finally, 
suggestions for future research directions are made; specifically the potential 
theoretical utility of exploring cross-cultural differences and similarities, and individual 






 The preceding chapters have sought to explore the likelihood that moral 
elevation is a naturally selected cognitive adaptation.  Although interest in the 
emotion has gathered steam over the past decade, and its potential social utility is 
clear, there have so far been no attempts to investigate whether the emotion 
displays functional properties indicative of ‘special design’.  Although no functionalist 
analyses have been undertaken, at least two (albeit somewhat off-hand) suggestions 
have been made that elevation may be a naturally selected emotion program which 
plays an important role in our social behaviour regulation.   
 In what has here been dubbed the relationship-building hypothesis, Haidt and 
Fredrickson (Fredrickson, 2004; Haidt, 2000) have proposed that moral elevation 
could function as a fruitful-relationship-building device, responding to cues indicating 
the presence of a good-quality prospective social relationship partner, and motivating 
behaviours which would facilitate affiliation with that individual.  In what has been 
referred to throughout as the reputation-management hypothesis, Fessler and Haley 
(2003) have proposed that moral elevation may function as a reputation-
safeguarding-device, responding to cues indicating that the bar for attracting social 
relationship partners has been raised, and motivating behaviours which would 
facilitate us meeting that new bar.   
 These two hypothesis make largely identical predictions about the 
computational properties moral elevation should be expected to display; broadly, if 
either account is correct, moral elevation should be expected to respond to 
indications that others’ have highly attractive social-partner qualities, and it should 
motivate behaviours which allow us to demonstrate our own social-partner value.  
Consequently, this thesis focused on tests of whether elevation displays functional 
properties that would marry with either account.  These tests were organized by 
inputs and outputs.   
 
Evidence That Moral Elevation’s Inputs Conform to the Expectations of a 
Functionalist Analysis 
 Chapters 3 and 4 reported the results of studies intended to test the 
predictions made in Chapter 2 regarding moral elevation’s elicitors.  Because others 
who are willing to confer benefits on others are, other things equal, more attractive 
as potential social-relationship partners than others who simply have a tendency to 
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follow norms, it was expected that moral elevation would be elicited exclusively by 
others’ benefit conferring behaviour, and not by behaviours which are morally-
laudable (norm-compliant) but non-benevolent (prediction 1).  Although study 1 failed 
to find any support for this prediction, study 3B (which employed a less conflicted 
control) found good support.  Participants who read a story about a young lady 
displaying exemplary virtues of character did not classify their emotional reaction to 
the story as morally elevating, but instead characterized the story as ‘inspiring’.  
Participants who read stories about protagonists who deliberately benefitted others, 
on the other hand, overwhelmingly classified their emotional reaction as morally 
elevating.  This clear-cut differentiation between moral elevation and admiration (the 
emotion to which being ‘inspired’ is the motivational concomitant) replicates a result 
found by Algoe and Haidt (2009); this not only adds weight to the confidence we can 
have in the construct validity of moral elevation, it also contributes towards 
addressing the relative dearth of research evidence supporting fine-grained 
distinctions between positive emotions in general (Strohminger et al., 2011).   
 Because of the importance we attach to others’ willingness to trade-off their 
welfare for others (as opposed to their ability to do so) when we make judgments 
about their value as potential social-partners (Delton & Robertson, 2012), it was 
expected that moral elevation would be sensitive to the valuations displayed by 
others in their benevolent actions (prediction 2).  Study 2 found good support for this 
prediction, with a strong linear trend indicating that the higher the cost : benefit ratio 
of a benevolent actor’s behaviour, the stronger the feelings of moral elevation it 
provoked.  The same strength of support was not present in study 4, but 
methodological problems which might account for this difference were discussed in 
Chapter 4.   
 It was suggested in Chapter 2 that instances in which individuals benefit 
others when there is a clear incentive for them to do so would carry less pertinent 
information for third-parties about the actor’s likely social-partner value than 
instances in which individuals benefit others in the absence of any direct incentives.  
It was predicted that moral elevation would be less strongly elicited in response to 
stories about protagonists benefitting their friends, family, or bosses than in response 
to stories about strangers helping strangers.  However, neither study 3A nor study 
3B found any support for this prediction, suggesting that the scope and 
sophistication of moral elevation’s operations may be less extensive than proposed.  
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The failure of this prediction highlights the fact that adaptations (and perhaps 
particularly cognitive adaptations) are seldom perfectly optimally designed (Gardner, 
2017; Olive, 1985).  Natural selection can only operate on already extant materials, 
and it operates only through chance mutation, meaning that its products often do not 
work in exactly the way they would if a Laplacian demon had set out to design them.  
Being able to imagine an optimally designed mechanism does not mean that natural 
selection will have had the time or the opportunity to shape it.   
 The notion that benevolent actors who have other attractive partner qualities 
should elicit stronger feelings of moral elevation that benevolent actors who do not 
(prediction 4) did find some support in study 4.  Although the manipulation used was 
not entirely successful, participants did report significantly stronger feelings of moral 
elevation when they judged the protagonist of the act as more dominant - a quality 
which would allow the protagonist to confer a greater number of indirect benefits as a 
social-relationship partner.       
 
Evidence That Moral Elevation’s Outputs Conform to the Expectations of a 
Functionalist Analysis 
 Chapter 5 made predictions about the observable outputs that moral elevation 
should be expected to generate if either the relationship-building or reputation-
management hypotheses are correct, and Chapter 6 offered empirical tests of these 
predictions.  It was suggested that moral elevation, if it is a naturally selected 
emotion program, would fall in the camp of ‘recalibrational emotions’ – emotions 
which function largely or solely by altering the operating parameters of other 
cognitive mechanisms (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Lim, 2012; Sell et al., 2008).  It 
was predicted, in turn, that if moral elevation does operate as a recalibration device, 
it would re-organize the configuration of other cognitive mechanisms in such a way 
as to produce behaviours which would effectively display our attractiveness as 
prospective social partners to others in our environment.    
 There is good evidence that our willingness to confer benefits on others is 
governed by a decision rule which relies on an internal regulatory variable called a 
welfare trade-off ratio (Delton, 2010), and study 5 found some evidence that moral 
elevation may act to upwardly recalibrate this IRV.  Participants in the morally 
elevating condition displayed higher WTRs towards an anonymous other than did 
participants in the control condition.  There was also evidence of an increase in 
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activation in elevated participants’ WTR mechanism; more morally elevated 
participants expressed significantly more consistent WTRs than their less elevated 
counterparts.  These results, in combination with the results from study 2, indicate a 
level of functional integration between moral elevation and other relevant cognitive 
devices (specifically our welfare trade-off estimator, and our welfare trade-off 
calculator) which would seem to decrease the likelihood that elevation is simply a 
non-functional byproduct of some other cognitive process.   
 Study 5 also investigated whether the effects of moral elevation on willingness 
to benefit others may be attenuated by the possession of other qualities which would 
contribute to an individual’s value as a social-partner.  No support was found for this 
prediction, though methodological flaws which may have contributed to this failure 
were discussed in Chapter 6.   
 Study 6 looked for evidence of differences between the motivational priorities 
of elevated and non-elevated participants.  Although there was a strong relationship 
between feelings of moral elevation and expressing motivations to engage in 
generally socially positive behaviours, there was little support for any nuanced 
differences between the motivational priorities of relatively more or less elevated 
participants.  There was no evidence of a relationship between moral elevation and 
prioritizing the performance of benevolent behaviours over moral norm-adhering 
behaviours, and no evidence of a relationship between elevation and the 
prioritization of helping strangers over loved ones.   
 There was evidence, however, for a relationship between elevation and the 
prioritization of reputation-guarding behaviours over relationship-building behaviours.  
This result adds to the prima facie reasons for preferring the reputation-management 
hypothesis to the relationship-building hypothesis.  The reputation-management 
hypothesis can more parsimoniously explain the breadth of moral elevation’s 
prosocial motivational output, and the relationship-building account would struggle to 
account for a prioritization of broadly benevolent behaviour over behaviour which 
would facilitate building a social relationship with the individual whose behaviour 
elicited the emotion.   
 Achieving a better understanding of moral elevation’s outputs will require 
future research to employ a greater number and diversity of behavioural measures.  
An over-reliance on self-report measures of moral elevation inhibits a proper picture 
of the full range of the emotion’s effects.  If the results reported in study 5 turn out to 
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be replicable, then Delton’s (2010) welfare trade-off ratio task would appear to be a 
promising method for garnering a finely-scaled estimation of the magnitude of 
elevation’s ‘prosocial contagion’.  Strategically manipulating the types of recipient 
that morally elevated participants are given opportunities to help may illuminate 
some of the more specific features of moral elevation’s motivational outputs (in a 
deeper way than study 6 of this thesis was able to achieve).   
 
Evidence of Sex and Religiosity Differences in Moral Elevation 
 Across the studies reported in the preceding chapters, there was a trend for 
female participants and participants who expressed some kind of religious affiliation 
to report stronger feelings of moral elevation than male or non-religious participants.  
An omnibus analysis revealed statistically significant differences between male and 
female elevation scores, and between the elevation scores of religious and non-
religious participants, although the magnitude of these effects was not large.   
 The fact that a number of other studies in the moral elevation literature have 
found the same sex difference (summarized in Pohling & Diessner, 2016) gives 
reasonable grounds to suspect that there may be some reliable interaction between 
sex and sensitivity to moral elevation.  The reason for this interaction, though, is 
unclear.  A large meta-analysis (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011) found no 
significant difference between men and women’s tendency to behave cooperatively, 
but it is a firm, and empirically supported prediction of competitive altruism theory 
that men engage in benevolent signaling behaviour more than women do (Barclay, 
2010; McAndrew, 2012; Raihani & Smith, 2015).  If moral elevation has been 
sculpted by the selection pressures induced by a biological marketplace for 
cooperative relationships, then the expectation should be that men would be more 
prone to experience it than women.  It could be that higher levels of empathy in 
women (Christov-Moore et al., 2014) or lower levels of emotional expressivity in men 
(Deng, Chang, Yang, Huo, & Zhou, 2016) contributed to the violation of this 
expectation.   
 This apparent sex-difference in moral elevation was uncovered here by 
chance, rather than as the result of intentional prediction testing.  Future research 
should include some deliberate investigations of male vs. female proneness to 
elevation, so as to rule out any confounds that may have come from the research 
methods and materials used in studies to date.  It is worth noting, for example, that 
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all of the benevolent protagonists used in the eliciting scenarios of this thesis were 
male (an oversight of the researcher, not an intentional design feature).  A fruitful 
area of further research would be to look at whether differences in the eliciting 
scenarios used to evoke moral elevation can predict differences in male and female 
experiences of moral elevation.  If it did transpire that the sex difference reported 
here is a stable feature across different eliciting scenarios, then that result would 
stand as a challenge to the reputation-management hypothesis (though it would be 
no more easily explained by the relationship-building hypothesis).   
 A relationship between religious belief and proneness to experiences of moral 
elevation has also been noted previously in the elevation literature (Landis et al., 
2009), but less frequently than the relationship between elevation and sex.  Under 
some interpretations, religious communities maintain their high coherence by 
demanding signals of commitment to costly norms and rituals (Alcorta & Sosis, 
2006), so it could simply be that religious participants were exhibiting their 
commitment to a religious norm of benevolence (an injunction to help others being a 
common theme across all major religions).  The higher scores of religious 
participants could have been an artifact of this kind of commitment; some of the 
items on the moral elevation scales used in the studies above, such as ‘I want to do 
something good for other people’, may receive stronger agreement from religious 
participants regardless of their actual emotional state.  The validity of this 
explanation could be explored in future research with the use of pre- and post-
manipulation moral elevation measures.    
 Religious communities also tend to be more close-knit, socially integrated, 
and cooperative networks than non-religious communities (Rai & Fiske, 2011; 
Sanderson, 2008), however, and so another possibility is that individuals who belong 
to religious communities face a stronger impetus to maintain an appearance as an 
attractive social-partner.  In the face of such increased competition intensity, greater 
sensitivity to moral elevation - a mechanism that (putatively) regulates the ‘signal 
value’ index of our welfare trade-off calculator - would be beneficial (it should be 
noted that this explanation would only be congruent with the reputation-management 






 The results presented in this thesis provide some very preliminary support for 
the proposal that moral elevation is a functionally integrated part of our species 
typical cognitive architecture.  The positive results found in Chapters 3, 4 and 6 
suggest that elevation is associated with a systematic pattern of activation and 
operation, potentially indicative of special design.  There were failures in some of the 
empirical studies reported above (some more attributable to methodological error 
than others), and so this support should be offered with caution; substantially 
stronger results are needed before a confident claim can be made that the emotion 
is a cognitive adaptation.  The studies presented above are by no means 
comprehensive or water-tight tests of the hypothesis that moral elevation is a 
naturally selected cognitive adaptation, but nonetheless, there were enough positive 
findings to warrant future research.    
   
Cross-cultural comparisons 
   Studies in the extant moral elevation literature have relied on a relatively 
culturally homogeneous participant pool.  The results from study 1 of this thesis, 
which recruited participants from both the USA and India, went a small distance 
towards addressing this lack of cross-cultural comparison, but future research will 
need to significantly broaden and deepen the search for ecological variation in the 
experience and expression of moral elevation.  In order to establish whether moral 
elevation is truly a cognitive adaptation, and if it is exactly what form it takes, we 
need to know whether it is experienced to the same degree, by the same types of 
people, in response to the same stimuli, and with the same cognitive and 
behavioural outcomes across the variety of social and environmental circumstances 
that human populations exist in.  This can only be achieved if efforts are made by 
researchers to recruit participants from more geographically and socioeconomically 
diverse populations.   
 The results from study 1 of this thesis may strengthen our confidence that 
moral elevation is not a phenomenon isolated to individuals in WEIRD populations 
(Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010) – participants from India in fact reported significantly stronger 
feelings of moral elevation than those form the USA – but they do nothing to address 
the question of whether any specific environmental contingencies may affect the 
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expression or development of the emotion.  For example, it might be expected (if the 
explanation offered above for the higher expression of moral elevation in religious 
participants is solidly reasoned) that populations inhabiting ecologies which increase 
the imperative to cooperate may express stronger and more frequent experiences of 
moral elevation.  Small-scale populations, and populations living in harsher 
environments, may be more prone to elevation than the estimates derived from 
economically comfortable and individualistic cultures have so far led us to expect.   
 
Individual differences 
 The importance of further exploring the apparent sex and religiosity 
differences in moral elevation was discussed above, but future research should also 
consider the possibility that other differences between individuals may affect their 
proneness to experience moral elevation.  A variety of variables affect the marginal 
returns an individual can expect to make from signaling partner value through 
benevolent behaviour (Clutton-Brock, 2009).  If moral elevation has been naturally 
selected to help regulate this kind of behaviour, we should expect to see its effects 
heightened or attenuated by the presence or absence of variables that alter an 
individual’s optimal market competition strategy.  It was suggested in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis that individuals who generate positive externalities, and who therefore (by 
virtue of already being socially-attractive) enjoy lower marginal returns from 
benevolent signaling, would be less prone to experiences of moral elevation than 
individuals who are forced to rely more heavily on their prosocial dispositions to 
attract social partners.  Although study 5 failed to find support for this prediction, it 
may still bear re-testing with more accurate measures and while controlling for the 
presence of other positive-externality-generating traits beside physical formidability 
and attractiveness.  Intellect, specialized skills, and surplus resources may all make 
it less worth an individual’s while advertising her partner-qualities through benevolent 
behaviour (Barclay, 2013).   
 It may also prove fruitful to consider whether any relationship may exist 
between an individual’s proneness to experiences of moral elevation and her 
particular life-history strategy (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005).  An individual’s life-
history strategy describes the pattern of bio-energetic resource allocation decisions 
she makes across the course of her life-time.  Strategies are expressed on a 
continuum which runs from ‘fast’ (r) to ‘slow’ (K), where faster strategies are those 
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better suited to environments in which the shadow of the future is relatively short, 
and slower strategies are those better suited to environments in which an individual’s 
life-span is likely to be relatively long (Figueredo et al., 2006;(Ellis, Figueredo, 
Brumbach, & Schlomer, 2009).  In human populations, individuals who display 
relatively high temporal-discounting rates (taken to be a major component of a faster 
life-history strategy (Figueredo et al., 2006; Griskevicius, Delton, Robertson, & 
Tybur, 2011) tend to be less cooperative than their slower-discounting counterparts 
(Curry, Price, & Price, 2008; Harris & Madden, 2002) (although it bears noting that 
empirical support for this relationship is not unequivocal - Wu et al., 2017).  If 
individuals with faster life-history strategies invest less in cooperation as a fitness-
promotion strategy, we may also expect to find the development of moral elevation 
less pronounced in these individuals.   
 Finally, there is evidence that frequency-dependent selection may have 
endowed human populations with polymorphic cooperative types; stable differences 
between individuals in terms of how cooperatively they behave, which reflect 
different strategies for fitness-maximization in a complex social environment 
(Kurzban & Houser, 2005; Murphy, Handgraaf, & Ackerman, 2011).  It seems 
reasonable to expect that moral elevation, if it functions as proposed, may vary 
across different cooperative types.   
 
Practical and theoretical utility 
 The social value of continuing research into a cognitive device which 
increases our willingness to benefit others seems obvious.  If moral elevation is an 
adaptation which causes contagious benevolence, then its operations must follow a 
predictable pattern, one that it would be possible to precisely discern and usefully 
exploit.  For example, simply understanding that elevation is likely to be recalibrating 
an individual’s extrinsic, and not her intrinsic welfare trade-off ratio, highlights the fact 
that fully harnessing any effects of intentionally manipulated moral elevation might be 
optimized by providing people with public opportunities to behave benevolently.  
Similarly, if moral elevation’s benevolent motivational effects are largely mediated by 
an increase in an individual’s welfare trade-off ratio, then efforts to utilize elevation to 
increase engagement in collective action problems (such as environmental 
preservation) may be best pursued by framing the consequences of contribution 
behaviours in terms of the benefits they will produce for identifiable other individuals, 
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rather than in terms of self-interest or more abstract and distal benefits.  Finally, if 
elevation’s effects are more pronounced in smaller or more closely-knit social 
contexts, where individuals face a stronger pressure to safeguard their reputations, 
then attempts to harness the positive social effects of the emotion may be best 
conducted at the most local level practicable.   
 Further expanding our understanding of this currently relatively obscure 
emotion would also help us to achieve a clearer view of how our minds have come to 
be so adept at managing the adaptive challenges posed by the intricate social 
groups we inhabit.  Recent advancements in understanding and explaining the 
mental mechanisms underpinning our emotions and motivations in computational 
terms (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Delton et al., 2012; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008) are 
an interesting and richly fertile new direction for evolutionary psychology.  Any 
explorations which contribute to our understanding of the regulatory and 
recalibrational cognitive  processes behind our social behaviours can only help to 























































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A: Study 1 Materials 
 
 
Study 1 Vignettes 
 
Benevolent vignette 
 It had been 10 days, and Oshin knew he probably wouldn’t make it through 
another night.  They had been over the centre of the mountain range when the 
propeller had jammed.  The plane was light enough that Oshin had been able to 
glide it away from the sheer rock and aim at a good-sized patch of clear snow, but 
the angle of the landing was too steep and the impact was hard.   
 At first, Oshin had clung to the conviction that the two of them would be found.  
He forced himself to remain certain that help would arrive at any moment – just 
another hour more and they would be rescued, just another day longer and the 
search team would arrive.  But as the starvation set in, tiredness and fear had 
drowned out Oshin’s hope, and by now he was sure that he would be dead by the 
time he and Mika were found.     
 Oshin had known Mika to be a sensible man.  He had flown the young 
researcher out to the remote villages several times before, and each time he’d been 
impressed by how knowledgeable Mika was.  Oshin had shown him before each 
flight how to brace himself in his seat if the plane ever got into trouble, but in the heat 
of the moment Mika had panicked and tried to get to the door at the back of the 
cabin.  He had been on his feet when the plane crashed, and the force of the 
collision injured him badly.  When Oshin regained consciousness, he had pulled 
Mika free and laid him between the seats of the small plane.   
 On the first day Oshin had been focused on keeping them warm and trying to 
signal for help.  The radio had been destroyed in the crash, but there was a flare gun 
and two flares in the cockpit.  Oshin fired one flare, but there was heavy mist and he 
feared it wouldn’t be seen, so he saved the second one, hoping the sky would clear 
by morning.  Oshin pulled everything they could use to keep warm from the luggage 
cases and they hunkered down inside the cabin.   
 On the second morning the mist had lifted, but the second flare was a dud – it 
hissed from the gun and buried itself in the snow a short distance from the aircraft.  
By that time, Oshin was light-headed with hunger, so he set about scouring the  
cabin for food.  He emptied every bag, and turned out every pocket of every garment 
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he found, but his searching yielded very little.  He searched the area around the 
plane, but the frozen ground was empty – nothing moved and nothing grew.   
 The grim reality of the situation quickly became apparent:  Oshin needed 
food, but Mika, in his weakened state, needed it more.  Oshin had always been a 
deeply kind man, and so to him it didn’t even seem like a choice – he knew what he 
would do.  However bad things got, he couldn’t let Mika die.  He would rather starve.   
 Oshin passed the hours in and out of sleep, treading the balance between 
conserving energy and moving around to keep himself warm.  He woke Mika every 
12 hours or so, to feed him small portions of the snack food he’d found in the 
luggage.  Oshin knew he could last several days without food, so long as he melted 
enough snow to drink.  He found himself chewing the cuff of his heavy cotton 
overcoat to distract himself, nibbling away at the frayed edge, swallowing a thread at 
a time.   
 Ten days had passed slowly.  Oshin found it harder to focus, his mind 
wondering, unsure at times whether he was awake or asleep.  The sharp pain of 
hunger in his stomach had disappeared after the fourth day, replaced by a gnawing 
emptiness.  He ate pieces of paper, chewed scraps of leather torn from clothes, and 
scraped small patches of lichen from the nearby rocks – anything to keep his hands 
and his mouth busy.  Throughout the ordeal, Oshin’s resolve never waivered.  He 
knew that other men had made different decisions in situations like this, and he could 
understand how the pain and desperation could drive them to it, but he refused to 
feed himself and let Mika die.    
 Eventually he lacked the energy to do anything at all, and now he lay curled 
under the pile of coats and clothes in the cabin.  Mika lay next to Oshin on the cabin 
floor.  He was still weak, but the meager rations had been enough to keep him alive.  
And as Oshin drifted into unconsciousness, he knew he had done everything he 
could to make sure Mika got home in one piece.   
 When he woke again, there were hands lifting Oshin’s head and legs.  A 
bright light stung his eyes.  The men were talking to him as they lifted him onto the 
stretcher, but the words were muffled by the sound of the helicopter’s blades.  
Though it hurt to talk, Oshin pulled at the sleeve of the paramedic who was guiding 
his stretcher towards the helicopter – “Mika…”, he managed.  The paramedic 
squeezed Oshin’s hand reassuringly; “don’t worry”, he replied, “we’ve got him”.   
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Non-benevolent moral vignette 
 It had been 10 days, and Oshin knew he probably wouldn’t make it through 
another night.  They had been over the centre of the mountain range when the 
propeller had jammed.  The plane was light enough that Oshin had been able to 
glide it away from the sheer rock and aim at a good-sized patch of clear snow, but 
the angle of the landing was too steep and the impact was hard.   
 At first, Oshin had clung to the conviction that the two of them would be found.  
He forced himself to remain certain that help would arrive at any moment – just 
another hour more and they would be rescued, just another day longer and the 
search team would arrive.  But as the starvation set in, tiredness and fear had 
drowned out Oshin’s hope, and by now he was sure that he would be dead by the 
time he and Mika were found.     
 Oshin had known Mika to be a sensible man.  He had flown the young 
researcher out to the remote villages several times before, and each time he’d been 
impressed by how knowledgeable Mika was.  Oshin had shown him before each 
flight how to brace himself in his seat if the plane ever got into trouble, but in the heat 
of the moment Mika had panicked and tried to get to the door at the back of the 
cabin.  He had been on his feet when the plane crashed, and the force of the 
collision killed him outright.  When Oshin regained consciousness, he had pulled 
Mika free and laid him under the wing of the small plane.   
 On the first day Oshin had been focused on keeping himself warm and trying 
to signal for help.  The radio had been destroyed in the crash, but there was a flare 
gun and two flares in the cockpit.  Oshin fired one flare, but there was heavy mist 
and he feared it wouldn’t be seen, so he saved the second one, hoping the sky 
would clear by morning.  Oshin pulled everything he could use to keep warm from 
the luggage cases and he hunkered down inside the cabin.   
 On the second morning the mist had lifted, but the second flare was a dud – it 
hissed from the gun and buried itself in the snow a short distance from the aircraft.  
By that time, Oshin was light-headed with hunger, so he set about scouring the  
cabin for food.  He emptied every bag, and turned out every pocket of every garment 
he found, but his searching yielded nothing.  He searched the area around the plane, 
but the frozen ground was empty – nothing moved and nothing grew.   
 The grim reality of the situation quickly became apparent:  Oshin needed 
food, but literally the only source of calories was Mika’s corpse.  Oshin had always 
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been a deeply moral man, and so to him it didn’t even seem like a choice – he knew 
what he would do.  However bad things got, he couldn’t resort to cannibalism.  He 
would rather starve.   
 Oshin passed the hours in and out of sleep, treading the balance between 
conserving energy and moving around to keep himself warm.  He left Mika’s body 
lying in the snow under the wing of the plane, his face covered with a shirt and his 
arms folded across his chest.  Oshin knew he could last several days without food, 
so long as he melted enough snow to drink.  He found himself chewing the cuff of his 
heavy cotton overcoat to distract himself, nibbling away at the frayed edge, 
swallowing a thread at a time.   
 Ten days had passed slowly.  Oshin found it harder to focus, his mind 
wondering, unsure at times whether he was awake or asleep.  The sharp pain of 
hunger in his stomach had disappeared after the fourth day, replaced by a gnawing 
emptiness.  He ate pieces of paper, chewed scraps of leather torn from clothes, and 
scraped small patches of lichen from the nearby rocks – anything to keep his hands 
and his mouth busy.  Throughout the ordeal, Oshin’s resolve never waivered.  He 
knew that other men had made different decisions in situations like this, and he could 
understand how the pain and desperation could drive them to it, but he refused to 
eat pieces of Mika’s body.   
 Eventually he lacked the energy to do anything at all, and now he lay curled 
under the pile of coats and clothes in the cabin.  Mika lay outside in the snow.  He 
was still as Oshin has left him 10 days ago – arms folded neatly, his face respectfully 
covered.  And as Oshin drifted into unconsciousness, he knew he had done 
everything he could to make sure Mika got home in one piece.     
 When he woke again, there were hands lifting Oshin’s head and legs.  A 
bright light stung his eyes.  The men were talking to him as they lifted him onto the 
stretcher, but the words were muffled by the sound of the helicopter’s blades.  
Though it hurt to talk, Oshin pulled at the sleeve of the paramedic who was guiding 
his stretcher towards the helicopter – “Mika…”, he managed.  The paramedic 







Moral Elevation Measure and Task Instructions 
 
 Please read each of the following pairs of statements.  For each pair, please 
pick the option which best describes how you felt whilst you read the story.  If you felt 
both of the options listed, please pick the option which you felt most strongly.  If you 
felt neither of the sensations listed, please pick the third option, ‘neither’.   
1)  As I read the story, I felt: 
 a) More open towards others 
 b) Like a strong and capable person 
 c) Neither of the above 
2) As I read the story, I felt: 
 a) Like a better person 
 b) Like someone who’s loved 
 c) Neither of the above 
3) As I read the story, I felt: 
 a) Warmth in my chest 
 b) Tingles down my spine 
 c) Neither of the above 
4) As I read the story, I felt: 
 a) A lump in my throat 
 b) A sudden rush of energy 
 c) Neither of the above 
5) As I read the story, I felt: 
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 a) My muscles relaxing 
 b) The hairs on my neck stand up 
 c) Neither of the above 
6) As I read the story, I felt: 
 a) Like I wanted to do something good for other people 
 b) Like I wanted to work on my skills and talents 
 c) Neither of the above 
7) As I read the story, I felt: 
 a) Like I wanted to do the same thing Oshin was doing 
 b) Like doing something playful 
 c) Neither of the above 
8) As I read the story, I felt:  
 a) Like I wanted to become a better person  
 b) Like I wanted to sit somewhere quiet and contemplate things 
 c) Neither of the above 
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Appendix B: Study 3A Materials 
 
 
Study 3A Vignettes 
 
 
Story 1 – ‘A Day on The River’ 
 
 
Version ‘A’ – Incentive present 
 It was the West & Sons corporate team-building day, and the employees had 
been split into pairs for a river rafting activity.  Each pair was given a small inflatable 
dinghy, paddles, life-vests, and zip-lock waterproof bags for storing their valuables.  
Sam had been paired with Ian, an imposing man in his mid 50’s – he was one of the 
company’s most senior executives.   
 The two of them donned their life-vests, put their phones, watches, wedding 
rings, and wallets into the bags, and carried the dinghy down to the water’s edge.  
Ian sat at the front of the dinghy, and Sam took the seat at the rear.  They pushed 
away from the bank with their paddles and set off down-river with the other rafts.  
Their route started in a calm tributary, but before long they joined the river proper, 
where the water picked up speed.   
 The dinghy bounced over the little eddies in the swift water, as the two men 
used their paddles to keep the front end pointing down-river.  When they approached 
a bend in the river, Ian lent over the edge of the dinghy to dig his paddle in hard.  As 
Ian did this, Sam saw his zip-lock bag of valuables fall from his pocket and drop over 
the side of the raft.  Ian didn’t notice it fall, but Sam acted quickly.   
 The water was too fast for them to stop the dinghy being carried down-stream 
using their paddles, but the river was only waist-height.  Sam dropped his paddle at 
his feet and hopped over the side of the dinghy, planting his feet firmly and grabbing 
the inflatable raft with one hand to hold it against the current.  He fished for Ian’s zip-
lock bag with his free hand – it was easy to see under the cold, clear water.  Ian 
helped Sam back into the dinghy and thanked him profusely.  “You’re welcome”, 
Sam smiled, as they righted the boat’s course and set off after the other rafters.  He 
would be damp and cold for the rest of the day, but it was worth it to help his boss 




Version ‘B’ – No incentive present 
 It was the West & Sons corporate team-building day, and the employees had 
been split into pairs for a river rafting activity.  Each pair was given a small inflatable 
dinghy, paddles, life-vests, and zip-lock waterproof bags for storing their valuables.  
Sam had been paired with Ian, a timid man in his early 20’s – he was one of the 
company’s newest and most junior employees.   
 The two of them donned their life-vests, put their phones, watches, wedding 
rings, and wallets into the bags, and carried the dinghy down to the water’s edge.  
Ian sat at the front of the dinghy, and Sam took the seat at the rear.  They pushed 
away from the bank with their paddles and set off down-river with the other rafts.  
Their route started in a calm tributary, but before long they joined the river proper, 
where the water picked up speed.   
 The dinghy bounced over the little eddies in the swift water, as the two men 
used their paddles to keep the front end pointing down-river.  When they approached 
a bend in the river, Ian lent over the edge of the dinghy to dig his paddle in hard.  As 
Ian did this, Sam saw his zip-lock bag of valuables fall from his pocket and drop over 
the side of the raft.  Ian didn’t notice it fall, but Sam acted quickly.   
 The water was too fast for them to stop the dinghy being carried down-stream 
using their paddles, but the river was only waist-height.  Sam dropped his paddle at 
his feet and hopped over the side of the dinghy, planting his feet firmly and grabbing 
the inflatable raft with one hand to hold it against the current.  He fished for Ian’s zip-
lock bag with his free hand – it was easy to see under the cold, clear water.  Ian 
helped Sam back into the dinghy and thanked him profusely.  “You’re welcome”, 
Sam smiled, as they righted the boat’s course and set off after the other rafters.  He 
would be damp and cold for the rest of the day, but it was worth it to help the new 
guy out.   
 
 
Story 2 – ‘A Lift in The Rain’ 
 
 
Version ‘A’ – Incentive present 
 It was late, it was cold, and the rain was lashing down.  Adam was driving 
home, looking forward to an early night after a long day at work.  Windscreen-wipers 
working overtime, he had to notch up the radio volume to hear it over the pummeling 
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of raindrops on the roof.  He was driving down a long stretch of road that ran through 
the edge of the industrial district when he saw a figure trudging through the sheets of 
rain.  It was dark, but Adam could see that it was his good friend Fred.  He 
recognized the well-cut clothes and confident stride of his old college room-mate.   
 Adam slowed the car and pulled up next to the curb, lowering the far-side 
window.  “You want a ride?” he called.  Fred nodded vigorously and pulled open the 
passenger door.  He bustled into the seat, closed the window, and turned to Adam – 
“hey thanks for this” he grinned “I was starting to think I’d have to swim the rest of 
the way”.  “No problem”, Adam replied, “where you headed?”.  Fred brushed the 
water off his face, “to the bus station”, he said, “just a half-mile down the road.  My 
car blew a gasket and I had to leave it with a mechanic back there”, he pointed back 
over his shoulder, “so it’s a ride home on the number 40 for me”.  "You moved 
recently, right?  Where’s home now?”, Adam asked.  “I did, yeah”, Fred replied, “I’m 
on the East side now”.  “Well hey, look”, said Adam, “I’ll just run you over there.  I’m 
heading that direction, and it’s a heck of a night to be stuck on a winding bus route”.  
“Are you sure?”, Fred looked grateful and relieved.  “Of course”, Adam smiled, “no 
problem”.   
 When he’d dropped Fred off Adam was 15 miles out of his way.  His chances 
of an early night were lost, but he was glad he’d been able to help a friend out when 
he needed it.     
 
 
Version ‘B’ – No incentive present 
 It was late, it was cold, and the rain was lashing down.  Adam was driving 
home, looking forward to an early night after a long day at work.  Windscreen-wipers 
working overtime, he had to notch up the radio volume to hear it over the pummeling 
of raindrops on the roof.  He was driving down a long stretch of road that ran through 
the edge of the industrial district when he saw a figure trudging through the sheets of 
rain.  It was dark, but Adam could see that it was a slightly unkempt man in his early 
thirties.  He had the scruffy clothes and hunched gait of someone down on his luck.   
 Adam slowed the car and pulled up next to the curb, lowering the far-side 
window.  “You want a ride?” he called.  The man nodded vigorously and pulled open 
the passenger door.  He bustled into the seat, closed the window, and turned to 
Adam – “hey thanks for this” he grinned “I was starting to think I’d have to swim the 
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rest of the way”.  “No problem”, Adam replied, “where you headed?”.  The man 
brushed the water off his face, “to the bus station”, he said, “just a half-mile down the 
road.  My car blew a gasket and I had to leave it with a mechanic back there”, he 
pointed back over his shoulder, “so it’s a ride home on the number 40 for me”.  
“Where’s home?”, Adam asked.  “Over on the East side”, the man replied.  “Well 
hey, look”, said Adam, “I’ll just run you over there.  I’m heading that direction, and it’s 
a heck of a night to be stuck on a winding bus route”.  “Are you sure?”, the man 
looked grateful and relieved.  “Of course”, Adam smiled, “no problem”.   
 When he’d dropped the man off Adam was 15 miles out of his way.  His 
chances of an early night were lost, but he was glad he’d been able to help a guy out 
when he needed it.     
 
 
Moral Elevation Measure 
 
1) Did either story make you feel more open towards others? (If both stories made 
you feel this, please pick the story which made you feel it more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 
c) No, neither story 
 
2) Did either story make you feel like a better person? (If both stories made you feel 
this, please pick the story which made you feel it more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 
c) No, neither story 
 
3) Did either story make you feel warm in the chest? (If both stories made you feel 
this, please pick the story which made you feel it more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 
c) No, neither story 
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4) Did either story make you feel a lump in your throat? (If both stories made you feel 
this, please pick the story which made you feel it more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 
c) No, neither story 
 
5) Did either story make you feel your muscles relaxing? (If both stories made you 
feel this, please pick the story which made you feel it more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 
c) No, neither story 
 
6) Did either story make you feel like you want to do something good for other 
people? (If both stories made you feel this, please pick the story which made you 
feel it more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 
c) No, neither story 
 
7) Did either story make you feel like wanting to do the same thing the protagonist 
did? (If both stories made you feel this, please pick the story which made you feel it 
more strongly) 
 
a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 
c) No, neither story 
 
8) Did either story make you feel like you want to become a better person? (If both 




a) Yes, story A 
b) Yes, story B 





Appendix C: Study 3B Materials 
 
Study 3B Vignettes 
 
Story 1 – ‘Boy Writes Book’ 
 
Version 1.1 – High incentive 
 Dylan Seigel, 7, would do anything for his brother Jonah.  The pair have 
always been inseparable.  Jonah faces a rare battle with glycogen storage disease, 
or GSD.  The condition causes Jonah’s blood-sugar to drop to potentially fatal levels, 
forcing his parents to follow an inflexible, round-the-clock schedule of feeding Jonah 
through a stomach tube in order to keep his metabolism stable.  
 GSD does not have a cure, and to Dylan, that is unacceptable.  Back in 2013, 
when he was 6 years old, Dylan wrote a book to help his brother and others 
struggling with the disease.  But it’s not your typical page-turner; every penny from 
sales of Chocolate Bar goes directly to a lab at the University of Florida College of 
Medicine, which is working on a cure for the disease.   
 To date, Dylan has raised more than $750,000 in the fight against GSD.  
Before the money began pouring in from book sales, funding for research into the 
disease was falling flat.  “It’s now a reality.  It’s not just a dream that these children 
can be cured”, Dr David Weinstein, who runs the University of Florida lab said.  “It’s 
an amazing thing that he didn’t just have the idea, he followed through and he 
actually did it”.  Chocolate Bar has given those suffering from GSD renewed hope for 
a better tomorrow.   
 
Version 1.2 – Moderate incentive 
 Dylan Seigel, 7, would do anything for his best friend Jonah Pournazarian.  
The pair have been inseparable since they met in preschool.  Jonah faces a rare 
battle with glycogen storage disease, or GSD.  The condition causes Jonah’s blood-
sugar to drop to potentially fatal levels, forcing his parents to follow an inflexible, 
round-the-clock schedule of feeding Jonah through a stomach tube in order to keep 
his metabolism stable.  
 GSD does not have a cure, and to Dylan, that is unacceptable.  Back in 2013, 
when he was 6 years old, Dylan wrote a book to help his friend and others struggling 
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with the disease.  But it’s not your typical page-turner; every penny from sales of 
Chocolate Bar goes directly to a lab at the University of Florida College of Medicine, 
which is working on a cure for the disease.   
 To date, Dylan has raised more than $750,000 in the fight against GSD.  
Before the money began pouring in from book sales, funding for research into the 
disease was falling flat.  “It’s now a reality.  It’s not just a dream that these children 
can be cured”, Dr David Weinstein, who runs the University of Florida lab said.  “It’s 
an amazing thing that he didn’t just have the idea, he followed through and he 
actually did it”.  Chocolate Bar has given those suffering from GSD renewed hope for 
a better tomorrow.   
 
Version 1.3 – Low incentive 
 Dylan Seigel, 7, would do anything for a good cause.  When he heard about 
Jonah Pournazarian at an inter-school fundraising event, Dylan decided something 
needed to be done.  Jonah faces a rare battle with glycogen storage disease, or 
GSD.  The condition causes Jonah’s blood-sugar to drop to potentially fatal levels, 
forcing his parents to follow an inflexible, round-the-clock schedule of feeding Jonah 
through a stomach tube in order to keep his metabolism stable.  
 GSD does not have a cure, and to Dylan, that is unacceptable.  Back in 2013, 
when he was 6 years old, Dylan wrote a book to help Jonah and others struggling 
with the disease.  But it’s not your typical page-turner; every penny from sales of 
Chocolate Bar goes directly to a lab at the University of Florida College of Medicine, 
which is working on a cure for the disease.   
 To date, Dylan has raised more than $750,000 in the fight against GSD.  
Before the money began pouring in from book sales, funding for research into the 
disease was falling flat.  “It’s now a reality.  It’s not just a dream that these children 
can be cured”, Dr David Weinstein, who runs the University of Florida lab said.  “It’s 
an amazing thing that he didn’t just have the idea, he followed through and he 
actually did it”.  Chocolate Bar has given those suffering from GSD renewed hope for 






Story 2 – ‘Marine Carries Boy’ 
 
Version 2.1 – High incentive 
 Spectators at a children’s triathlon in Florida were brought to tears by the sight 
of a Marine carrying a little boy with a broken prosthetic leg across the finish line.   
 Bone cancer survivor Ben Baltz, 11, was participating in his third triathlon of 
the summer when he had an accident with his prosthetic leg Sunday during the final 
portion of the race.  
 The Marine who carried Be, Pfc. Matt Baltz, is Ben’s big brother, and 
happened to be part of a group of marines helping out at the event.  He said “I’d 
been watching Ben throughout the race, and he was doing very well.  It came to the 
final leg of the race where it was a run and I was sitting at the halfway point with 
people that were passing out water.  As he approached the halfway point, his 
prosthetic failed and he fell”.  
 Ben had already jumped up and was trying to fix his prosthetic when his 
brother ran over to see if he needed help.  “He said no, he’d finish by himself and he 
continued trying to fix it.  But after a couple of seconds he knew there was something 
wrong with it and he was going to need a hand.  He was going to finish the race no 
matter what, but I told him to jump on and we’d finish it together”, Matt said.   
 
Version 2.2 – Moderate incentive 
 Spectators at a children’s triathlon in Florida were brought to tears by the sight 
of a Marine carrying a little boy with a broken prosthetic leg across the finish line.   
 Bone cancer survivor Ben Baltz, 11, was participating in his third triathlon of 
the summer when he had an accident with his prosthetic leg Sunday during the final 
portion of the race.  
 The Marine who carried Be, Pfc. Matt Morgan, is a friend of the Baltz’s, and 
happened to be part of a group of marines helping out at the event.  He said “I’d 
been watching Ben throughout the race, and he was doing very well.  It came to the 
final leg of the race where it was a run and I was sitting at the halfway point with 
people that were passing out water.  As he approached the halfway point, his 
prosthetic failed and he fell”.  
 Ben had already jumped up and was trying to fix his prosthetic when Pfc. 
Morgan ran over to see if he needed help.  “He said no, he’d finish by himself and he 
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continued trying to fix it.  But after a couple of seconds he knew there was something 
wrong with it and he was going to need a hand.  He was going to finish the race no 
matter what, but I told him to jump on and we’d finish it together”, Matt said.   
 
Version 2.3 – Low incentive 
 Spectators at a children’s triathlon in Florida were brought to tears by the sight 
of a Marine carrying a little boy with a broken prosthetic leg across the finish line.   
 Bone cancer survivor Ben Baltz, 11, was participating in his third triathlon of 
the summer when he had an accident with his prosthetic leg Sunday during the final 
portion of the race.  
 The Marine who carried Be, Pfc. Matt Morgan of San Diego, said “I’d been 
watching Ben throughout the race, and he was doing very well.  It came to the final 
leg of the race where it was a run and I was sitting at the halfway point with people 
that were passing out water.  As he approached the halfway point, his prosthetic 
failed and he fell”.  
 Ben had already jumped up and was trying to fix his prosthetic when Pfc. 
Morgan ran over to see if he needed help.  “He said no, he’d finish by himself and he 
continued trying to fix it.  But after a couple of seconds he knew there was something 
wrong with it and he was going to need a hand.  He was going to finish the race no 
matter what, but I told him to jump on and we’d finish it together”, Matt said.   
 
Story 3 – ‘CrossFit’ 
 Some of us go to great lengths, inventing a host of excuses, to avoid exercise 
at all costs.  Not Krystal Cantu.  
 Despite losing an arm in a car accident last August, Cantu, and avid member 
of Ballistic CrossFit, has continued to immerse herself in a demanding fitness 
regimen.  
 Since her accident, Cantu has competed in high-intensity competitions, 
including the Working Wounded Games, and the Gladiator Rock n’Run.  “I wasn’t 
going to be that person crying on the couch, saying ‘why me?’” Cantu explained.   
 Not only has she continued her rigorous regime, she told the Huffington Post 
that she is much stronger since her accident, surpassing many of her pre-amputation 
records.   
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 Cantu wasted no time in getting back to her training after losing her arm.  A 
month after the accident, she was back in the gym.   
 She doesn’t think there is ever a reason to give up; “Every day I get stronger, 
and every day I prove to myself that the human body is an amazing thing when you 
have the right mind set.  Never make excuses.  Know that there is someone out 
there that has it worse than you do”. 
 
  Moral Elevation Measure 
 Please indicate, using the scale provided, how strongly you felt each of the 
following as you were reading the story.   
 
1. A warmth in my chest 
2. A lump in my throat 
3. My muscles relaxing 
4. I felt like a better person 
5. I felt a sense of openness towards other people 
6. I wanted to behave like the person in this story did 
7. I wanted to do something good for other people 
8. I wanted to become a better person 
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Appendix D: Study 4 Materials 
 
 
Perceived Partner Value Measure 
 
 Please indicate, using the scale provided, how much you agree with the 
following statements.   
 
1.  I hope that good things happen to people like Alex 
2. If I met Alex, I think I would not like him [reverse coded item] 
3. Alex is altruistic 
4. Alex is kind 
5. I would like to spend time socially with Alex 
6. Alex would make a bad team player [reverse coded item] 
7. Alex would make a good friend 
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Appendix E: Study 5 Materials 
 
 
Welfare Trade-Off Ratio Task 
 
Task instructions 
 The following task will ask you to make a series of decisions about how to 
allocate money between yourself and another person.  You have been randomly 
paired with another study participant, and a coin-toss has put you in the role of the 
decider.  Your fellow participant will not get to make any decisions, but he/she will be 
affected by the decisions you make.  Once the study is complete, 3 participant pairs 
will be chosen at random and the allocations made by the decision-maker will be 
paid out in full.   
 Below is an example of the type of decisions you will be asked to make.   
 
 You Other  You Other  You Other 
Option 1 25 0  15 0  -13 0 
Option 2 0 20  0 20  0 20 
 
 If you choose the first option, a sum of money will be given to you and no 
money will be given to the other person.  If you choose the second option, a sum of 
money will be given to the other person and no money will be given to you.  In this 
example, the first decision asks you to choose between 25p for you or 20p for the 
other person.  If you choose the first option, then you get 25p and the other person 
gets 0p.  If you choose the second option, you get 0p and the other person gets 20p.  
Similarly, the second decision asks you to choose between 15p for you or 20p for the 
other person.   
 In the third decision, you must choose between -13p for you or 20p for the 
other person.  If you choose the first option, then you would have to pay 13p and the 
other person gets zero.  Choosing a negative value for yourself means you lose 
money.  If you choose the second option then you get 0p and the other person gets 
20p.   
 As an example, consider the decisions made by a hypothetical decision-




 You Other  You Other  You Other 
Option 1 25 0  15 0  -13 0 
Option 2 0 20  0 20  0 20 
 
 
 Based on the choices made in the example above, for the first decision the 
decision-maker would receive 25p and the other person 0p.  In the second decision 
the decision-maker would receive 0p and the other 20p.  In the third decision the 
decision-maker would have to pay 13p and the other would receive 0p.   
 Please try to make each of your decisions independently of your other 
decisions.  That is, try not to let any decision you make influence any of the other 
decisions you make.  The identity of the participant with whom you are paired will be 
kept anonymous, so you cannot share any money you receive with the other 
person, and they cannot share any money they receive with you.   
 In the following pages, you will be faced with a series of these decisions.  For 
each decision, please circle your preferred option.  There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
answers to the questions.  Please respond based on what feels appropriate to you.  



















  You Other   You Other   You Other 
Option 1 10 0  Option 1 16 0  Option 1 54 0 
Option 2 0 23  Option 2 0 19  Option 2 0 37 
           
Option 1 39 0  Option 1 9 0  Option 1 49 0 
Option 2 0 37  Option 2 0 37  Option 2 0 75 
           
Option 1 20 0  Option 1 71 0  Option 1 -8 0 
Option 2 0 23  Option 2 0 68  Option 2 0 23 
           
Option1 4 0  Option 1 -24 0  Option 1 -3 0 
Option2 0 75  Option 2 0 68  Option 2 0 19 
           
Option 1 17 0  Option 1 30 0  Option 1 2 0 
Option 2 0 37  Option 2 0 46  Option 2 0 37 
           
Option 1 9 0  Option 1 19 0  Option 1 24 0 
Option 2 0 19  Option 2 0 75  Option 2 0 19 
           
Option 1 -10 0  Option 1 99 0  Option 1 -11 0 
Option 2 0 68  Option 2 0 68  Option 2 0 75 
           
Option 1 12 0  Option 1 6 0  Option 1 39 0 
Option 2 0 19  Option 2 0 23  Option 2 0 46 
           
Option 1 31 0  Option 1 20 0  Option 1 94 0 
Option 2 0 37  Option 2 0 19  Option 2 0 75 
           
Option 1 -7 0  Option 1 48 0  Option 1 -7 0 








  You Other   You Other   You Other 
Option 1 67 0  Option 1 5 0  Option 1 1 0 
Option 2 0 46  Option 2 0 19  Option 2 0 19 
           
Option 1 -6 0  Option 1 15 0  Option 1 3 0 
Option 2 0 37  Option 2 0 23  Option 2 0 68 
           
Option 1 34 0  Option 1 -3 0  Option 1 33 0 
Option 2 0 75  Option 2 0 23  Option 2 0 23 
           
Option1 -16 0  Option 1 31 0  Option 1 79 0 
Option2 0 46  Option 2 0 68  Option 2 0 75 
           
Option 1 1 0  Option 1 2 0  Option 1 -13 0 
Option 2 0 23  Option 2 0 46  Option 2 0 37 
           
Option 1 24 0  Option 1 28 0  Option 1 109 0 
Option 2 0 23  Option 2 0 19  Option 2 0 75 
           
Option 1 21 0  Option 1 85 0  Option 1 58 0 
Option 2 0 46  Option 2 0 68  Option 2 0 68 
           
Option 1 44 0  Option 1 -26 0  Option 1 58 0 
Option 2 0 68  Option 2 0 75  Option 2 0 46 
           
Option 1 64 0  Option 1 46 0  Option 1 29 0 
Option 2 0 75  Option 2 0 37  Option 2 0 23 
           
Option 1 24 0  Option 1 17 0  Option 1 12 0 










Ipsative Motivation Probes 
 
Question set 1 – morality vs. benevolence 
 Please read each of the following pairs of statements.  For each pair, please 
pick the option which you agree with more strongly.  If you agree with both of the 
statements, please pick the one you feel more passionately about.   
 
1a.  I want to make a positive difference in other peoples’ lives 
1b.  I think it’s very important to fulfill my obligations 
1c.  Neither of the above 
 
2a.  Being kind is the most important thing in life 
2b.  I always try to do what’s right 
2c.  Neither of the above 
 
3a.  I want to be a more generous person 
3b.  I want to be a more moral person 
3c.  Neither of the above 
 
 
Question set 2 – benefitting strangers vs. loved ones 
 Please read each of the following pairs of statements.  For each pair, please 
pick the option which you agree with more strongly.  If you agree with both of the 
statements, please pick the one you feel more passionately about.   
 
1a.  I want to help someone less fortunate than myself 
1b.  I want to remind my family that I love them 
1c.  Neither of the above 
 
2a.  Everyone deserves help when they’re at their lowest ebb 
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2b.  It’s important to be there for the people who are there for you 
2c.  Neither of the above 
 
3a.  I think we should all work to make society fairer for people who get a raw deal 
3b.  I’m looking forward to the next time I get to hang out with my closest friend 
3c.  Neither of the above 
 
 
Question set 3 – building relationship vs. signaling benevolence 
 Please read each of the following pairs of statements.  For each pair, please 
pick the option which you agree with more strongly.  If you agree with both of the 
statements, please pick the one you feel more passionately about.   
 
1a.  If I was in [Sam or Adam’s / Oshin’s] position, I’d like to think I would have done 
the same thing they did 
1b.  If I met someone like [Sam or Adam / Oshin], I think we’d be really good friends 
1c.  Neither of the above 
 
2a. I’d like to get more involved in projects that help my local community 
2b.  I’d go out of my way to help someone who acted like [Sam or Adam/ Oshins] did 
2c.  Neither of the above 
 
3a.  Reading the story made me want to be a more caring person 
3b.  As I read the stories, I wished I could tell [Sam or Adam / Oshin] what [good 
people / a good person] I thought [they were / he was] 
3c.  Neither of the above 
	
